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Although the United States made considerable advances in improving sport venue 
security following 9/11, many sporting events remain vulnerable to attack. The perceived 
lack of threat to smaller venues, budget limitations and technical constraints are 
restricting the level of patron and vehicle screening at Special Event Assessment Rating 
(SEAR) 4–5 events. 
This thesis assesses the risk of attack by analyzing 21st century developments in 
explosive trace detection and closed-circuit television technologies, as well as trends 
surrounding the terrorist target value of SEAR 4–5 events. The research shows that these 
events have become viable, valuable terrorist targets because of increasing attendance 
and rapidly expanding exposure via cable television, satellite broadcasts, and the Internet. 
It identifies shortcomings of national protection doctrine and outlines potential cost-
effective policy options to better support SEAR 4–5 sporting event venue security.  
Establishing a national doctrine, organizational support and training standards, 
along with deploying select surveillance and detection technologies, will bring untold 
benefits to the national protection mission.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The disparity in security at U.S. special events has left some venues more vulnerable to 
attacks via armed gunmen, suicide bombers, and improvised explosive devices. This 
difference in security priority is defined by each event’s Special Event Assessment 
Rating (SEAR). SEAR 4–5 events, as softer targets than the SEAR 1–3 events, are less 
protected. 
Despite scholarly and professional efforts to devise ways to prevent terror attacks, 
terrorism will certainly remain an effective strategic practice globally for many years to 
come, if not forever.1 Furthermore, while communication technologies have brought the 
world closer, research reveals that 21st century globalization has benefitted those 
targeting the American Homeland.2 
One such example of how the Internet can be used to cultivate radicalization in 
America involved Inspire online magazine. The bombers who carried out the attack 
during the 2013 Boston Marathon used instructions contained in the magazine’s first 
issue to build and detonate their devices.3 Countless other communication outlets share 
information about vulnerabilities in public event venue security. Even the basic use of 
cell phones can greatly facilitate complex attack coordination.4 Considering these 
expansive communication factors, coupled with the ease of international travel 
1 John Mueller, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
4, no. 17 (2005): 491, doi: 10.1080/095465591009359; United Kingdom Home Office, The United 
Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism. Command Paper Number Cm 7547 (London: 
United Kingdom Home Office, March 24, 2009), 12, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=32602. 
2 Denise Lavoie and Tom Hays “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Boston Bombing Suspect, Was Influenced by 
Internet: Indictment,” Huffington Post, June 28, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/28/dzohkhar-tsarnaev-Internet-indictment_n_3515432.html. 
3 Bill McMahon in an interview with Edward Norris and Steve Davis on the “Norris and Davis Show,” 
CBS, WJZ-FM, January 27, 2014, citing online instructions on how to use rudimentary explosives made 
from household goods like those that were found in the backpack of the lone attacker in the Columbia, MD, 
mall shooting on January 2014.  
4 Onook Oh, Agrawal Manish, and H. Raghav Rao, “Information Control and Terrorism: Tracking the 
Mumbai Terrorist Attack through Twitter,” Information Systems Frontiers 14, no. 1 (March 2011): 
33–43. 
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facilitating global integration, the United States can no longer rely on geographic 
isolation for security.  
Even though astute, aggressive national counterterrorism (CT) strategy may 
prevent attacks in the homeland by foiling some plots in their earlier stages of 
development, there will remain unforeseen threats that will suddenly emerge to. 
Terrorists may arise from a wide variety of sources and not just from foreign, well-
funded sub-nation state organizations.5 Radicalized terrorists in the homeland present an 
extremely difficult threat to defend against because these attackers may be less 
susceptible to discovery by national intelligence and terrorist tracking sources.6  
Therefore, the last line of CT security will always need to be on-site at the intended 
“ground-zero” target location of an event.7  
As a result, the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) must remain agile to quickly 
adapt to evolving terrorist strategies and choices of target and be vigilant in its campaign 
to seek improvement and transition over time to provide protection from terrorist attacks 
in the homeland.8 
This thesis analyzes the current threat to sporting events and the status of venue 
security to assess and identify potential needs for cost-effective public policy evolutions 
to better protect SEAR 4–5 events from terrorist attacks.9   
The analysis was structured to answer three primary research questions:    
• How well is the current National Protection Mission policy framework 
(the status quo) providing counterterrorism protection at sporting events in 
5 Bruce Hoffman, “Defending America against Suicide Terrorism,” in Three Years After: Next Steps in 
the War on Terror, edited by David Aaron, 21–24 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 9. 
6 Billy Kenber, “Nidal Hasan Convicted of Ft. Hood Killings,” Washington Post, August, 23, 2013; 
Lavoie and Hays, “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.” 
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A 
Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: DHS, February 2010), 1; U.S. National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 2011 Report on Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: DHS, March 2012), 
13. 
8 Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States: Hearing 
before the Committee on Homeland Security, 112th Cong., 1st sess., (2011). 
9 The term “cost-effective” will be used to express the concept to field surveillance/detection 
technologies or new doctrinal practices to at little cost, or innovatively funded to meet larger cost courses 
of action.   
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light of a) increasing publicity and exposure through global media 
coverage at SEAR 4–5 events, and b) more rigorous protection at SEAR 
1–3 event?  
• Are there quantitative or qualitative methods to demonstrate a positive 
cost-benefit relationship between potential solutions versus consequential 
alternatives? 
• If evolution in security for SEAR 4–5 events is needed, what cost-
effective public policy solutions can be synthesized into a better 
Counterterrorism protection paradigm? 
The Department of Homeland Security Risk Management Framework provided in 
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) establishes the steps to combine 
consequence, vulnerability, and threat information to generate an assessment of national or 
sector risk. The national objective is to weigh infrastructure security priorities, goals, and 
requirements to allocate security resources effectively in order to reduce vulnerability, deter 
threats, and minimize the consequences of attacks.10  With the NIPP model as the larger 
framework, the concepts used to construct the analytical framework in this thesis were 
derived from a thorough review of the literature on terrorist psychology, security 
technology, comparative security, and cost-benefit analysis formula and theory.   
The first question is answered with analysis in four parts: data trends in terrorism 
attacks; the effects of increased security at SEAR 1–3 events; the effects of no requisite 
or licensing-based security metric; and the rapid, 21st century evolution of global sports 
broadcasting in real-time. Quantitative data such as patron attendance, media exposure to 
sporting events, and SEAR 4–5 events data were examined. Qualitative comparison was 
employed and examined doctrinal gaps and potential vulnerabilities that were revealed in 
the baseline literature review and public policies. The qualitative review also analyzed 
the gaps in the current HSE organizational structure, especially using comparative 
analysis of the experience of other nations. Adding to this, data reflect that the mega-
events are spending immense amounts of money and committing vast numbers of 
security personnel to pose a much more difficult challenge for terrorists to penetrate than 
10Georgios Giannopoulos, Roberto Filippini, and Muriel Schimmer, Risk Assessment Methodologies 
for Critical Infrastructure Protection: Part I, A State of the Art (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2012), 34–35. 
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ever before. Meanwhile, similar or greater casualty rates are attainable at the soft target 
venues. Coupled with the tremendously rapid increase of national and global coverage of 
SEAR 4–5 events in real-time (such as NFL, MLB, MiLB or NCAA athletic events), 
from the terrorists’ perspective, the phenomenon of displacement is worthy of grave 
consideration, transforming these SEAR 4–5 venues into attractive targets.   
The purpose of the second research question is to examine an objective means of 
weighing a cost-benefit analysis in order to determine grounds for the affordability of 
public policy action and respond to opposition of new forms of HSE expenditure. Using 
the cost-benefit analysis formula established in Terror, Security, and Money, the thesis 
has demonstrated that there are quantifiable methods to adjudicate and deem select 
expenditures as worthy and pragmatic.11  
The scenario used was a successfully orchestrated, simultaneous, geographically 
dispersed multiple IED attack at four respective venues. The full range of costs to American 
society resulting from a catastrophic terrorist attack at a SEAR 4–5 sports venue is 
summarized in Table 1:  
One-time Damages Subsequent Annual Damages 
Value of Lives (Quantified by Mueller) Subsequent Enhancements Instituted 
Liability for Injuries Ticket Sales 
Facility Property Damage Club Revenues Future Losses 
Corollary Property (Adjacent Buildings) Marketing Ad Losses 
Response, Rescue, & Clean Up Area Economic Disruption Activity 
Reconstruction Businesses Bankrupt As Result 
 
Table 1. Successful Attack Cost Factors12 
11 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and 
Costs of Homeland Security (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
12 Ibid; Claude Journès, “Policing and Security: Terrorists and Hooligans,” Sport in Society 1, no. 2 
(1998): 145–60. 
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However, for the purposes of the cost-benefit demonstration, basing the success 
of such an attack on the quantified value of lives lost, alone, demonstrated that there is a 
reasonable break-even point at which federal public policy action should be taken. 
Considering the massive costs of all the factors together only further substantiates the 
benefit of select cost-effective public policy actions. 
In answering the third research question, it was revealed that the sports 
entertainment industry may be one of the few business sectors in America that public 
policy action can be teamed with the private sector as well as with resource input from 
the patrons to share in the costs of providing solutions. There are current models of 
government-private sector cooperation that also include the customer-citizens to establish 
forms of “voluntary taxes,” or funding for government coordinated projects. For example, 
the U.K. has set up the Football Foundation, and within the U.S., the TSA serves as such 
a model.   
Upon thorough analysis, the findings produce new considerations regarding the 
feasibility of direct government involvement, the indirect provision of government 
incentives, or as an alternative, the possible existence of other low-cost, advantageous 
courses of action for SEAR 4–5 sporting events. As a result, ideas both innovative and 
revisited are presented for HSE consideration and potential working group research and 
development.  
The overarching conclusion of this thesis is the necessity for the federal 
government and private sector to build an exceptionally robust public-private 
collaboration to more successfully protect SEAR 4 and 5 sports venues from potential 
terrorist attacks. The following recommendations provide a viable range of options, 
which when implemented in full, will affect this partnership and strengthen existing 
security measures at these less nationally prominent yet vulnerable venues. 
The recommendations of this thesis are listed in order of escalating cost and 
associated with increasing legislative and/or public resistance. The final recommendation, 
however, is in preparation for the future and involves no current fiscal expense. Provided 
 xxi 
here is a summary list of the recommendations with the lead agency/entity denoted; each 
recommendation is subsequently explained in greater detail: 
1. Finalize and publish the National Protection Framework with a specified 
annex for sporting event venue security (DHS) 
2. Establish a streamlined office within HSE for inspection and compliance 
adherence (DHS) 
3. Replicate U.K.’s organizational structure placing a federal Subject Matter 
Expert with state/local level personnel to synchronize security at the local 
level with the national level to improve operational harmonization (DHS) 
4. Allocate 2.2% of the FEMA Grant budget annually for a five year plan 
dedicated to reduce security vulnerabilities at SEAR 4–5 venues 
nationwide (DHS) 
5. Assess a statutory security fee on sporting event ticket purchases to fund 
enhanced SEAR 4–5 venue security, while acting to obtain patron 
stakeholder partnership with the government  (DHS and Congress) 
6. Create a charitable foundation to serve as a funding source dedicated to 
stadium infrastructure renovations to facilitate improved security for 
SEAR 4–5 events (private sector)   
7. Rapidly prepare for future use of CCTV facial recognition technology by 
addressing operational and legal concerns immediately (DHS) 
In order to render these recommendations a reality, several steps are necessary in the 
near term and long term future.   
The first step is for DHS to form a Working Group across department and agency 
borders. It is essential to remove the idea of such creative solutions from the abyss of the 
federal stove-pipe syndrome, where ideas are thought of and conceived simultaneously 
but without coordination (i.e., repeating the same efforts and wasting time and resources 
in so doing). 
This Working Group (WG) should examine the nuances of the issues raised and 
further research the shaping of the thesis recommendations. The WG will also bear the 
responsibility and authority to form a collective judgment not only regarding doctrinal 
revisions and additions, but for deriving new HSE organizational structures and working 
relationships, assessing technological capabilities, and laying the groundwork for the 
innovative funding streams recommended. These actions would tremendously serve the 
 xxii 
people by evaluating and planning for the future development of where, when, and how 
to stop terrorist attacks in America.   
The WG must be expansive enough to be insightful but not bloated to the point of 
inaction or inability to move at anything more than glacial speed. Preparations are needed 
now for technology innovations on the cusp of becoming reality in the market. More 
importantly, as facility managers already perceive, it is just a matter of time before 
attacks occur at SEAR 4–5 venues. The WG must move forward with purpose. Therefore, 
representation on the WG will be needed from: 
• Professional sports league Security Directors from MLB, NFL, NBA, 
NHL, and MLS; 
• Three select NCAA Security Directors, such as one each from the 
Southeastern Conference, the Big 10, and the Pac 12; 
• The state/local law enforcement community, such as the Association of 
Chiefs of Police, several major metropolitan Police Chiefs such as from 
New York, Boston, and Dallas, as well as  a few select State Police 
Chiefs; 
• Federal law enforcement SMEs from the FBI and JTTF; 
• Intelligence Community representation, i.e., one or two SMEs from any of 
ODNI, NSA, CIA, DHS-OI and/or NPPD;  
• The Academic community, with a representative from the two leading 
centers for sports venue security study at the University of South Carolina 
and Southern Mississippi University 
A WG of these 18–20 representatives with DHS HQ synchronization will serve as 
an excellent resource base of Subject Matter Expertise and be reflective of an industry-
wide partnership with the HSE. 
Though the thesis recommendations may incur some modicum of cost for the 
most ambitious applications, the WG can fully analyze the investment for long-term 
security. 
Because even state and local agencies in the U.S. are facing austere fiscal 
climates, the burden of the training for local law enforcement and private sector security 
teams can be shared with the federal government. The WG can advocate congressional 
action to grant private sector incentives, statutory fees, and FEMA funding for training 
 xxiii 
venue security team employees how to use world class technology and to conduct 
training to standard in the roles as emergency first responders, as is done in the U.K. 
Such funding for training can be used by DHS for conferences and forums that continue 
to push constantly developing technology and collaboration in the security industry. With 
such equipment and SOC precision planning possible, the security workforce executing 
the operations plans must receive comparable quality training.    
The WG will also serve as the initial collaborative planning body for the 
operational partnership between federal and state/local levels. It will establish the roles 
and responsibilities for the federal embedded personnel and make determinations as to 
where these people will work daily, such as at fusion centers or in police departments. 
The WG can also complete detailed reviews of other functional and logistically practical 
aspects of implementation.    
So it is imperative that DHS establish the Working Group to explore the 
possibilities recommended in this thesis, to ensure the HSE is making its fullest effort to 
accomplish its Homeland Security protection mission.  
Just because a well-orchestrated, multiple coordinated IED attack has not yet 
reigned catastrophe at America’s smaller sports venues, does not mean that the United 
States government should not take prudent, sage steps forward to prepare a defense for 
that imminent terrorist strategy. The NCTC considers this a worst case scenario, and so 
too should DHS.   
If the Department of Homeland Security is to win not only in the close-in, current 
battle against terrorism, but also in the deep, future battle against terrorism as well, then it 
must take time to recognize the status-quo of its protection mission posture as insufficient 
to meet the threat of an ever-increasingly more sophisticated enemy. Such status-quo 
recognition will illuminate where increased protection is needed today and paths forward 
tomorrow. DHS should proactively pursue and act on the recommendations provided in 
this thesis by establishing a professional Working Group to improve on the HSE 
protection mission of sports venues today and move aggressively into the future, before 
the enemy does. 
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• To Edmund Burke, President Ronald Reagan, Dr. W. Ross Yates, and Dr. 
Barbara Tuchman: Thank you for your roles in history, illuminating my 
academic life, and for furthering the cause of mankind’s philosophical 
thought and wisdom. 
• To Jose S. Chaves, Transportation Security Administration; David 
Warner, London Metropolitan Police; Jim Ammons, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; Don McKinnon, Department of Homeland Security; 
Lawrence Rabalais, Louisiana State University; Don Paisant, New Orleans 
Superdome; Dr. Tom Regan, University of South Carolina; Dr. Geoff 
Alpert, University of South Carolina; and Dr. Kathleen Kiernan, Naval 
Postgraduate School: Thank you all for your priceless firsthand insights 
and tremendous contributions to my research. 
• To Keith Malley and Sam Mumley, Transportation Security 
Administration:  Thank you for your time, endless encouragement, and 
invaluable support opening this door of opportunity for me. 
• To my father and mother, Harry and Betty Gehring, and to Gregory 
Gehring, Mark and Elisabeth Fordney: Thank you for giving me 
encouragement, a work ethic, and common sense to think outside the box.  
• To my departed mother, Betty: I am especially thankful. You were the 
rock and foundation of courage, wisdom, and intellectual curiosity in all of 
our lives. You showed me that intelligence and wisdom does not come 
from a classroom, and that love of academic pursuit comes from the heart.  
• Praise be to God, the Most Merciful: I thank Him for boundless 
benevolence, divine wisdom, and endless mercy; and to God incarnate, the 
Messiah, a real man named Jesus of Nazareth. 
All of them have led me to see what I have seen, to think what I think, and to say 




A man full of warm, speculative benevolence may wish his society 
otherwise constituted than he finds it, but a good patriot and a true 
politician always considers how he shall make the most of the existing 
materials of his country. A disposition to preserve and an ability to 
improve, taken together, would be my standard of a statesman. 
—Edmund Burke,  
Reflections on the Revolution in France 
 
With American sporting events numbering into the tens of thousands annually at 
more than 1,350 sports arenas and stadiums in the U.S., viable, valuable, and vulnerable 
terror targets abound on a daily basis.1 The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) asserts 
that improvised explosive device (IED) attacks yield the highest casualties of any form of 
terror attack, and multiple coordinated IED attacks are of paramount concern for operations 
planning.2  This kind of attack was carried out during the 2013 Boston Marathon, and the 
bombers used instructions contained in the first issue of the online magazine Inspire to build 
and detonate their devices. The guide was called “Make a bomb in the kitchen of your 
mom.”3 Inspire is produced by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has been linked 
to terrorist cases, and contains exhortations to carry out “lone wolf”‘ terrorist attacks by 
radicalized homegrown groups and individuals. Al Qaeda-linked websites are believed to 
have more than 100,000 registered members worldwide.4  Homeland Security Enterprise 
(HSE) practitioners, planners, and senior leaders, all striving to protect the public, need to 
expediently address the 21st century’s rapidly changing factors exacerbating the vulnerability 
of America’s public sporting event venues.   
1 “Intercollegiate Athletics Summit.” National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security 
(NCS4). January 2014. https://www.ncs4.com/summit/overview. 
2 U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 2011 NCTC Report on Counterterrorism 
(Washington, DC: NCTC, March 2012), 9.  
3  Stephen Wright, “Were They Inspired by Al Qaeda Magazine? Authorities Investigating Whether 
Terrorists Were Spurred Into Action by Publication Which Urges ‘Lone Wolf’ Attacks.” MailOnline, May 
22, 2013. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/. 
4 Ibid. 
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The vast majority of the scope and plethora of these terrorism targets are outside 
of the fortified confines of the most high profile, widely publicized events such as the 
Super Bowl or the Olympics. These sports mega-events have been historically perceived 
as primed for terrorists to send a worldwide message by executing an attack during the 
broadcast, potentially reaching tens of millions of viewers simultaneously across the 
globe. However, these mega-events are routinely designated by the American Homeland 
Security Enterprise (HSE) as either National Security Special Events (NSSE) or as 
special events (SE). 
Of these HSE designations, the NSSEs and the highest rated of the SEs bring 
greatly enhanced security from sizable federal resources rendering them virtual fortresses 
to withstand any terrorist plot to strike them. Therefore, security for these events is not 
the subject of this thesis but will be reviewed and analyzed to establish a contextual 
framework of the status quo security provided to lower rated SEs. This framework will 
also shed light on the challenges faced by the security community whose mission it is to 
protect the lower-rated SEs. Essentially, the subject of the thesis is that as the NSSEs and 
highest-rated SEs have become more secure, the lower priority SEs have become more 
vulnerable.   
Though historically regarded as less worthy to terrorists, these lower-rated SEs 
are the targets that are widely acknowledged as easier to strike, constituting them as “soft 
targets.”  If struck with lethality and simultaneous multiplicity, in the manner of a 
strategically audacious but foreseeable attack like 9/11,5 then a terrorist cause will draw 
great attention to its policy goals and to the vulnerability in the everyday life of our 
society here in the U.S., instilling fear in Main Street, USA. 
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
There will be terrorists in the homeland, either from abroad, lone wolf, or 
homegrown radicals; there is a disparity in the amount of security support provided 
between Special Event Assessment Rated (SEAR) 1–3 (higher priority) events and SEAR 
5 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), The 9/11 
Commission Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 22, 2004). 
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4–5 events; and the SEAR 4–5 events being softer targets than the SEAR 1–3 events are 
more vulnerable to attack from armed gunmen, suicide bombers, and various IED attacks.  
Despite scholarly and professional efforts to understand the motives of terrorists 
in order to devise ways to prevent terror attacks, terrorism will certainly remain an 
effective strategic practice globally for many years, if not forever.6 With communication 
technologies advancing to bring the world closer, research reveals that 21st century 
globalization has benefitted those targeting the American Homeland.7  Inspire magazine 
is one such example of how the Internet can be used to cultivate radicalization in 
America. In addition to online instructions on producing and using bombs, there are 
countless other forums to seek out and share information about vulnerabilities in public 
event venue security.8  Furthermore, even the basic use of cell phones can greatly 
facilitate complex attack coordination.9  Considering these expansive communications 
factors, coupled with the ease of international travel facilitating global integration, the 
United States can no longer rely on geographic isolation for security.  
Even though astute, aggressive national counterterrorism (CT) strategy may 
prevent attacks in the homeland by foiling some plots in their earlier stages of 
development, there will remain unforeseen threats that will suddenly emerge. Terrorists 
may arise from a variety of sources and not just from foreign, well-funded sub-nation 
state organizations.10  Radicalized terrorists in the homeland present an extremely 
difficult threat to defend because these attackers may be less susceptible to discovery by 
6 John Mueller, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
4, no. 17 (2005): 487–505. doi: 10.1080/095465591009359. 
7 Denise Lavoie and Tom Hays “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Boston Bombing Suspect, Was Influenced by 
Internet: Indictment,” Huffington Post, June 28, 2013, 
.8 Bill McMahon in an interview with Edward Norris and Steve Davis on the “Norris and Davis 
Show,” CBS, WJZ-FM, January 27, 2014, citing online instructions on how to use rudimentary explosives 
made from household goods like those that were found in the backpack of the lone attacker in the 
Columbia, MD, mall shooting on January 25, 2014. 
9 Onook Oh, Agrawal Manish, and H. Raghav Rao, “Information Control and Terrorism: Tracking the 
Mumbai Terrorist Attack through Twitter,” Information Systems Frontiers 14, no. 1 (March 2011): 
33–43. 
10 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 9. 
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national intelligence and terrorist tracking sources.11  Therefore, the last line of CT 
security will always need to be on-site at the intended “ground-zero” target location of an 
event.12  
As a result, the HSE must remain agile to quickly adapt to evolving terrorist 
strategies and choices of target. It must be vigilant in its campaign to seek improvement 
and transition over time to provide protection from terrorist attacks in the homeland.13   
This thesis analyzes the current threat to sporting events and the status of venue 
security to assess and identify potential needs for cost-effective public policies to better 
protect SEAR 4–5 events from terrorist attacks.14   
B. BACKGROUND AND NEED 
For background, it is requisite to specify that the NSSE designation merits the most 
amount of federal support, which includes federal funding, equipment, and personnel 
from various agencies in the HSE. Routinely, there are only a handful of these NSSEs 
declared annually. If a SE does not merit the NSSE rating, it is rated from 1 to 5 in 
descending order of security risk and therefore, priority for attention and support. These 
SE security ratings are designated as Special Event Assessment Ratings (SEAR). 
The SEs that are designated with the highest three tiers of status, SEAR 1–3, also 
receive federally  provided equipment and personnel in varying degrees, but unlike the 
NSSEs, they receive no direct federal funding. For example, the NFL Super Bowl is a 
SEAR 1 event and receives voluminous equipment and personnel from across multiple 
federal agencies for support. SEAR 2–3 events, such as the Boston Marathon and the 
Coca-Cola 600, respectively, also receive federal support, but on reducing scales. 
11 Billy Kenber, “Nidal Hasan Convicted of Ft. Hood Killings,” Washington Post, August, 23, 2013; 
Lavoie and Hays, “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.” 
12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A 
Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: DHS, February 2010), 1; NCTC, 2011 
NCTC Report on Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: NCTC, March 2012), 13. 
13 Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States: Hearing 
before the Committee on Homeland Security, 112th Cong., 1st sess., (2011). 
14 The term “cost-effective” will be used to express the concept to field surveillance/detection 
technologies or new doctrinal organization and practices at little cost, or innovatively funded to meet larger 
cost courses of action.   
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However, there exist many more SEAR 4 and 5 sporting events than SEAR 1–3 events. 
These SEAR 4 and 5 events are considered to have limited national importance or may be 
of some national recognition with only local or state importance.15  Major League 
Baseball regular season games and select NCAA Division I football games are 
considered SEAR 4 events. Accordingly, Minor League Baseball games and most NCAA 
Division I football and basketball games will constitute SEAR 5 ratings.16    
Level 1 • Significant national and/or international 
importance 
• May require extensive federal interagency support 
• NFL Super Bowl 
• United Nations General Assembly 
Level 2 • Significant events with national and/or 
international importance 
• May require some national-level support 
• Boston Marathon 
• DC Fourth of July 
• NY New Year’s Eve 
• Kentucky Derby 
Level 3 • Events of national and/or international importance 
• Require only limited federal support 
• Coca-Cola 600 
• Rolling Thunder 
• Oklahoma State Fair 
Level 4 • Limited national importance 
• Handled at the state and local level 
• Major League Baseball Games  
• NCAA Division I Football Games  
(e.g., Big 10 Football 
Championship) 
Level 5 • Events that may be nationally recognized but 
generally have local or state importance 
• Minor League Baseball Games 
• NCAA Division I Football and 
Basketball Games 
Table 1.   Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) Categories17 
The need for perpetually reviewing venue security and weighing improvements 
emanates from the sports entertainment industry, which, as one of the largest industries in 
America, captures close to two-thirds of the world’s $700 billion annual sport industry 
revenues.18  Yet the sporting event industry is not only a significant part of the American 
economy but is also a prominent fixture in the American social fabric. Because sporting 
events warrant a tremendous level of advertising, strong links of support from alcohol 
producers, and flashy displays by female cheerleaders, an attack on such a venue can 
support a vehement cultural judgment assailing American societal values. These venues, 
15 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Office of Operations Coordination and Planning 
(OPS), Special Events Program (SEP) and Special Events Working Group (SEWG): Program Overview 
and Federal Coordination Team Briefing (Washington, DC: DHS, January 2014). 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Patrice Zygband and Hervé Collignon, “The Sports Market,” A.T. Kearney, May 2011. 
http://www.atkearney.com/paper/-/asset_publisher/dVxv4Hz2h8bS/content/the-sports-market/10192. 
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therefore, serve as ideological targets as well as economic targets at which to inflict 
injury, death, and destruction. An attack against these SEAR 4–5 events will readily 
make a strong cultural statement to Americans.  
Furthermore, sporting events permit millions and millions of Americans to retreat 
from the anxiety of their day-to-day challenges in life to a protected haven of emotional 
outlet. Like other forms of public entertainment, sporting events possess a cornerstone of 
trust and safety with the American public.19  A successful attack on such a haven can 
send a strong strategic message to the American public that the terrorists will not rest, and 
they will reach Americans in their trusted sanctuaries. Such a strike can signal that 
terrorist organizations are more pervasive and more powerful in the homeland than 
previously considered. These messages are extremely persuasive to demonstrate to the 
American people that the terrorist cause is not worth contesting at the national strategic or 
diplomatic level.20  
Meanwhile, there is no consistent national standard for all five SEAR ratings 
regarding technologies employed, doctrinal practices, and training, and the state of the 
public-private stakeholder collaborative enterprise management.21  This is a key shortfall 
that is reminiscent of the pre-9/11 aviation transportation industry, and is therefore an 
urgent issue which this thesis will address. 
Following the successful terrorist attacks in 2001, the 9/11 Commission assessed 
that the multiple security contract companies and each respective airline’s security 
capabilities “failed utterly” to prevent the 19 terrorists from on-boarding aircraft with 
very basic lethal weapons.22  The attackers “defeated all of the security layers that 
America’s civil aviation security system had in place.”23  The commission found the 
19 Kristine Toohey, “Terrorism, Sport and Public Policy in the Risk Society,” Sport in Society 11, no. 
4 (2008): 429–42. doi: 10.1080/17430430802019367. 
20 Toohey, “Terrorism,” 433. 
21  Stacey Hall, Lou Marciani, Walter Cooper, and Robert Rolen, “Securing Collegiate Sport Stadiums 
in the 21st Century: Think Security, Enhance Safety,” Homeland Security Institute, Journal of Homeland 
Security (August 2007). https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=30643.  
22 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, 4. 
23 Ibid., 4.   
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different standards of security conducted by the varying contract companies associated 
with their respective airlines as a significant cause of the security failure.24  This thesis 
will analyze how America’s sporting venue security eerily possesses some of the same 
inconsistent qualities as that of pre-9/11 aviation transportation with no set national 
doctrine or standards for equipment deployment, personnel training, or operational 
management.   
In the immediate aftermath of the September 2001 attacks, there arose many 
organizationally driven security precautions at sporting events nationwide. However, 
within six months, these heightened security measures were increasingly seen as 
problematic to venue and event managers.25  In the ensuing years, facility managers, 
professional team ownership groups, and college administrations worked to provide 
security at public events, but with this success, came a sense of complacency.26  By 2011, 
only one third of the 1,350 sports arenas and stadiums in the U.S. were providing 
heightened security measures compared to those that were in place in the 1990s.27   
Notwithstanding the attention to the pre-emptive activity to interdict plots as far 
from the target site as possible, there still exists the possibility that terrorists will emerge 
at venues with little or no advance notice to the event security teams on location.28  These 
enemies may be members of well-organized terror cells, radicalized homegrown 
extremists, or “lone wolf” attackers.     
Therefore, this thesis will focus on the threat of suicide bombers, attackers using 
IEDs, and armed gunmen targeting any of America’s SEAR 4–5 rated public sporting 
venues. The thesis will consider the terrorist that has defeated or otherwise bypassed the 
many layers of the HSE attempting to detect and interdict them before arriving at the 
24 Ibid., 3. 
25 Ronald E. Hurst, Catherine Pratsinakis, and Paul H. Zoubek, “American Sports As a Target of 
Terrorism: The Duty of Care after September 11th,” Martindale.com, May 1, 2003, 
http://www.martindale.com/legal-library/Article_Abstract.aspx?an=entertainment-sports&id=2342. 
26 Hurst, Pratsinakis, and Zoubek, “American Sports.” 
27 Peter Keating, “Industry of Fear,” ESPN The Magazine, September 11, 2011, 
http://espn.go.com/espn/story/_/id/6936819/stadiums-increase-budgets-heighten-security-measures-protect-
fans-espn-magazine. 
28 For example, the Tsarnaev brothers’ successful bombing of the 2013 Boston Marathon. 
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sporting event venue. The primary concern of the thesis is the last line of 
counterterrorism defense, at the venue. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This thesis will establish three primary research questions:  
• How well is the current National Protection Mission policy framework 
(the status quo) providing counterterrorism protection at sporting events in 
light of a) increasing publicity and exposure through global media 
coverage at SEAR 4–5 events, and b) more rigorous protection at SEAR 
1–3 event?  
• Are there quantitative or qualitative methods to demonstrate a positive 
cost-benefit relationship between potential solutions versus consequential 
alternatives? 
• If evolution in security for SEAR 4–5 events is needed, what cost-
effective public policy solutions can be synthesized into a better 
counterterrorism protection paradigm? 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH TO THE HOMELAND SECURITY 
ENTERPRISE 
This research aims to assess the potential for terrorist attacks at single or multiple 
coordinated SEAR 4–5-rated sporting events, and if necessary or possible, what may be 
cost-effective possibilities for public policy consideration. There has been literature 
published and various sports organizational efforts to move at the local level to increase 
threat awareness, recognition of venue security vulnerability, and improved collaboration 
for user-level best practices.29  However, these efforts have been largely independent of 
each other with little centralized visibility, synchronization, or support. Additionally, 
there has been modest noteworthy research at the strategic level to determine possible 
next steps for a federal role to support the solidification of the nation’s CT homeland 
defense at SEAR 4–5 sporting events nationwide.  
29 Gary Joseph Lhotsky, “An Analysis of Risk Management at NCAA Division I-A Football 
Stadiums,” Paper 3082 (PhD diss., Florida State University, 2005). 
http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3016&context=etd  
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This thesis will be especially of interest to stakeholders involved in the venue 
security paradigm. In particular, the framework provided may assist in shaping policy for 
three main constituencies: 
• Those in the respective sporting industries—such as the professional 
sporting leagues (e.g., the NFL, MLB, Minor League Baseball [MiLB]; 
the collegiate sporting organizations at the national and regional levels, 
including the NCAA, the Southeastern Conference, the Big 10). 
• American government policy makers—such as at the federal level (e.g., 
Congress, the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, 
Intelligence Community agencies); at the state and local (SL) level( e.g., 
legislatures and mayor’s offices, state and metropolitan police, state rapid 
and mass transit authorities, state offices of business development and 
tourism).  
• Other interested groups—such as the state chambers of commerce; private 
sector security companies and stakeholders in providing rapid and mass 
transit; resident groups located in immediate proximity to stadiums; and 
the research and development (R&D) community involved with the 
public-private security collaboration.  
This is not an exhaustive list of parties who might be interested in the contents of 
this thesis but provides an overview of the myriad of stakeholders who may benefit from 
an analysis of SEAR 4–5 event venue security. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II: Literature Review 
The goal of this chapter is to identify what is known regarding current special 
event sporting venue security and what aspects or issues are not sufficiently addressed or 
researched to date. The review is organized into six sections, each of which will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter II: 
• Sporting event security threats 
• Current doctrinal organization 
• U.K. and E.U. approaches to sporting event security   
• Technology in sporting venue security  
• Legal review 
• Cost benefit considerations 
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Reviewing the literature will yield a baseline understanding for an assessment of 
sporting event venue security and establish the framework for the analysis of the thesis. 
Any gaps identified in the overall picture of event venue security will then be researched 
using quantitative and/or qualitative methods for analysis in Chapter III.   
Chapter III: Analysis and Findings  
The intent of this chapter is to respond to the three research questions. Based on 
Chapter II’s revelation of doctrinal weaknesses and possible organizational and 
technology employment strengths, this chapter will then examine the collection of data 
and information for quantitative and/or qualitative analysis. Chapter III will examine 
developing national and global trends in terrorism, sporting event exposure, and mega-
event security. The trends will be analyzed with literature and data to weigh the concept 
of a growing viable threat of attack, or multiple coordinated attacks, against SEAR 4–5 
rated sporting events. The second goal is to identify whether a cost-benefit relationship 
can be established to merit enhanced protective equipment or doctrinal measures that 
incur modest expense at SEAR 4–5 events. The final goal is to identify and introduce 
potential public policy roles, both those that bear little or no cost, and those that may bear 
significant government expense. However, the findings of the chapter will yield 
innovative funding streams to minimize the government expense to field long-term 
solutions. 
Chapter IV: Summary 
This chapter will revisit this thesis’ problem statement and research questions to 
encapsulate how the research served to answer the questions. Conclusions drawn from 
Chapter III will be presented as recommendations toward innovative future security 
models. To move forward, a working group structure and purpose will be outlined. Thus, 
the end-state of this thesis will produce risk-reducing, cost-effective recommendations. 
These recommendations will serve the HSE by improving SEAR 4–5 event venue 
security in order to thwart another foreseeable catastrophic terrorist attack. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Political actors throughout history  ... [have been] regularly trying to win 
over the masses and gain popular support by taking advantage of mass 
movements and profit from mass gatherings. 
—Nobel Prize-winning novelist Elias Canetti 
A. SPORTING EVENT SECURITY THREATS 
In this chapter, the literature will be reviewed to facilitate better understanding of the 
nature and extent of the terrorist threat issues facing sporting event security teams.   
One widely acknowledged definition of terrorism established by the United Nations 
articulates that targets are selected to maximize negative psychological effects on 
societies or governments.30  To achieve this, and because of the nature of the power 
imbalance between terrorists and their sovereign government enemies, unorthodox or 
unanticipated selections of targets and delivery methods support the purpose to achieve 
utmost impact with the minimum resources available.31  There is sufficient baseline 
literature to establish that terrorism is a successful strategy and is not likely to disappear 
from the tactical options available to outmanned, outgunned terrorist groups anytime 
soon.32   
There is little question that the various terror cells around the world retain members 
that are fervently committed.33  Because of the depth of devotion to their cause, members 
of groups and radicalized individuals can readily adapt to counterterrorism strategies 
30 Toohey, “Terrorism,” 433. 
31 Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They 
Come to Destroy (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2006), 5–6, 2006, citing, “Al Qaeda-inspired terrorist attacks 
have been designed to achieve maximum impact using minimum resources—the biggest ‘bang for the 
buck.’ “ 
32 Kathryn Fisher, “From 20th Century Troubles to 21st Century International Terrorism: Identity, 
Securitization, and British Counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011,” (Ph.D dissertation, The London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 2012). 
33 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point, 4; David W. Brannan, and N.T. Anders Strindberg, 
Critical Analysis of Terrorism and Terrorist Groups: A Handbook for Practitioners (unpublished 
manuscript) 2013, 30. 
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meant to defeat them. The result is that terrorists will continually seek innovation in their 
technologies, delivery means, and targets.34   
The literature reflects that often, if not routinely, terrorists are not madmen 
deranged by evil, but rather they are driven individuals reverting to rational, problem-
solving strategies (in their view) to serve and promote their cause.35   
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency found that professional subject matter 
experts in the intelligence community agreed that “terrorist [attack] innovation is usually 
motivated by problem solving intended to overcome constraints in the security 
environment, or limitations in the political one.”36 Furthermore, terrorists seek “new 
technologies, targets, or opportunities in order to circumvent security measures, revitalize 
support for their cause, pursue a new strategy to remedy failed ones, or simply to escalate 
a conflict because lower levels of violence are assessed to be ineffective.”37  These 
adaptations are classified as strategic, tactical, or organizational innovations in 
terrorism.38 
To clarify between the first two of these adaptations, strategic innovation involves 
the development of new objectives for the terrorist organization.39  It encompasses 
significant shifts in how groups frame their goals, and thus may require new forms of 
violence, target sets, or audiences to influence.40  An example of strategic innovation was 
Al-Qaeda’s shift from aiding insurgencies against “near enemies” (secular regimes in the 
Muslim world) to attacking the “far enemy” (Western countries).41  Author Martha 
34 Mohammed Hafez and Maria Rasmussen, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, Phase 
II. PASCC Report Number 2012 003 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Center on Contemporary 
Conflict, January 2012), 4–5  
35 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point, 5. 
36 Hafez and Rasmussen,  Terrorist Innovations in Weapons, 4–5, citing Martha Crenshaw, 
“Innovation: Decision Points in the Trajectory of Terrorism,” paper presented at the conference 
Trajectories of Terrorist Violence in Europe, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 9–11, 
2001. 
37 Ibid., 4–5 
38 Ibid., 39 
39 Ibid., 4–5 
40 Ibid., 39 
41 Ibid. 
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Crenshaw lists several other cases of strategic innovation: the Irgun’s campaign against 
British authorities in Mandate Palestine in the 1940s; airline hijackings in the 1960s; 
Hezbollah’s campaign of suicide bombings in the 1980s; and Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin 
attack in 1995.42   
On the other hand, tactical innovation involves significant shifts in technologies 
and techniques of terrorism without a concomitant change in objectives.43  Consequently, 
Crenshaw avers that changes in weapons or targets occur more frequently in the life of 
terrorist organizations than does a fundamental strategic shift.44  Among the examples 
she offers are the murder of Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, which was the first time an 
international mediator was murdered, and the IRA’s switch from attacking Ireland to 
attacking the British mainland.   
The final form of innovation, organizational, is worth noting because of its 
application to global communications of the 21st century. Organizational innovation 
contains new ways of structuring the terrorist group or inventive methods to reach new 
recruits.45  As cited in Chapter I, Inspire magazine has proven to be one such source used 
to cultivate and train homegrown radicals in America.   
These three types of innovations are catalysts for the need for DHS to plan for the 
eventuality of the employment of new forms of attack by terrorists. The fact that certain 
targets have not yet been attacked does not preclude these targets from future attacks if 
they meet the goals and level of susceptibility deemed suitable by the terrorist. Tactically, 
innovative choices in target selections, timing of attack, and delivery method greatly 
exacerbate the challenge to the HSE. The challenges are more formidable when coupled 
with the practically oriented, demonstrated resolve to attack non-combatants and soft 
targets.    
42 Martha Crenshaw, “Innovation: Decision Points in the Trajectory of Terrorism,” paper presented at 
the Conference on Trajectories of Terrorist Violence in Europe, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 
March 9–11, 2001. 
43 Hafez and Rasmussen, Terrorist Innovations, 39. 
44 Hafez and Rasmussen, Terrorist Innovations, citing Crenshaw, 5–6  
45 Ibid., 40 
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As Fathali Moghaddam points out, this, along with the perceived severity of the 
threat terrorists believe they face from the West (and most often, the U.S.), allows them 
to justify the attack of virtually anyone, anytime, anywhere.46  Moghaddam further 
explains that from the terrorists’ point of view, the acts they perpetrate against non-
combatant civilians are part of a “rational problem-solving strategy.”47  Terrorists do not 
view themselves as “terrorists,” they see themselves as warriors, freedom-fighters, or 
revolutionaries.48  They envisage themselves as soldiers for a cause, “Commandos … 
attacking the United States and its forces at home and abroad in a declared world war.”49  
Moghaddam expounds that although innocent civilians (as victims of the attacks) do not 
consider themselves as enemy combatants, the mindset of the attackers is unaltered, and 
they believe they are fully justified in conducting these attacks.   
Notwithstanding the presumption that they may be able to strike in any nation, 
terrorists also understand that if they attempt to attack U.S. military forces in a 
conventional battle, they will be risking “organizational suicide.”50  Therefore, they 
embrace the rationale of attacking the civilian electorate to influence American 
leadership and foreign policy because it is the electorate who put the leaders into office.51  
It is the non-combatant citizens that share responsibility with leaders for attacks against 
the in-group terrorist organizations and Muslim nation-states.52  The result is that 
unsuspecting civilians and soft targets are easy to strike. On occasion, as with the Madrid 
train bombings in 2004, such attacks can pay major dividends to the terrorist cause by 
virtue of swaying public opinion and, thereby, government action.53 
In addition to the presence of media members and a sporting event’s public 
visibility to the electorate and its government, several other key attributes render these 
46 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point, 4–5 
47 Ibid., 2 
48 Brannan and Strindberg, “Critical Analysis of Terrorism,” 30. 
49 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point, 2. 





                                                 
events as desirable terrorist targets. Kristine Toohey asserts that “the terrorist power of 
uncertainty is potent because we live in a risk society, characterized by the cultural desire 
to control chance, be secure, and by institutions increasingly organized around risk 
management.”54  One advantage for terrorists against the stronger, organized society they 
attack lies in the unpredictability of the strike, hitting at places and times when non-
combatants (victims) consider themselves safe.   
This is one of the central features of the impact of terrorism, to strike when the 
society as target thinks that it is secure.55  Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle assess that 
the “fear culture” is present in western society now because terrorists promote the idea of 
uncertainty in society. This leads governments to focus more attention on security and 
certainty, which then continues the cycle for terrorists to find new ways to attack the 
vulnerability gap and promote the concept of uncertainty and fear.56 
An additional aspect of modern terrorism strategy and tactics meriting review in 
this thesis is the rapid 21st century innovations in communications and cultural 
globalization, which are making it easier for terrorist groups to recruit, train, and deploy 
“lone wolf” and radicalized home-grown attackers.57   
Department of Homeland Security Acting Secretary Randy Beer asserts: 
Lone offenders—prime targets of al-Qa’ida’s English-language 
messaging, such as the online magazine Inspire—tend to favor plots 
involving the use of easily acquired weapons against local targets. These 
lone offender plots are especially challenging because they can be 
tactically simple and adaptable, complicating disruption by authorities.58 
54 Toohey, “Terrorism,” 432. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle, Uncertain Business: Risk, Insurance and the Limits of 
Knowledge (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 141. 
57 Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for 
Ontological Security.” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 741–767; Toohey, “Terrorism,” 432. 
58 Threats to the Homeland: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs, 112 Cong (2013) (statement of Rand Beers, Acting Secretary, Department of 
Homeland Security). 
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Further demonstrating the diverse origins of terrorists and the difficulty to identify 
and track them, a study of Islamic radicalization found that between 1989 and 2011, 211 
individuals had radicalized in North America to the point of supporting violence.59  
Many of these individuals (80 percent) initiated their radicalization after the events of 
September 11, 2001.60  
The innovations in their means and targets of attack are not, per se, new strategy, 
but like many terrorist organizations through the centuries, these latest innovations of 
how and where to attack are “unorthodox for their day.”61  For terrorists, impact, 
symbolism, and dramatic effect are all essential ingredients to successful attack.62  
Historically, terrorists have considered attacks upon larger stages as better platforms to 
promote their cause, while asserting their power over the host nation’s inability to protect 
their people.63   
Regarding the link between sports and terrorism, a watershed moment in history 
took place during the Munich Olympic Games in 1972. Some have even attributed this 
attack as THE defining moment in the growth of modern terrorism.64   The worldwide 
broadcast of the video image of the terrorists at the 1972 Munich Olympics operation 
became the iconic symbol of 20th century international terrorism and was a source of 
inspiration for future attacks on the summer games.65  Just the word “Munich” also 
became synonymous with the threat from extremely well-funded, nationalist, and 
religious-based terrorists such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).66   
59National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Fact Sheet: 
Violent Extremism in the U.S (College Park, MD: START, December 9, 2011). 
60 Ibid. 
61 Fisher, “From 20th Century Troubles,” 50. 
62 Toohey, “Terrorism,” 432. 
63 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point, 5–6 
64 Toohey, “Terrorism,” 434. 
65 Hafez and Rasmussen, Terrorist Innovations, 9. 
66 Ibid., 2–3. 
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The PLO proclaimed a few weeks after the 1972 Summer Games that the 
propaganda of the Munich attack was an astounding 100 percent success. The attack’s 
planner stated, “It was like painting the name of Palestine on a mountain that can be seen 
from the four corners of the Earth.”67 Because of the magnitude of the success of the 
Munich attacks, apparent to terrorists and counterterrorist experts alike, it was and still is 
reasonable to recognize that a moment such as that, occurring at a sporting venue, 
bestows some sense of importance to all sporting venues for generations to come.68  
An additionally important HSE consideration arising out of the Munich attack 
was the manifestation of a “wild card” motivational factor. The Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA) specifically cited the 1972 Munich Olympics as an example 
of practically driven strategic motivation. The PLO-backed Black September 
Organization executed the attack at the Games; however, the strategic impetus for the 
attack was directly linked to the expulsion of Palestinian guerilla factions from Jordan by 
the government. The PLO’s defeat at the hands of the Jordanian government, combined 
with the loss of bases from which to attack Israel, greatly demoralized the PLO members 
and weakened their leaders.69  Seeing the Olympics as a soft target sporting event (in that 
era), “The Munich operation was an attempt to regain legitimacy for the PLO’s senior 
leaders after an ignominious defeat.”70  It is this element of inner organizational politics 
and strife prompting the organization to act at unanticipated times which serves as a 
strategic wild card factor.   
With the literature setting the stage for the baseline terrorist threat faced by 
sporting event security teams, contemporary issues and data arising from the research 
found to be applicable to the thesis questions will be explored in the Analysis chapter 
later in this thesis. Qualitative issues of current doctrinal organization and standards of 
training, compliance, and inspections will be reviewed and addressed in greater detail in 
67 Toohey, “Terrorism,” 434. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Hafez and Rasmussen, Terrorist Innovations, 4–5 
70 Ibid. 
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the Analysis chapter as well. However, to facilitate that qualitative analysis, the current 
doctrinal framework literature will be reviewed in the next section. 
B. CURRENT DOCTRINAL ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE 
Complacency is the enemy of (homeland) safety.  
—British Lord Chief Justice Peter M. Taylor, 
Final Report of Hillsborough Stadium Disaster 
 
In order to view the proper context of the current doctrine, known as the DHS 
National Planning Framework, it is important to briefly review the evolution from 2001 
to the status quo reflected in the literature. This will facilitate a better understanding of 
past schools of strategic thought that were previously attempted or established. The intent 
of the later doctrinal analysis will be to reveal if there even is such a doctrine in place 
now, and if so, how effectively it is currently employed at sporting venues.     
Following the al Qaeda attacks in 2001, the 9/11 Commission Report revealed that 
the disparate security doctrine, equipment, and security methods practiced prior to 2001 
contributed significantly to the failure of the security system dedicated to protecting the 
American public on that fateful day.71  Subsequently, an underlying premise for the 
colossal increase of centralized government providing security was to synchronize multi-
agency collaboration and the myriad state/local and private sector stakeholders through a 
single command and control institution.72  Thereafter, the U.S. government experienced 
an Odyssean journey through the ensuing first decade’s development of myriad 
documents, goals, strategies, tasks, and milestones in the name of homeland and national 
security.   
Chronologically documenting the evolving nature of America’s homeland and 
national security doctrine emanating from the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Sharon Caudle asserts 
that perceiving the criticality and immediacy of the terrorist threat to America, the federal 
government under the George W. Bush administration established terrorism as the 
71 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, 4.   
72 Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Pub L. No. 107–71, 114, 49 U.S.C. § 114 
(2001). 
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primary domestic threat.73  That led the president to claim in one early strategic planning 
document that terrorism was “a permanent national condition” and therefore homeland 
security as a new permanent fixture in federal government.74  The direct result was the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the issuance of a specific national 
homeland security strategy, and other major policy developments.75    
Accordingly, over the subsequent years of the Bush administration, the federal 
government and newly founded DHS acknowledged the need to avoid stove-piped 
planning and envisioned the whole American community coming together as one entity 
to develop the complex preventive, protective, and responsive net to stop terrorism and 
be ready to recover from it .76  The initial blueprint in the Presidential Office of 
Homeland Security’s National Strategy (2002) and the President’s Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD-8, 2003) defined the whole community with the 
collaborative stakeholder relationships between federal, state, and local governments and 
non-governmental organizations along with the private sector. The Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 codified the central organizational point of leadership and policy 
development at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).   
In 2005, producing what it then deemed the “Interim National Preparedness 
Goal,” DHS proclaimed it answered the questions, “How prepared do we need to be?  
How prepared are we [actually]?” and “How do we prioritize efforts to close the gap?”77  
In so doing, the Interim Goal identified 15 national planning scenarios and an extensive, 
comprehensive target capabilities list as two primary planning tools for use in the 
fledgling homeland security community. For example, the Interim Goal listed IEDs as 
one of the threat scenarios to prepare for and laid out a detailed description of how 
73 Sharon Caudle, “Homeland Security: Advancing the National Strategic Position.” Homeland 
Security Affairs 8 (August 2012):2, http://www.hsaj.org/?article=8.1.11. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., 3 
77 Ibid. 
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explosive trace detection equipment could be employed as a system of systems. The 
critical task list was then crafted to support the projected scheme.78   
At this point, in 2005, the DHS and FEMA-based grants to the state/local 
governments were distributing much-needed support and had become prominent parts of 
fiscal year budgeting. There is no literature on whether the government had begun 
conceptualizing the various infrastructure sectors as separate lanes or industries that 
could be sought out to collaborate with and develop alternate forms of funding to meet 
these risk-based security needs.     
In 2007, a new National Strategy for Homeland Security defined a full range of 
potentially catastrophic events including natural disasters, diseases, and man-made 
accidents. Also introduced was a Homeland Security Management System, intended to 
build on the operational and tactical level planning and activities detailed in the 
guidelines.79  This served as a first example of a comprehensive system emplaced to 
provide evaluation and oversight inspection capabilities for planning and exercises or 
operations.   
In summary of the first administration’s view toward homeland security doctrine, 
it was established as a national community responsibility and not merely a federal 
government responsibility. It recognized the federal government control of policy 
strategy development “buttressed with federal grants to states and localities” to establish 
specific goals, performance targets, and measures. However, when the Obama 
administration took charge in early 2009, another shift in strategy took root and resulted 
in significantly altered goals and metrics. 
In 2011, Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) was released. PPD-8 decidedly 
marked the swing away from terrorism as a primary HSE focus to a posture built on 
flexibility and scalability to react to virtually any source of national or regional safety 
concern.80  A significant change was to subsume Homeland Security doctrine under the 
78 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Interim National Preparedness Goal, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (Washington, DC: DHS, March 31, 2005),.14 
79 Caudle, “Homeland Security,” 4. 
80 Ibid., 5. 
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auspice of national security doctrine. The Obama administration assessed that there was a 
myriad of grave security issues meriting a broader security stance than just one focused 
on terrorism.81  Also needing to be addressed with doctrine were social and political 
instability, health care issues, cyber threats, climate change, and weather hazards. The 
Obama administration also directed the HSE to begin preparing for simultaneous crises of 
varying kinds. This shift in viewpoint became relevant to sports venue security due to the 
seemingly more strategic level input role for the federal government (i.e., less specific 
about plans and task/compliance requirements than in the Bush administration era). 
Introducing Core Capabilities to replace the formerly used 15 planning scenarios 
and accompanying target capabilities (task) list, the intent of the drastic reduction in 
specificity was to enable state/local authorities to tailor resource abilities with mission 
challenges in their respective regions.82  Pursuant to PPD-8, DHS was required to 
produce National Planning Frameworks to address each of the homeland security mission 
areas.83  The core capabilities were to be addressed in greater detail in each of the five 
mission areas’ respective national planning framework document.   
DHS released its Overview of the National Planning Frameworks in 2013. Rooted 
in the PPD, the overview consolidates summaries and key themes for the respective 
mission area frameworks. Further echoing the PPD, the overview also establishes that the 
initial conditions premising the respective frameworks are what the community and 
senior government leaders should do “upon the discovery of intelligence or information 
regarding an imminent threat to the homeland in order to thwart an initial or follow-on 
terrorist attack.”84  The overview defines that the respective frameworks are established 
in order to “explain and guide the Nation’s approach for ensuring and enhancing national 
preparedness” in each respective mission area.85  It further asserts they are intended to 
81Caudle, “Homeland Security,” 5–6. 
82 Ibid., 6–7 
83 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Overview of the National Planning Frameworks 
(Washington, DC: DHS, May 1, 2013), 3 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., 1 
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1. Set the strategy and doctrine for building, sustaining, and delivering the 
core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness Goal 
2. Describe the coordinating structures and alignment of key roles and 
responsibilities for the whole community and integrate to ensure 
interoperability across all mission areas 
3. Address the roles of individuals; nonprofit entities and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs); the private sector; communities; critical 
infrastructure; governments; and the Nation as a whole86 
It acknowledges that the five respective mission areas represent “a spectrum of 
activity” and are “highly interdependent [with] ... regular coordination among 
departments and agencies working to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and 
recover from all threats and hazards.”87 
However, the overview presents planning frameworks for only four of the five 
mission areas. Conspicuously absent from the overview is the Protection Mission 
Framework. The overview also does not present any explanation as to why, as of May 
2013, the framework is missing from the synthesized overview document. However, for 
analysis purposes, this thesis uses the still unapproved-for-release Working Draft—
National Protection Framework,88 which was originally circulated for input and approval 
in 2012.  
The effectiveness of the Core Capabilities-based approach been called into 
question.89 DHS has attempted to link dollars spent with the development of capabilities 
but without established metrics or a proven system of inspection, compliance verification, 
or evaluation. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) lacked any standardization for data collection 
and overall data reliability yielding critical problems in its metrics and assessment 
process.90  Therefore, there is room for alternative options to be raised that have already 
86 DHS, Overview. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Working Draft—National Protection 
Framework, Review Package, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8 (Washington, DC: FEMA, March 2012. 
89 Caudle, “Homeland Security.” 
90 Ibid., 9. 
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been proven effective.91  Still to be resolved would be whether adoption of the 
management system preparedness standards should be mandated (perhaps tied to federal 
funding), and how certification or accreditation against the standards would be 
conducted. The question also remains whether such a compliance and evaluation system 
can be effectively implemented to ensure the building and sustaining of core capabilities 
if it is only voluntary.92  
In conclusion, the literature reflects there is no national doctrine with specific 
equipment or procedural standards to be applied to sports venue security. Even with best 
practices offered for voluntary implementation, without effective compliance measures, 
the federal level has difficulty assuring the American people that the HSE is 
accomplishing the National Protection Mission. In the next section, the literature will be 
reviewed to examine how strategic doctrine is organized, inspected, and executed in the 
United Kingdom.93 
C. U.K. AND E.U. APPROACHES TO SPORTING EVENT SECURITY 
Security professionals and U.S. government leaders must also recognize 
that constant threats of both organized and spontaneous terror have been 
managed with relative levels of success in ... Great Britain, which combats 
Catholic/Protestant aggression in addition to soccer hooligans, and ... 
[t]hough unfortunately acquired through horrid levels of sustained 
violence, certain elements from such international cognates of expertise 
may hold particular insight into security training for domestic venues in 
the United States. 
—Benjamin D. Goss, Colby B. Jubenville, and Jon L. MacBeth, 
Primary Principles of Post-9/11 Stadium Security in the United States: 
Transatlantic Implications from British Practices 
Venue managers, sporting league officials, security professionals and government 
officials on both sides of the ocean have cited their concerns of sporting venue terrorist 
91 Caudle, “Homeland Security,” 9–10. 
92 Ibid., 10. 
93 Stacey A. Hall, “An Examination of British Sport Security Strategies, Legislation, and Risk 
Management Practices: Lessons Learned from the English Football League,” The Sport Journal 13, no. 2 
(2010): 1–7. http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/. 
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attack since 9/11.94  José Luis Arnaut asserts that they are also concerned that terrorists 
may take a path of least resistance in carrying out attacks, seeking easily accessed targets 
with maximum disturbance potential and politically or economically symbolic value.95  
Goss, Jubenville, and MacBeth, note that though terrorists may desire to execute 
spectacular attacks, they are realistic in perceiving their own limited capabilities and 
therefore specifically seek softer targets of opportunity such as banks, shopping malls, 
places of recreation, and sports entertainment.96  Further supporting that notion of 
smaller venue vulnerability Gary Lhotsky avers the concept that the larger the stadium 
and event, the better trained venue staff, crowd management and security practices. 
Attacking smaller events and venues offers the possibility of more mayhem and corollary 
damage or destruction.97     
Whereas the U.S. National Protection Framework is still unpublished, and the 
federal government does not have an active presence at SEAR 4–5 events,98 the United 
Kingdom effectively integrates national government doctrine with local law enforcement 
organizations to secure sporting venues.99  Similarly, whereas the U.S. does not have a 
standard business practice that maximizes technology resources as part of venue security, 
the U.K. sets a global example in the use of technology at sporting events. The 
integration of the U.K. doctrine and its deployment of technology illustrate how the HSE 
can enhance and expand its ability to protect sports venues in the U.S. 
The U.K. initiated a push on sporting event security in the 1980s, long before 
9/11, as a response to “hooliganism.”  Gerald Griggs documents that this behavior of 
hooliganism started more than a century ago by some accounts, and may have originated 
94 Benjamin D. Goss, Colby B. Jubenville, and Jon L. MacBeth, Transatlantic Implications from 
British Practices (International Association of Assembly Managers, June 2003), 17–18. 
95 José Luis Arnaut, Independent European Sport Review 2006 (UK Presidency of the EU 2005, 
October 2006).  
96 Goss, Jubenville, and MacBeth, Transatlantic Implications,17–18 
97 Gary Lhotsky, “An Analysis of Risk Management at NCAA Division I-A Football Stadiums, (Ph.D. 
diss. Florida State University, 2006). 
98 Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers: Hearing before Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong., 
2nd sess., October 3, 2012. 
99 Hall, “An Examination of British Sport Security Strategies.”  
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out of enthusiasm toward supporting a sporting club and vehement opposition to an arch-
rival club; however, it evolved into unbridled violence and crime casting a pall over the 
national pastime in England.100  Over the course of the 1960s–1970s, such gangs as the 
Head Hunters from West London, the Inter City Firm from East London and the 
Bushwhackers from Millwall all became notoriously renowned for their routinely 
perpetrated criminal violence and mayhem.101  By the 1980s, hooliganism had evolved 
into an extensive array of hoodlums throughout the nation which the U.K.’s law 
enforcement (LE) community found to be contributing toward corollary criminal activity.   
Drug trafficking, robbery, assault, kidnapping, and spontaneous violence summarily 
equated to terrorist behavior against the freedom and security of the British public.102  In 
the 1990s, as technology advanced for CCTV, the IRA attack at Bishopsgate in Central 
London proved to be a catalyst for the expanded use of CCTV to provide security to 
public places.103 
Meanwhile, the U.K. Parliament and Home Office considered hooliganism as 
evolving into a serious public threat and took proactive measures to use legislation, 
doctrine, and technology to prevent and combat it as it would for any other form of 
terrorism.104  What arose was the development of centralized organization and doctrine 
to be implemented from the national level downward to the local level targeted to support 
local policing in its campaign to combat hooliganism and protect public order. This 
aggressive operational approach was reinforced with technology to maximize efficiency 
of costs and available resources. In time, it was recognized that the campaign against 
100 Gerald Griggs, “Soccer Hooliganism in England Between the Wars,” The Sport Journal 7, no. 3 
(2004): 1–5. http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/soccer-hooliganism-england-between-wars; Goss, 
Jubenville, and MacBeth, Transatlantic Implications, 3, citing Football Violence in Europe by Marsh, 
James, Anne Fox, Kate Fox, Giovanni Carnibella, Joe McCann, and Peter Marsh.  
101 A. J. Haley, “British Soccer Superhooligans: Emergence and Establishment: 1982–2000,” The 
Sport Journal 4, no. 3 (2001). http://web.archive.org/web/20070221100029/. 
102 Goss, Jubenville, and MacBeth, Transatlantic Implications, 4, citing “Football Violence on the 
Rise,” BBC News, August 15, 2001, hi/uk_news/1491743.stm. 
103 Michael McCahill and Clive Norris, CCTV Systems in London. Their Structure and Practices, 
Working Paper No.10 (Hull, UK: Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Hull, April 
2003), 2. http://www.urbaneye.net/results/. 
104 Ibid. 
 25 
                                                 
hooliganism was an effective model for defending venue locations and combating 
organized terror attacks at public venues.105 
Though the U.S. sports market does not suffer from hooliganism to the extent that 
the U.K. had in the past, the doctrinal lessons learned and technology systems employed 
in combating hooliganism are applicable for HSE counterterrorism operations and sports 
venue security.   
Another component of the U.K.’s success was due to the safety legislation which 
was passed requiring stadiums and club (private sector) ownership groups to acquire and 
maintain a “Safety Certificate.” This was in accordance with the government’s “set of 
safety requirements in the ‘Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds’ for every soccer team 
playing in the top four divisions in England.”106  The local governments issue the 
certificate and monitor event/stadium compliance with the requirements. Local LE also 
assigns a designated Safety Officer to assist facility management with safety strategies on 
match day.107 The U.K. also developed an organizational Code of Practice and doctrine 
that originated at the national government level and disseminated down to the local law 
enforcement and event venue management level. The U.K.’s organization has no exact 
comparison in the U.S.   
The U.K.’s national synchronization of sporting security effort begins with the 
United Kingdom Football Policing Unit (UKFPU), established in 2005, and accountable 
to the Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). The UKFPU is 
the UK’s point of contact for collaboration with international counterparts, i.e., football 
policing “information points” designated, and it receives assistance from the U.K.’s 
National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO).108  The NaCTSO provides 
security in what the U.K. defines as “crowded places” (i.e., many public venues including 
shopping malls, mass transit stations, and sports venues). The ACPO has defined roles 
105 Goss, Jubenville, and MacBeth, Transatlantic Implications, 4.  
106 Hall, “An Examination of British Sport Security Strategies.” 
107 Ibid. 
108 Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Guidance on Policing Football (London: National 
Policing Improvement Agency, 2010), 54. 
http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/uniformed/2010/201008UNGPF01.pdf. 
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and responsibilities for consistent application to local LE. These roles include each local 
police station whose area of responsibility envelopes a football stadium and various 
football clubs to have a football liaison officer (FLO), football intelligence officer (FIO), 
and police football spotters.109  The UKFPU provides leadership, training, and guidance 
to FIOs, including the sharing and dissemination of threat intelligence updates.110   
The FIO develops offender profiles and provides analytical assessments of events 
and participants, both as after action in review for learning purposes and in preparation 
for upcoming events.111  One FIO intelligence product is a breakdown of event attendees 
into risk and non-risk attendees based on advance notice of ticket sales and identification 
of ticket purchasers.112  Such a breakdown is essentially the application of a risk-based 
strategy to sporting events security.  
The ACPO has also produced guidance for renovations and the new construction 
of stadiums in order to comply with safety legislation. In the initial conception of how to 
defend a site from an attack, the U.K. applies a logical approach to look at the site 
(venue) location itself, the structure, surrounding areas, gathering space in and outside of 
the venue. It then analyzes general access to the site in conjunction with the capabilities 
of an enemy (whether hooligan or terrorist) that is seeking that access.   
Also becoming actively involved in the analysis and development of future venue 
security doctrine, the European Union (E.U.) has recognized that the World Cup 
tournament and others, like the UEFA Champions League matches, that are played 
throughout Europe and watched the world over, make for unprecedented platforms for 
international publicity. Because these events are suitable for various activities intended to 
attract public attention, such as demonstrations and peaceful protests, the E.U. recognized 
that “the modern constitutional democratic state needs to reconcile the risk of [terrorist 
109ACPO, Guidance on Policing, 15. 
110 Ibid., 17. 
111 Ibid., 18. 
112 Ibid., 10.  
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attack] ... with the degree of surveillance and other preventive law enforcement 
procedures.”113  
Accordingly, a working group of professionals and scholars was commissioned to 
assess future protection mission possibilities and to begin constructing a path of 
milestones to achieve it. The consortium, Supporting Fundamental Rights, Privacy and 
Ethics in Surveillance Technologies (SAPIENT), recognized the impact of the 1994 and 
2010 attacks at World Cup gathering sites in Djibouti, Ulster, and Somalia. These attacks, 
yielding 87 killed and 97 wounded, revealed the vulnerability of the communities 
surrounding venues and linked to sporting events, rendering them necessary to be 
included in security plans. SAPIENT is working for the long-term toward the security 
model of the next decade built upon three pillars: 
• The preventive and precautionary collection, storage and processing of 
vast amounts of data on football fans, tourists and local citizens being 
considered actively or passively involved in the World Cup   
• Surveillance in and around the stadiums of people and objects 
• Monitoring of places with relevance to the World Cup events and venues 
such as lodging areas for the national teams, public viewing areas of fans 
and transportation hubs114 
The SAPIENT projection is a visionary, but feasible doctrine blended with the 
best surveillance and detection technology resources either available now or in proto-type 




113  Philip Schütz et al., Smart Surveillance and Securing Public Spaces. SAPIENT Report # 261698 
(Germany: Fraunhofer ISI, 2012), 2, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=734129. 
114 Schütz et al., Smart Surveillance, 3 
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D. TECHNOLOGY IN SPORTING VENUE SECURITY 
A security system is a combination of multiple components that must work 
together seamlessly to provide the appropriate level of protection for a 
facility. 
—DHS Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist  
Attacks against Building 
 
Security Operations Centers (SOC or control centers) have sprung up at many 
major sporting facilities throughout America [Anderson 2010].115  At the SOC, security 
management teams receive input from various intelligence resources such as state fusion 
centers, human intelligence, and on-site venue technology resources. The SOC routinely 
will also have numerous video monitors linked to CCTV systems covering the vast 
acreage of a sports complex coupled with the ability to communicate immediately with 
security forces on the ground at the facility as well as with local community first 
responders. It is at the SOC that security management teams can leverage and monitor 
available technological resources.116      
This section reviews the available technology resources which support facility 
protection and counterterrorism plans. The four primary forms of technology support to 
venue security operations that will be addressed in this thesis are Closed-Circuit 
Television (CCTV), X-ray screening systems, metal detectors, and Explosive Trace 
Detection (ETD).117 
Since 9/11, DOD and DHS/HSE have invested vast amounts of time and funding 
into numerous forms of technology research and development (R&D) for security 
equipment technology, and there has been a heavy emphasis on ETD.118  ETD 
115 Teresa Anderson, “How Dallas Does Security” Security Management, 2010, 
http://www.securitymanagement.com/article/how-dallas-does-security-007656 
116U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks against Buildings, 2nd ed., FEMA-426/BIPS-06 (Washington, DC: DHS, October 2011), 5–10 
117 DHS, Reference Manual, 5–9. Security equipment also includes screening and contraband 
detection devices, such as, security XC-ray (e.g., explosive, weapons, backscatter), trace type detection 
(e.g., explosive, chemical, radiological), and magnetometers (metal detection). 
118 “MIT Lincoln Laboratory Wins Two R&D 100 Awards,” Lincoln Laboratory, July 2013,  
http://www.ll.mit.edu/news/2013-RnD100awards.html; “Detecting Explosives Remotely,” R&D Magazine, 
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technology capabilities include the inspection of people, containers, and objects. This 
technology bears intrinsic value for counterterrorism protective measures.119   
In 2004, members of Sandia National Laboratories published the Survey of 
Commercially Available Explosives Detection Technologies and Equipment, 2004..120 
Although now dated, this document provides an excellent foundational analysis of 
various technologies still available to detect trace and bulk explosives and presents 
system characteristics that should be considered before investing in one type of ETD 
technology over another. From 2001–2007, R&D focused on sensors operating on 
different transduction principles, ranging from electrochemical to immune-sensors 
electrochemical sensors. For the ensuing five-year period through 2012, optical or laser-
based technology had largely become the primary focus of R&D.   
However, throughout the period, numerous stubborn technical challenges arose to 
continually thwart the intent of developing an accurate system that could detect 
explosives at a beneficial stand-off range to security operations. To sum up the major 
challenges, a trace detector would essentially seek a particulate matter in the air that 
exhibited molecular structures identical to the chemical element inherent in the 
combustible material. But because many different objects may contain natural elements 
which are also present in man-made explosives, ETD inaccuracy and high false alarm 
rates greatly diminish the value of the system.   
Further complicating the detection effort, people may be exposed to objects which 
contain such elements and therefore not only certain objects can cause false alarms, but 
people can as well. Other factors that would diminish accuracy and stand-off ability to 
find trace elements included sunlight, wind, rain, and objects consisting of combinations 
August 29, 2013, http://www.rdmag.com/award-winners/2013/08/detecting-explosives-remotely, citing 
PHASE team members Robert Haupt, Rosalie Bucci, Jae Kyung, Leaf Jiang, Charles Wynn, Napoleon 
Thantu, and Francesca Lettang. 
119 Malcolm McLellan III, “Tailoring Screening Technology to Prevent or Deter Terrorists from 
Attacking Commercial Ferries with Improvised Explosive Devices” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2010), 11. 
120 Lisa Thiesen et al., “Survey of Commercially Available Explosives Detection Technologies and 
Equipment,” (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, 2004). 
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of chemical elements.121  Therefore, if the ETD system could be positioned close enough 
to objects or people, and especially if in a somewhat controlled environment, then it 
could achieve tremendous accuracy. This is how the systems are now deployed at airports 
across the country.122   
As of 2013, the industry best practices implemented meant explosives screening 
was conducted manually, visually, by swabbing, and through X-ray inspections.123  
Because these systems all involved being in the same virtual proximity, or in contact 
with, the person or container/object to be screened, they cannot be used in any sort of 
covert facility protection operation. These non-covert approaches can also be time-
consuming because they are not able to screen crowds or large expanses of space, e.g., 
when throughput of a large crowd is required as at a sporting event.124  Therefore, ETD 
systems have been of limited use for advance warning or interdicting against a “terrorist 
smart bomb” (i.e., an explosive-vest wearing suicide attacker).125 
However, in late 2013, possibly a major breakthrough in technology was 
announced which rekindled the realistic possibility of ETD technology for deployment at 
sporting venues. The “cutting edge” discovery is the science of Photoacoustic Sensing of 
Explosives (PHASE).126  This technology works with a combination of laser and audio 
technology. In summary, a laser pulse is sent out from a device, and when it strikes an 
object or person, it will “excite” elements on or in the subject of the scanning. The 
exciting of the element means to cause the element to emit an infinitesimal vapor. This 
process is similar to already established ETD systems; however, the new technology 
discovered is that in emitting the vapor, explosive elements actually release a form of 
121 Ibid.  
122 Transportation Security Administration (TSA), “Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport 
Planning, Design and Construction,” May 2011, 96 
123 Robert Haupt, “Photo-acoustic Sensing of Explosives,” Tech Notes, November 2013, 
http://www.ll.mit.edu/publications/technotes/TechNote_PHASE.pdf 
124 McLellan, “Tailoring Screening Technology,” 10. 
125 Bruce Hoffman, “Defending America Against Suicide Terrorism,” in Three Years After, Next Steps 
in the War on Terror (2005), 21–22; Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point, 3 
126 Haupt, “Photoacoustic Sensing of Explosives.” 
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unique “audio” signal, or vibration wave. The unique “audio” signal, virtually unaffected 
by environmental elements, is detectable by laser vibrometry up to 100m away.   
The accuracy of the tests, to date, have met with professional standards, 
exhibiting a superior accuracy of subject location designation to within millimeters, and a 
significantly lower false alarm rate when compared to heritage technologies.127  
Furthermore, the photo-acoustic system is also much more compact than the other 
technologies. It requires significantly less power to execute, permitting it to be deployed 
covertly and adding another dimensionality of deterrence to site venue protection.128  In 
addition to ETD systems potentially aiding sports venue protection, CCTV has also 
become an integral part of effective security operations. 
CCTV systems have been a part of the English sporting event system layered 
approach to technology for decades.129  Since the 2001 attacks, CCTV usage has 
increased dramatically in the U.S. as well. Today’s sporting and concert (cultural) event 
stadiums and arenas (venues) often cost hundreds of millions of dollars to build, with 
some even topping the $1 billion mark.130  In the 21st century, construction of these 
modern venues presents opportunities for the most current security technologies and 
architecture to be built-in. One of this era’s newest venue marvels, Texas Stadium, is 
complete with more than 260 Closed Circuit (CC) TV cameras.131 
There are too many types and choices of cameras suited for many different 
environments and purposes to effectively review and address them all in this thesis. 
However, with regard to sports venue security, this thesis will categorize them into two 
general groups: low resolution and high resolution. Lower resolution CCTVs can be 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
.129 Hall, “An Examination of British Sport Security Strategies.” 
130 Jeff Mosier, “The Cost of Cowboys Stadium Has Escalated to $1.2 billion,” Dallas Morning 
News, April 1, 2010, http://stadiumblog.dallasnews.com/2010/04/the-cost-of-cowboys-stadium-ha.html  
131 Anderson, “How Dallas Does Security.” “There are 263 CCTV cameras, both analog and digital, 
and more than 600 access control points. The camera feeds are recorded and also monitored live from an 
on-site control room (A second on-site control room is used solely to monitor traffic conditions around the 
stadium.) The primary control room is staffed by security officers as well as two officers from the 
Arlington Police Department who monitor texts and emails from fans.”  
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effectively used for their wide-sweeping viewing capability to cover large swaths of 
space. This brings an added dimension of security team personnel efficiency. Cameras 
put “eyes on” locations and “patrol” multiple areas without expending human resources 
by employing numerous officers on the beat to cover the same logistical area. 
Beneficially, once identifying incidents as they occur, the SOC can either coordinate an 
effective and appropriate response or choose to conserve manpower by determining that 
no response is necessary.132  Additionally, lower resolution cameras are routinely less 
expensive and can be installed to provide a sweeping view of a scene in order to detect 
actions as they occur or subject behaviors indicating imminent events about to happen.133 
High resolution cameras, on the other hand, are capable of quickly ascertaining 
fine details within a scene, and are therefore excellent resources to locate and identify 
potential threat individuals.134  Facial recognition is a developing technology and 
identifies faces in camera view and compares them against a known database.135  An 
optimal image is captured with at least moderate lighting and users facing toward a 
camera.136  The stiffest challenge to their performance is to automatically identify a 
person without active cooperation or consistent and favorable conditions for a high-
resolution camera (e.g., identifying individuals from within a large, moving crowd 
located outdoors).137  Therefore, in past years they may have been an expensive resource 
misused on a subway platform, a parking lot, or a pedestrian avenue of approach to a 
sporting venue.138   
132 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Justice Programs (OJP), “CCTV: Constant Cameras 
Track Violators,” National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Journal, no. 249 (July 2003): 16–23. 
133 U.S Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Defining Video Quality Requirements: A Guide for 
Public Safety, (Washington, DC: DHS, May 2013), 13–18 
134 Harry Wechsler, Reliable Face Recognition Methods (New York: Springer: 2007), 123–125 
135Edmund Spinella, Biometric Scanning Technologies: Finger, Facial and Retinal Scanning 




137 Wechsler, Reliable Face Recognition,123–125 
138 DHS, Defining Video Quality, 13–18. 
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However, CCTV is rapidly becoming more effectively employed in a crowd to 
locate particular mannerisms. One such trait is gait, the identification of which may be 
predictive of an individual in a crowd walking with a heavily weighted object concealed 
within his or her clothing, such as a bomb vest.139  Cameras with a shorter lens and 
greater aperture are capable of providing a wider spectrum of view and are more 
competent to transmit effective imagery while in various, or darker, lighting 
conditions.140  These cameras may also be equipped with some smart capability to better 
identify individuals with suspicious behavior, such as subjects in view standing, loitering 
in one place to the SOC.141  Providing a real-time feed to a SOC on-site, it can then be 
possible to deploy security teams more efficiently to evaluate or interdict in a scenario, 
often as far from the target venue as possible. Much like the potential benefit provided by 
accurate ETD, effective CCTV usage can provide the best stand-off range, i.e., protective 
buffer time and space from the attacker’s high payoff target location. 
Facial recognition is a CCTV benefit that is continually improving. There exist 
numerous variations of mathematical formulas and means (e.g., using decision trees, to 
take the machine’s captured image and translate that through a comparison process into 
actionable intelligence).142  FaceTrac is one system that has become a leader in the field. 
FaceTrac captures faces from the video stream and compares them with images stored in 
a database. Once a subject has been identified, FaceTrac notifies security personnel with 
a user-configured prompt or alert, greatly increasing the effective operational use of 
existing security manpower on location.   
Proponents of employing facial recognition systems also cite that these systems 
require less concentration from human staff to monitor the video, making security 
operations more efficient by freeing some employees for other tasks.143  Thereby smaller 
venue security teams can cover larger areas while simultaneously facial recognition 
139 “If Looks Could Kill,” The Economist, October 23, 2008, ww.economist.com/node/12465303, 
citing Frank Morelli from Aberdeen Proving Ground.  
140 DHS, Defining Video Quality, 13–18. 
141 “If Looks Could Kill,” The Economist. 
142 Wechsler, Reliable Face Recognition, 123–125 
143 Ibid., 21. 
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systems can lead to a greater number of officers on patrol or in being accurately guided in 
on where to go to make arrests.144 
However, there is a lack of available literature that  thoroughly addresses the 
operational and legal risks created by the utilization of facial recognition CCTV. 
Questions that require solutions include which databases to use, what training procedures 
are used for on-site security staff, and what is the potential liability deriving from false-
positive alarms at the venue?  These solutions are as integral to fielding future doctrine as 
is the success of the science itself.   
In the literature, there exists explicit descriptions of the technical aspects of 
CCTV. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the paramount importance of the 
literature review is that it reflects the steady technology improvements made to establish 
CCTV and facial recognition as viable components of the venue security model worthy 
of analysis in the next chapter.   
Metal detectors and X-ray screening equipment have been in use for many years. 
Because metal detectors are effective but limited in the span of their use, this thesis will 
not address literature regarding future possibilities. What is of importance is that metal 
detectors can be counted on for future employment in venue security operations. Major 
League Baseball will be requiring all of its (SEAR 4) venues to install metal detectors as 
a doctrinal upgrade before the beginning of the 2015 season.145  
Similarly worth noting, since 2008, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has 
employed a low (dosage) level X-ray system known as “Z Portal” for use in inspecting 
automobiles at border crossings and checkpoints.146   
144 Ibid.  
145 Greg Johns, “Safeco Field Adding Metal Detectors for Added Security, MLB.com, January 21, 
2014, http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article/mlb/fans-to-pass-through-metal-detectors-at-safeco-field-beginning-
this-season?ymd=20140121&content_id=66900582&vkey=news_mlb. 
146 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). “Fact Sheet: Z-Portal Vehicle Imaging System.” 
August 2008. http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/port_security 
/z_portal.ctt/z_portal.pdf. 
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Figure 1.  Z Portal X-Ray at CBP Canadian Border Checkpoint 
The same manufacturer of the Z Portal, American Science and Engineering 
(ASE), also produces a mobile version of the portal that is mounted inside a van or 
truck.147  Known as the ZB Van, this resource can be used to go through parking lots 
scanning for threat items concealed in vehicles.   
Transitioning from what is currently available to what can be considered for 
future use, there are several creative scenarios worth recognition. The European Union’s 
SAPIENT project demonstrates a vision of a detailed venue security team scenario 
synchronizing all four resources with real-time audio and video communications and 
security patrols on the ground.148  Another possible future innovation for application at 
sporting venues is currently being developed in the aviation transportation industry. Since 
2001, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) has evolved as a global 
organization with participation and support from more than 240 airlines and 19 
international governments, including the U.S.149  The “Checkpoint of the Future” (COF) 
is a model checkpoint system that is being tested in the field by IATA.150   
147 “ZBV,” AS&E, accessed April 4, 2014, http://as-e.com/products-solutions/cargo-vehicle-
inspection/mobile/product/zbv/. 
148 Philip Schütz et al., Smart Surveillance, 4. 
149 Peter Murray, “IATA Unveils Checkpoint of Future,” Jun3 28, 2011, Singularity HUB, 
http://singularityhub.com/2011/06/28/iata-unveils-the-airport-checkpoint-of-the-future/; “Press Briefing by 
DHS Secretary Napolitano and IATA Director-General Bisignani,” U.S. Mission Geneva, January 22, 
2010. https://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/01/23/napolitano-bisignani/. 
150 James Shillinglaw, “IATA to Focus on Fast Travel, Checkpoint of the Future to Improve Air 
Travel,” TravelPulse, October 16, 2012, www.travelpulse.com/iata-to-focus-on-fast-travel-checkpoint-of-
the-future-to-improve-air-travel.html. 
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Figure 2.  IATA Models of the “Checkpoint of the Future” Prototype 
As Figure 2 displays, a Checkpoint of the Future (COF) is modeled as a hallway 
or tunnel-type device that is intended for screened subjects to walk through without the 
need to stop and remove clothing or personal items. The intent of the global airline 
industry and security organizations is that the COF is improves the traveler experience by 
rendering the screening and inspection process as user-transparent to customers while 
vastly increasing throughput capacity, safely admitting people beyond the checkpoint 
with little reduction from the normal flow of movement.151   
The IATA model uses advanced biometrics for identity confirmation152 and 
draws from private sector (airline) and government collaboration to implement a risk-
based screening (RBS) security model. This approach will identify passengers worthy of 
enhanced security screening apart from low-risk travelers, i.e., rather than the one-size-
fits-all approach of looking for objects that may pose a threat or be used by a terrorist 
when onboard a plane.153  This style of risk-based security may someday be applicable 
for sporting events, but that is a topic for future research and consideration in the HSE.   
151 A. Pawlowski, “Is This the Checkpoint of the Future?” CNN.com, June 7, 2011, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-07/travel/checkpoint.of.the.future_1_airport-checkpoint-airport-security-
traveler-program?_s=PM:TRAVEL. 
152 Spinella, Biometric Scanning Technologies. 
153 Ibid. 
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The four primary forms of technology support reveal many benefits to security 
operations, but they also unveil several very relevant legal issues of concern in the HSE, 
which will be addressed in the next section.   
E. LEGAL REVIEW 
Whatever the after-the-fact analysis of the duty of care may be for a 
specific incident, the fundamental question will always be whether or not 
reasonable steps were taken to protect against an incident in light of the 
availability of security measures, the industry “standards” for security, 
and the potential threat of terrorism. 
—Ronald E. Hurst, Catherine Pratsinakis, and Paul H. Zoubek, 
 “American Sports As A Target of Terrorism: The Duty of Care after 
September 11th” 
 
A review of the literature reveals that two primary legal issues of relevance exist 
related to sporting event venue security and counterterrorism operations: the duty of care 
(liability) and privacy. 
Liability for patron and athlete participant safety rests with the owners, operators, 
supervisors, or possessors of land (venue manager) of sports venues.154  Since 9/11, 
judicial trends regarding duty of care for security have leaned toward abrogation of 
government immunity, opening the opportunity for schools and universities to be sued.155   
Therefore, private sector professional sporting event and collegiate athletic venue 
managers owe a duty of care to a patron attending the event. The legal term for the 
patrons’ status is that of “invitee,” and it is accorded the highest legal duty of obligation 
from the venue manager to provide for the safety of the patrons. The obligation to 
provide for the patrons’ safety entails several primary aspects, but the one most relevant 
to sports venue managers is to conduct operations on the premises with reasonable care 
preventing the patrons from harm due to being hurt by others while there. This means that 
154 Ibid. 
155 Lhotsky, “An Analysis of Risk Management.” 
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venue managers must take reasonable actions to protect patrons from “foreseeable” 
harm.156 
If injured, wounded, or killed at a sporting event due to a terrorist attack, on 
reviewing the facts of a patron’s case against a venue manager, one essential question to 
be answered by a court will be whether there existed a generally foreseeable risk to 
determine the existence of a duty and to limit the scope of the duty found. Stanford v. 
Kuwait Airways Corp., 89 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 1996) (airline had duty to protect 
passengers from risk of terrorists boarding connecting flight). The court of appeals in 
Stanford found that the hijacking of a plane was a generally foreseeable risk. The judicial 
rationale was that the airline-defendant’s complacency had created a “zone of risk” and 
passengers would not have been harmed if the airline had reasonably mitigated the 
vulnerability beforehand.157   
In this example, the court recognized that the airline had four sets of information 
that constituted it as having a general ability to foresee a terrorist attack: 
(1) threatened [airline attacks in general] by Hezbollah terrorists; (2) that 
terrorists were boarding flights in . . . airports to infiltrate other airlines; 
(3) that the Beirut airport had extraordinarily poor security; and (4) that 
the four hijackers who boarded in Beirut had tickets which teemed with 
suspicion. A jury could reasonably find, under these circumstances, that if 
[the airline] did nothing, it would create a zone of risk that stretched at 
least as far as the innocent passengers aboard flights with which the four 
hijackers would eventually connect. 
In the past 13 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, 
DC, the United States has had numerous instances of a heightened security alert status 
with various terrorist threats to American public safety. Though DHS retired the color-
coded alert system in 2011 and has not enacted its replacement, the National Terrorism 
Advisory System does send alert bulletins to sectors and regions of the nation when 
various security risks arise.158   
156 Hurst, Pratsinakis, and Zoubek, “American Sports.” 
157 Ibid. 
158 “National Terrorism Advisory System,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), accessed 
April 4, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/national-terrorism-advisory-system. 
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As a result, terrorist attacks could very well be considered generally foreseeable, 
or “within the range of apprehension.”159 Customarily, the courts have found evidence of 
substantially similar prior criminal acts may be used to demonstrate that the landowner 
had actual or constructive knowledge of risk of harm to the invitee.160  The term 
‘substantially similar’ does not mean identical, but rather, whether the prior crimes 
committed elsewhere would have put a reasonable landowner on notice that visitors, 
residents, invitees, were subject to increased risk of harm. The question is whether the 
prior activity would have attracted the attention of a reasonably prudent landowner, and 
caused him to be concerned about the safety of the invitees.   
What is required to be foreseeable is the general character of the event or harm, 
not the precise nature of the activity or the precise manner of its occurrence.161  In 
particular, based on historical records linking sports to terrorism, venue operators and 
owners should be more aware of the risk that an American sporting event that attracts 
thousands of spectators could be a target of terrorist attack.162  By failing to act or 
institute increased safety measures because of complacency or other reasons, venue 
owners and operators could be creating a zone of risk and be liable for a breach of the 
duty of care to invitees.163   
Judicial precedent regards sporting events as a potential target of terrorism for the 
foreseeable future.164  The scope of duty for venue managers, therefore, requires that 
reasonable measures be taken to protect against terrorist acts. Terrorist attacks may no 
longer be characterized as unforeseeable, creating a heightened duty of care owed by 
owners and operators to spectators, participants, and employees.165   
159 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E.2d 99. 
160 Robert D. Bickel, Legal Issues Related To Silent Video Surveillance. Washington, DC: The 
Security Industry Association and The Private Sector Liaison Committee, April 8, 1999, citing Shoney’s 
Inc. v. Hudson, and  Cohen v. Southland Corporation. 
161 Bickel, Legal Issues Related To Silent Video Surveillance. 





                                                 
Lhotsky assesses that “in the 21st century, risk management will become a close 
companion to the sport business industry in its attempt to reduce losses and exposures, 
while increasing the desire to make the sport business industry safer.”166  This reveals 
that an incentive for private sector venue managers is that the reduction in vulnerability 
translates into corporate insurance savings.167  There are numerous best practices that are 
suggested for venue managers to implement in order to constitute taking reasonable steps 
to reduce liability in protecting from terrorist attacks at their facilities. Hiring and vendor 
background checks, security operations doctrines, personnel training standards on the 
guidelines, and invoking exercises to drill and test incident response plans are all 
examples of venue managers taking effective measures to protect patrons from 
terrorism.168   
The literature review reflects that privacy is also a relevant legal issue regarding 
the use of surveillance technologies at sporting events. However, whereas liability issues 
infer a duty on venue managers to stay current with equipment and security best practices 
to protect patrons, the privacy and civil liberties issue is more germane to the basic 
thresholds necessary to execute select security operations.   
Citing “privacy rights” violations,169 there have been and will likely continue to 
be objections to the use of CCTV, facial-scan technology, and other certain scanning and 
inspection techniques. Aside from the constitutional argument, there have been and will 
be opponents of the technology that will claim that its implementation and use is costly 
and ineffective in bringing about arrests, convictions, or real-time interdiction to prevent 
crime.170  Additionally, opponents contend that its use furthers the negative image of 
166 Lhotsky, “An Analysis of Risk Management,” 15. 
167 Keating, “Industry of Fear.” 
168 Hurst, Pratsinakis, and Zoubek, “American Sports.” 
169 Edmund Spinella, Biometric Scanning Technologies; see also self-proclaimed Civil Liberties 
watchdog group, The Young Turks, YouTube video, 5:51, October 1, 
2010,http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SZ2YW7-4Gbw. 
170 Bickel, Legal Issues Related to Silent Video Surveillance. 
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policing and security operations by fostering the “big brother is watching you” 
atmosphere.171   
However, the longstanding “objectively reasonable expectation” test administered 
in courts today has consistently rendered a lowered expectation of privacy in automobiles 
than for a private residence.172  That standard is lowered even further when a subject is in 
another’s auto, or when going onto another’s private property or onto municipal, state, 
and federal property.173  Furthermore, the courts have consistently and specifically ruled 
that while in public view, there is no right to privacy from being watched on CCTV.174 
Although the element of cost did arise in this section as an argument posed by 
opponents of CCTV surveillance, technology expense and the cost-benefit analysis 
theories found in literature will be addressed in the next, final section of the review. 
F. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Cost-benefit analyses are important because they help decision makers 
determine which protective measures, for instance, investments in 
technologies or in other security programs, will provide the greatest 
mitigation of risk for the resources that are available. 
—John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, 
Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of 
Homeland Security 
 
In the era of austere fiscal climates there exist political strategic stances claiming 
either a diminished threat from terrorism, thereby questioning security expenditures, or 
alternatively, a focus on resilience after the fact of the rare attack which may occur. 
Similarly, there are sources in the reviewed literature that make the argument that many 
government expenditures for homeland security are not worthwhile. Before HSE senior 
171 Ibid. 
172 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S .(1976); 
173 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S (1978)  
174 Bickel, Legal Issues Related to Silent Video, citing, L. R. Willson and Sons v. Occupational Safety 
& Health Review Commission, also, Secretary of Labor v. Concrete Construction Co. 
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leaders make vital decisions in how to allocate scarce resources, it is essential that proper 
attention and thorough cost-benefit analysis be weighed in consideration.   
Crenshaw, Zulaika, and Burrows are among those that contend that the costs for 
DHS and the HSE are a waste of government funds that could be more effectively spent 
on socio-economic domestic policies. However, one of the foremost opponents of 
government spending in homeland security are Mueller and Stewart.   
Mueller and Stewart offer multiple arguments for why the benefit does not 
outweigh the cost. He demonstrates quantitative data asserting that there is little viable 
terrorist threat targeting Americans,175 and that the enemy specter portrayed to 
Americans is largely conjured as justification of the government, the media, and private 
sector stakeholders in the “terrorism industry.”  Further, it is the Mueller and Stewart 
formula that will be used to conduct the cost-benefit analysis later in this thesis to 
determine a breakeven point at which it is conducive to seriously consider enhanced 
security measures for the SEAR 4–5 softer targets.   
However, these are not the only sources in the literature that explore costs of the 
HSE counterterrorism effort. Literature exists demonstrating that the costs to American 
society at the hands of a successful terrorist attack are as overwhelmingly staggering as 
the numbers presented in assessing its cost to combat it , the direct and indirect costs, and 
the short to long term economic impact.   
Further, numerous sources affirm that terrorism will always be a threat to 
American society and that the question of the next successful, horrific attack within the 
U.S. is not if, but when. This means that the government will always need budget 
expenditures for homeland security to some degree. Governments abroad also recognize 
that terrorist organizations will adapt to survive, using new technology, new strategies, 
and may become capable of conducting more lethal operations.176  Accordingly, the 
175 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, 
and Costs of Homeland Security (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 44 
176 United Kingdom Home Office, The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International 
Terrorism. Command Paper Number Cm 7547 (London: United Kingdom Home Office, March 24, 2009). 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=32602 
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ideology associated with al Qaeda and groups like it will almost certainly adapt and 
outlive changes to their respective structure or group existence.177  Even among 
opponents of large expenditures on homeland security, there is concurrence that as long 
as there are animosities and hostilities among groups in the world, be they sovereign 
nation v. sub-nation organization, or just tribe versus tribe, terrorism has historically 
existed and always will.178   
Regarding expenditures on sporting events, Olympic Games security and SEAR 1 
events in America are all well documented, costing hundreds of millions of dollars.179  
The results are exemplary; since the 1972 Munich Games there have been no major 
terrorist attacks at the venues of the Games.180  The literature also suggests that because 
of the success of the security at these mega-events, that terrorist attack plans have 
targeted related locations to attack instead. Locations outside of the venues at the 
Olympics and World Cup events, where patrons gather to view them, have been targeted 
since 1996.181 
The damages and costs related to suffering a terrorist attack are many and will be 
addressed in detail in the Analysis chapter. However, the myriad cost factors highlighted 
in the literature lead to two questions to be resolved in this thesis: 
1. Is there a cost-benefit analysis that can be conducted to show that it is in 
the interest of either the private sector or public policy to invest in the cost 
of improving SEAR 4–5 security technologies and staff training; and  
2. Even if the cost might be exorbitant for a private sector sports league or 
team ownership group, might it be something that public policy can 
creatively venture into with the private sector to jointly support the cost to 
make upgrades work?   
177United Kingdom Home Office, The United Kingdom’s Strategy. 
178 Mueller and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money. 
179 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Preparing for the World: Homeland Security and 
Winter Olympics,” news release, January 10, 2012, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=475294; Rob King, 
“Olympics Run £2 Billion Over-Budget as Security Costs Double Due to Poor Planning,” Daily Mail, 
March 9, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2112489/London-2012-Olympics-runs-2bn-
budget-security-costs-double.html. 
180 START, Fact Sheet. 
181 Ibid. 
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Both of these questions support the thesis research questions. If the answer to 
either question is yes, then as scholars and professionals we must ask ourselves, might it 
not be embarrassing to get to the day after the next catastrophic attack and have to ask 
ourselves, “Why didn’t we at least try to make it work?” 
In the next two chapters this thesis will analyze the research completed and viable 
public policy options available. 
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III. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
“However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the 
results.” 
—Sir Winston Churchill, 
former prime minister of the United Kingdom 
 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The DHS Risk Management Framework provided in the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP) establishes the steps to combine consequence, vulnerability, and 
threat information to generate a rational assessment of national or sector risk. The 
national objective is to weigh infrastructure security priorities, goals, and requirements to 
allocate security resources effectively in order to reduce vulnerability, deter threats, and 
minimize the consequences of attacks.182  With the NIPP model as the larger framework, 
the concepts used to construct the analytical decision framework in this thesis were 
derived from a thorough review of the literature on terrorist psychology, security 
technology, comparative security, and cost-benefit analysis formula and theory.   
For use in responding to the first research question, quantitative data such as 
patron attendance and media exposure to sporting events and SEAR 4–5 events data was 
examined. Qualitative comparison was employed and examined doctrinal gaps and 
potential vulnerabilities which were revealed in the baseline literature review and public 
policies. The second research question was addressed using a cost-benefit analysis 
formula that was established in Mueller’s “Terrorism, Security, and Money.”  The factors 
for the cost-benefit analysis also were derived from the literature, and sources for expense 
estimates are referenced in the analysis. For the third research question, this thesis 
proposes innovative ideas and revisits those presented in the literature for HSE 
consideration and potential working group research and development.  
182 Georgios Giannopoulos, Roberto Filippini, and Muriel Schimmer, Risk Assessment Methodologies 
for Critical Infrastructure Protection: Part I, A State of the Art (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2012), 34–35. 
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The literature review reflects an absence of direct, effective study of SEAR 4–5 
event security in light of rapid 21st century changes in material circumstances that are 
enhancing their value as terrorist targets. To develop solutions, this thesis will analyze 
several key concepts. Consistent with PPD-8 strategy, the “whole of community” 
approach will be examined, including public-private collaboration for providing venue 
security operations, compliance inspections, and funding.   The nexus among them set the 
context and direction for this chapter’s analysis.    
The cost-benefit analysis will determine grounds for the affordability of public 
policy action. The qualitative review will examine the gaps in the current HSE 
organizational structure, especially using comparative analysis of the experience of other 
nations. Upon thorough analysis, the synthesized findings will produce new 
considerations regarding the feasibility of direct government involvement, the indirect 
provision of government incentives, or as an alternative, the possible existence of other 
low-cost, advantageous courses of action for SEAR 4–5 sporting events. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
How well is the current National Protection Framework (the status quo) 
providing counterterrorism protection at sporting events in light of a) 
increasing media coverage at SEAR 4–5 events, and b) more rigorous 
protection at SEAR 1–3 events?  
Even though the Boston Marathon was a SEAR 3 event, there are a vast majority 
of events at the SEAR 4–5 level that attract more patrons and viewers than do the 
collective total of SEAR 1–3 events. As an example of the massive scope of public 
vulnerability to attack, each week throughout the autumn months more than 1.1 million 
Americans attend SEAR 4 rated National Football League (NFL) games at 16 different 
venues nationwide and more than 3.4 million Americans attend college football games at 
more than three hundred SEAR 4 and 5 rated venues.183    
This topic was briefly addressed in the Introduction and Literature Review, but 
due to the importance of select data trends to the theme of this thesis, certain aspects bear 
183 Gary Johnson, “NCAA Attendance Hits New High.” NCAA.com. January 26, 2012.  
http://www.ncaa.com/news/football/article/2012-01-26/ncaa-attendance-hits-new-high. 
 48 
                                                 
reason for further examination in this Analysis chapter. This section of the chapter will be 
organized into four components to synthesize the conclusion: 
• Data Trends: Terrorism Strategy, Tactics, and the Threat to Sporting 
Events 
• Effect of Hardened Protective Posture at SEAR 1–3 events  
• Effect of the National Protection Framework and Voluntary Best Practices 
• 21st Century Circumstances rendering SEAR 4–5 Events as more 
Prominent 
The purpose for addressing and resolving the first research question is to establish 
recent data reflects that SEAR 4–5 events are not only viable, valuable, and vulnerable 
soft targets but that it is wise to anticipate they will be attacked in the near future. 
1. Data Trends: Terrorism Strategy, Tactics, and the Threat to Sporting 
Events 
Though the literature review in Chapter II revealed the sociological factors of why 
sporting events make viable terrorist targets, and the marked history linking them, this 
section will analyze data to examine trends reflecting SEAR 4–5 venues as reasonably 
likely future targets. 
Examining suicide-bombing attacks reveals that from 1990 through 1999 there 
were only 106 such terrorist assaults in fifteen different countries that claimed the lives of 
over 1,500 people. In comparison, from 2000 until 2010, there were 2,114 suicide-
bombing attacks in thirty-two different countries that murdered more than 26,000 
people.184 In 2011 such attacks occurred in more than 70 countries world-wide,185 
accounting for 2,670 deaths.186  Although suicide bombing attacks accounted for only 2.7 
percent of all terrorist attacks that year, they accounted for 21 percent of the deaths 
related to terrorist attacks.187   Fatalities, property damage, tremendous economic impact 
184 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point; Jeffrey W. Lewis, The Business of Martyrdom: A 
History of Suicide Bombing (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 178, 346. 
185 Robert Anthony Pape and James K. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide 
Terrorism and How to Stop It. 9Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 2, 349. 
186 Lewis, The Business of Martyrdom, 178, 346. 
187 U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, 2011 NCTC Report on Terrorism (Washington, DC: 
National Counterterrorism Center, 2011), 13. 
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to the sports entertainment industry as well as the national economy, and a severely 
damaged faith in homeland security would be the expected consequences of a successful 
thoroughly planned suicide terrorism campaign targeting sports venues in America.188   
One tactical reason for the global increase in suicide-bomb attack frequency is 
that it constitutes a very primitive form of “smart bomb.”  Terrorist planners value the 
ability for a dispatched attacker to visually identify and assess the target’s security 
measures and be able to redirect to softer targets at the site if necessary.189  A more 
strategic reason for their increased frequency is that suicide terrorism conveys an image 
of strength for a cause and defeat of a nation’s security enterprise while building 
solidarity among its group members and followers.190  The effects of a synchronized 
suicide bombing campaign at America’s sporting events would convey superiority over 
the HSE while having historic and astronomical economic effects.   
Another devastatingly effective terrorist strategy is to employ numerous 
coordinated bombings at a single target site, or simultaneously over a vast geographic 
area. Two of the deadlier terrorist attacks in Europe within the past decade were in 
Madrid (2004) and London (2005). The Spanish train bombings and English “7/7” attack 
were both the result of the tactic to use multiple, simultaneous detonations in public 
places of mass gathering.191  Such a complex, synchronized attack of planting multiple 
IEDs at soft target sports venues across the country would have a similar deleterious 
effect on the American people and change the landscape of sports entertainment and 
venue security forever, further inhibiting American freedoms and civil liberties.   
Several factors influence terrorist attack methods and tactics which, in turn, 
directly matter to the HSE protection of SEAR 4–5 venues. Though the most recent 
sports-related bombing at the Boston Marathon was not a suicide bombing, records 
188 Richard Fleece, “Suicide Terrorism in America?: The Complex Social Conditions of this 
Phenomenon and the Implications for Homeland Security” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
December 2012). 
189 Hoffman, “Defending America,” 21–22.   
190 Fleece, “Suicide Terrorism in America?” 
191  “IED Attack: The Danger,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).accessed January 12, 
2014, http://www.dhs.gov/ied-attack-danger.  
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reflect that it was considered by the attackers but was an option they chose not to execute. 
This indicates the real presence of suicide bombing as a possible terrorist planning 
measure in America today. Further, terrorist tactics are related to security defense 
measures. As previously cited, suicide attacker “smart” bombers have the capability to 
analyze sporting venue protections at the site of the target and effect last minute decisions 
selecting exact detonation locations.   In addition to suicide attackers, those planting 
IEDs, such as at the Boston Marathon, can also render last minute decisions about event 
venue vulnerabilities. This tactical agility possessed by the terrorists must be matched by 
the HSE in its protection mission capabilities. 
This is important to SEAR 4–5 venue protection because it reflects the expanding 
possibility of different groups taking up arms at less orthodox times and places than 
perhaps currently anticipated by the Homeland Security Environment (HSE).   
A number of other reasons, including logistical and economic factors, cause 
sporting events to be conducive to terror attacks. Among the enticing features for terrorist 
attacks, sports venues are in close proximity to transportation centers for use as escape 
routes. Additionally, they have far-reaching economic repercussions on the community 
around the stadium. Finally, the nature of the sporting events means inviting onto the 
premises masses of people about which the organizers know nothing.192  Putting these 
reasons together with the opportunity to feed off of the “fear culture,” terrorists often 
choose bombings and target places where people congregate such as transportation 
centers, sports stadiums, or related places.193   
Thus, it can be safely asserted that terrorists are 1) motivated to deploy attacks to 
new targets in order to circumvent existing security measures, 2) considering soft targets 
and non-combatants as justifiable to attack, and 3) recognizing that American sports 
venues are symbolic icons of citizens trusting in their government for protection at these 
places of public gathering. As this relates to SEAR 4–5 sporting events, it is important to 
192 Tarlow, Event Risk Management and Safety, 135–137. 
193 Toohey, “Terrorism,” 433. 
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recognize the types of terrorists that may plan and execute such an attack while linking 
their existence to a need for heightened security at the venue site.   
In the past decade, the attacks of MAJ Nidal Hassan and the Tsarnaev brothers 
have been the most lethal and widely publicized terrorist attacks in America, both the 
result of home-grown radicalism. Both attacks were against soft targets to which these 
terrorists gained easy access demonstrating not only the ability, but the prevailing current 
tactic, to recognize soft targets at the local level that can be used as a platform for a 
terrorist cause. 
Before analyzing the current protection mission doctrine and the materializing 
effects of some specific 21st century factors on SEAR 4–5 venues, it is instructive to 
review the effect of the enhanced security measures at America’s SEAR 1–3 events as 
they relate to the lower-rated SEAR events.   
2. Effect of Hardened Protective Posture at SEAR 1–3 events  
Schütz remarks that the world’s 21st century mega-sporting events, which capture 
hundreds of millions of spectators via television and Internet viewers, have opened an 
opportunity for host nations and cities to demonstrate “an unrivalled platform . . . to 
create an image of stability, openness, and prosperity.”194  This image is the cornerstone 
for building a positive and safe image for potential investors, business partners, and the 
tourism industry to elicit visitors and capital.195  With the stability established, the host-
nation’s most highly prestigious foot forward, and security assured, these events serve as 
a catalyst for long-term economic reward.196  Because the safe, successful completion of 
these events garner praise and benefit for the host nations, the disruption of them 
becomes a symbol of terrorist strength and the fortitude of their cause.   




                                                 
In the United States the Olympics are classified as an NSSE.197  As cited in the 
Introduction, such events merit the most sophisticated CT strategic planning and 
surveillance technologies in the world. Because of the increasing trend in terrorism and 
late 20th century increased attraction for terrorists to attack high visibility sports venues, 
mega-events such as the Olympics and the Super Bowl have become veritable fortresses. 
Following the success of the Munich attacks, security at the Olympics and other 
iconic sporting mega-events, like the soccer World Cup, were drastically solidified. The 
1976 Games in Montreal were renowned for the draconian, prison camp-like security 
measures used to secure the athletes. Though not as rigid on the athletes now, Olympic 
security has often been regarded as the supreme model for event maximum security. It 
has become an ultimate staging point for newly developed technologies, information 
sharing, and tens of thousands of armed security personnel to provide protection. With 
the newest technologies tested and seemingly limitless security budgets, these mega-
events have become consummate prototypes of sporting event security.  
Security funding spent for the Games has been steadily, dramatically increasing over 
the decades since Munich.198  For the London 2012 Games, the security costs reached $771 
million and the costs for the 2014 Sochi Games are projected to eclipse the $3.2 billion mark. 
Whereas these weeks-long sporting events held at multiple venues incur the highest security 
costs, the NFL Super Bowl sustains proportionately higher security costs for the one day, 
single venue event. Completing the protection mission with SEAR 1 security measures at the 
2014 Super Bowl in New Jersey cost $17.7 million. 
It is clear that NSSEs and SEAR 1–3 events in America are proving secure largely 
as a result of receiving vast federal financial and operational support. However, there is 
an unforeseen consequence of these events becoming impenetrable (i.e., that terrorists 
will pivot to softer SEAR 4–5 event targets). This consequence is the result of the 
197 “National Special Security Events,” U.S. Secret Service, accessed April 5, 2014, 
http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml, citing the Presidential Protection Act of 2000, Title 18, USC § 
3056 which codified Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62 
198 United Kingdom, Department of Culture, Media and Sport, London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic 




                                                 
phenomenon of criminal activity “displacement.”  In the U.K. and U.S., although wide 
use of CCTV cameras in neighborhoods has had a deterrent effect there, crime has also 
“moved,” or increased in other neighborhoods nearby that did not have cameras. This is 
the understandable concept that once potential perpetrators of crime recognize they are 
under surveillance, and are therefore suspect of either real-time reaction forces or a 
record of events for future judicial use, that criminal activity in that location decreases.   
This same phenomenon is displayed in terrorist strategic and tactical innovations. 
As explained early in Chapter II, terrorist agility to adapt strategically and tactically 
means that the HSE agility must be equal or superior. The examples cited by Crenshaw 
were prior to the 9/11 attacks. The September 2001 attacks were simultaneously 
demonstrative of the strategic shift, to attack the West, and they were equally reflective of 
a tactical innovation to use airliners for more than ransom purposes, but rather, now as 
guided missiles. 
Such tactical innovations were also reflected by the trends in the recorded terrorist 
activity regarding NSSE level Olympic Games and World Cup events in the past several 
decades. Since the 1972 Games there have been no successful attacks at the venue sites 
themselves. Rather, the successful attacks that resulted in the heaviest casualties were 
outside of the Games or World Cup matches, and took place at social gathering places of 
viewers and patrons.   
In 1994, terrorists in Djibouti and Ulster claimed the lives of 10 spectators and 
wounded 20 others gathered at respective World Cup viewing events.199  For the 2010 
World Cup held in South Africa, two al-Shabaab suicide bombers struck a viewing crowd 
in Uganda while several attacks of viewers in Somalia led to a total of 77 deaths, 70 
wounded and one hostage situation. The group Hizbul al Islam claimed responsibility for 
the attacks in Somalia claiming that it was a violation of Islamic law merely to gather to 
watch the sporting event.200  Another three were slain, and 100 wounded in the 1996 
Centennial Square bombing in downtown Atlanta, away from the sporting venues. These 
199 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
Background Report: Terrorism and the Olympics Attacks (College Park, MD: START, July 2012), 4. 
200 Ibid. 
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attacks and casualties can be in part attributed to the strength of the protective security 
measures in place at the sporting mega-events, yielding a form of Displacement. This is 
very relevant to SEAR 4–5 sporting matches as they are the logical alternative event 
targets to the heavily secured top-level SEAR venues. 
Further reflecting terrorists’ strategic planning flexibility to redirect to attack 
softer targets in the face of overwhelming site security, Faud Al-Shameli, planner for the 
1972 Munich attack, stated that the mere bombing of an El Al (Israeli Airline) office is 
not enough.  “We have to kill their most important and famous people. Since we cannot 
come close to their statesmen, we have to kill artists and sportsmen.”201  This also 
demonstrates that terrorists regard sporting events, athletes, spectators, or even selected 
corporate sponsors of sporting events as targets the result of Displacement from being 
able to attack higher profile figures.202   
In this context then, the concept of criminal displacement may apply to the 
heavily secured SEAR 1–3 events, in effect enticing attacks upon SEAR 4–5 events. The 
logical inference is that as demonstrated with attacks moving to alternate locations away 
from heavily protected mega-events, so too terrorists may consider the lower rated SEAR 
events as softer targets worthwhile to attack. However, because the SEAR 1–3 events are 
outside of the notion of a steady-state, receiving support that is far beyond normal 
security measures, this thesis will next examine the National Protection Framework and 
the security industry Best Practices that coalesce to form America’s security doctrine for 
SEAR 4–5 events.  
3. Effectiveness of the National Protection Framework and Voluntary 
Best Practices 
As revealed in the literature review, although DHS has not yet produced a 
National Protection Framework as a universally doctrinal expression of the current 
Administration’s counterterrorism strategy, the working draft displays a vague overview 
of the topic. It does not provide specific examples of procedures, surveillance, and 
201 Toohey, “Terrorism,” 434. 
202 Ibid., 438. 
 55 
                                                 
detection equipment to use, nor any standards for compliance regarding operations or 
staff training. 
The Protection Framework is intended to be an overarching, strategic level 
document that takes specific ownership of sporting event venue security and defines the 
framework that encompasses NSSEs and SEAR events.203  However, it does not delve 
into any particulars about site protection procedures, necessary equipment, training and 
compliance inspections, or funding. Nonetheless, pursuant to Presidential Policy 
Directive #8 (PPD-8), the Framework enumerates eight Core Capabilities for the 
Protection mission.204  Six of the eight core capabilities are applicable to sports venue 
security:  Intelligence and Information Sharing; Interdiction and Disruption; Screening, 
Search, and Detection; Access Control and Identity Verification; Physical Protective 
Measures; and Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities. 
Though these six capabilities are interwoven into one security scheme, two of 
them are intended to take place largely in preparation for events, namely, the Intel/info 
sharing and risk management planning. The remaining four capabilities are directly 
applicable at a venue. Physical protective measures and access/identity control are 
measures that security teams prepare for in advance of the events and can monitor during 
the events. It is in the last two core capabilities which the most challenges are presented 
because of their intrinsic reliance on real-time threat recognition and response. Screening 
and detection procedures will lead to search, interdiction, and disruption of operations on 
location.   
However, in keeping with the framework’s intent to establish a “flexible, scalable, 
and adaptable approach to the delivery” of PPD-8 Core Capabilities, the Framework is a 
generalized planning document. It is purposely not establishing readiness procedures or 
training standards and relinquishes the role of defining the decision making process and 
metrics to the SLLE and stakeholders.205  Elsewhere in the framework, the Core 
203 FEMA, Working Draft, 2. 
204 Ibid., 12. 
205 Ibid., 7. 
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Capabilities are listed respectively with an accompanying set of bulleted Critical Tasks in 
an attempt to give more specific guidance beyond just the eight core capabilities. 
However, these critical tasks are only slightly less general than the Core Capabilities 
themselves.  
In contrast to the higher level PPD and DHS Overview documents that are 
predicated on the imminent threat being known, the Protection Framework does address a 
doctrinal context when threat of attack is not imminent, by separating out a “Steady-
State” status as opposed to the “Enhanced Steady-State.”206  Therefore, there is a 
discrepancy in national guidance to lower level events because NSSEs and SEAR 1–3 
events receive federal support and do not constitute a steady state. In conclusion, the PPD 
level guidance does not accurately pertain to SEAR 4–5 events. 
Nonetheless, despite this lack of inspection or compliance metric established at 
the federal level, achieving the core capabilities at the SLLE level was tied to federal 
funding. Using the core capability-based approach, the Protection Framework leaves it to 
the state/local level for inspection, evaluation, and reporting to FEMA as the DHS lead 
agency for national policy and guidance.     
However, the effectiveness of the core capabilities-based approach has been 
called into question. DHS has attempted to link dollars spent to achieve the core 
capabilities but without established metrics or a proven system of inspection, compliance 
verification, or evaluation that is externally verifiable. The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) found that FEMA lacked any standardization for data collection and 
overall data reliability yielding critical problems in its metrics and assessment process.207  
Therefore, there is room for alternative options to be raised that have already been proven 
effective.   
Among the questions still to be resolved are whether adoption of the management 
system preparedness standards should be mandated, perhaps tied to federal funding, and 
how certification or accreditation against the standards would be conducted. The question 
206 Ibid., 27. 
207 Caudle, “Homeland Security,” 9 
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also remains whether such a compliance and evaluation system can be effectively 
implemented to ensure the building and sustaining of core capabilities if it is only 
voluntary.208  This is especially valid when considering the source of the answer to fill 
the void of doctrine for SEAR 4–5 events, the various and unsynchronized Best Practice 
documents.    
Over the past decade there has been an inordinate number of best practice-type 
documents developed from various sources and levels of the HSE. The origins range 
from professional and college levels of the sports entertainment industry to select 
government or non-government organizations. As an example, in 2005, the Department 
of Justice (DoJ) produced “Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: 
Guidelines for Law Enforcement.”209  In the same year, DHS (via FEMA) produced 
“Special Events Contingency Planning:  Job Aids Manual.”210   Both were voluminous 
documents that explored issues for terrorist attack and non-terrorist based safety issues. 
The result was two federal agencies producing versions of doctrine on the same subject 
without proper coordination.    Further, because one document was produced at DoJ and 
one at DHS, there developed a discrepancy in distribution, reference, usage, and 
compliance. 
However, one strategic planning concept was introduced in the 2005 DoJ “Major 
Special Event: Guidelines” that is still widely in use for special event security. The site 
location strategy entails establishing three concentric rings of security, an outer ring, a 
middle ring, and an inner ring. The intent is for the security to get progressively more 
rigorous moving from outer to inner ring.211  However, this strategy is routinely only 
applied to “major events” (i.e., the NSSEs and SEAR 1–3 events). The same conceptual 
208 Ibid., 10 
209 Edward Connors, Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law 
Enforcement (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Law and Justice, March 2005). 
210 Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Special Events 
Contingency Planning: Job Aids Manual,” (Washington, DC: FEMA, March 2005). 
211 Connors, Planning and Managing Security, 33–37. 
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site counterterrorism posture is successfully practiced abroad in Israel and employs 
interlocking defensive layers to identify and track a threat for subsequent interdiction.212     
Since 2005, scholarly and NGO sources have emerged as well to produce well-
regarded venue security Best Practices. The University of South Carolina produces the 
Journal of Event Venue and Management (JEVM), and the Sports Entertainment Venue 
Tomorrow (SEVT) annual conference, both of which include various professionals from 
throughout the field to discuss Best Practices for management and security issues. 
Likewise, the National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security (NCS4) at 
Southern Mississippi University routinely produces publications and conducts an annual 
summit that also addresses Best Practices for security.   
One sports venue stakeholder issuing Best Practice-type guidance was the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). It issued “planning options” as 
guidelines for intercollegiate athletic programs but there have not been any requisite 
standards in place for institutions to adhere to or be held accountable for by the NCAA or 
local law enforcement. Therefore, there is a lack of consistency in security management 
practices at university sports events throughout the United States.213 The National 
Football League has also produced a best practices guide that has since been adapted for 
use with other professional sports leagues. But currently none of the best practices are 
required by the federal government in order to meet a facility licensing or staff 
certification standard. Since there is no federal inspection or compliance process, their 
implementation is voluntary. This reveals the possibility that many facilities and 
organizations may not be implementing even the suggested practices.   
Synthesizing previous research conducted is relevant to the analysis in this thesis. 
Post 9/11 heightened security measures were increasingly seen as problematic to venue 
and event managers as early as in 2002.214  It was also revealed that as early as 2003 
212 Nadav Morag, Homeland Security in Israel: Counterterrorism Strategies (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, 2011). 
213 Hall et al., “Securing Collegiate Sport Stadiums,” 1 
 214  Hurst, Pratsinakis, and Zoubek, “American Sports.” 
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football stadiums generally scored higher in security surveys than basketball facilities.215  
Important to this thesis, several reasons for the disparity included such causes as the 
volume of basketball events leading to higher security costs at arenas than at football 
stadiums, and the general perception that the arena facility was “just another building” on 
campus.216  This reflected a trend of growing complacency amid facility security 
operations linked to event frequency and cost.217  This trend continued to worsen in time. 
In 2007, 87% of football facility managers had an established emergency action plan in 
place, but only 75% of them had actually ever practiced it.218 Meanwhile, intercollegiate 
facility managers strongly agreed that terrorism is a foreseeable threat and that terrorist 
activity at a collegiate sports venue was not a matter of if, but when it will occur.     
Also that same year, DHS analyzed commonalities or trends in mission critical 
shortcomings at various collegiate sports venues. The end product would identify 
weaknesses for management to then harden the venue security. They conducted 
unannounced game day audits to ensure measures said to be in place actually were in 
place and found there was a lack of consistency in security management practices at 
university sports events throughout the United States.219  The litany of security task 
failures included: 
• Porous perimeter control 
• Failing physical protection systems 
• Loose venue and facility access control 
• Insufficient security team and venue staff training 
• Non-existent communications in the stadium and with local first 
responders 
• Inadequate emergency response and evacuation plans 
215 M. Pantera et al., “Best Practices for Game Day Security at Athletic & Sport Venues.” The Sport 
Journal 6, no. 4 (2003). http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/best-practices- game-day-security-athletic-
sport. 
216 Pantera et al., “Best Practices.” 
217 Hall et al., “Securing Collegiate Sport Stadiums.” 
218 John Miller and Adam Dunn, “Perceptions of Terrorist Threat: Implications for Intercollegiate 
Basketball Venue Managers,” Journal of Venue and Entertainment Management 3, no. 1 (July 2011): 3. 
219 Hall et al., “Securing Collegiate Sport Stadiums,” 1. 
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•  Inconsistent pre-event searching of facilities 
• Fluctuating standards for searches of fans and their belongings 
• No accountability for vendors and their vehicles   
• Concession areas not secured with intrusion detection systems 
• Absence of closed-circuit television (CCTV) in and around the 
stadiums220 
By 2011, even though 87% of the arena managers indicated they had an 
emergency plan in place in the event of terrorist attack, which was consistent with 2007 
surveys, now only 46% conducted counter-terrorism contingency training with their 
staffs.221 Furthermore, of those that did conduct training, most of them, only 18% in total 
were conducting training once annually. By meeting perfunctorily only once per year, it 
is logical that staff members may lose a sense of urgency for counterterrorism preparation 
or focus for providing a safe environment. Thus, the trend in venue staff terrorist event 
training had consistently declined from 2002 to 2011222   
Another troubling trend that developed by 2011, was that a majority of facility 
managers were not adjusting their risk management and security posture in accordance 
with the DHS alert system increases.223  The final disturbing factor was that in that same 
year, only one third of the nation’s 1,350 sports arenas and stadiums were providing 
improved security compared to 1990s era operational practices.224  Thus, it is evident that 
although facility managers perceive the terrorist threat as real, they do not have 
confidence in their doctrine or training levels. Additionally, complacency, funding, and 
resources are common constraints preventing them from applying enhanced measures. In 
general, the security teams at the two-thirds of sporting venues are little or no better 
prepared to protect the public against terrorism attacks than they were prior to the 2001 
attacks.225  
220 Ibid. 
221 Miller and Dunn, “Perceptions of Terrorist Threat.” 
222 Ibid.: Goss, Jubenville, and  MacBeth, Transatlantic Implications. 
223 Miller and Dunn, “Perceptions of Terrorist Threat.” 
224 Keating, “Industry of Fear.” 
225 Ibid.   
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While the media exposure or public visibility of the event is certainly a significant 
factor for terrorists to consider in target selection, complacency in implementing security 
best practices rendering them extremely soft targets to attack also weighs into terrorist 
operational decision making processes.  
As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, large public gatherings, such as 
sports events, that celebrate American popular culture are considered terrorist targets. In 
the 21st century, sports managers must be adequately trained and knowledgeable of 
available security measures in order to prepare for, prevent, detect, and deter potential 
threats to their sports venues. The HSE goal is to increase capabilities, to match terrorist 
innovative planning agility, and to more efficiently protect from acts of terrorism and 
exercise crowd management. In sum, however, the voluntary Best Practice-type 
documents, which serve as the de facto doctrinal sports venue security standards for the 
government, are failing.   
4. 21st Century Circumstances Rendering SEAR 4–5 Events As More 
Prominent 
Over the past half century there has been a dramatic increase in global and 
national terrorist attacks. As noted in Chapter II, there were 168 sports-related terrorist 
events between 1972–2004 to assert the strong ties between terrorism and sports.226 Of 
relevance to SEAR 4–5 event venues is that facility managers whose institutions hosted 
the top 100 attended NCAA basketball programs in 2011, 15% of them knew of terrorist 
threats at their universities and 10% of them had received terrorist threats at their own 
facility.227  These were all SEAR 4–5 rated event venues. The largest demographic of 
these 100 facility managers possessed more than 10 years of experience in their jobs, 
demonstrating that they were not inexperienced or insecure in their positions.   
Meanwhile, as attendance and complacency has been increasing at SEAR 4–5 
events, standards have been decreasing. ESPN, MLB, and other available public sources 
from the nation’s sporting leagues and conferences reveal that attendance in the sport of 
226 Toohey, “Terrorism,” 433. 
227 Miller and Dunn, “Perceptions of Terrorist Threat,” 1. 
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baseball and college football (both SEAR 4–5 events) has steadily increased over the past 
50 years. This increase in attendance is a very relevant factor for terrorist targeting 
selection. However, to begin putting event venue attendance figures in perspective, it is 
important to raise the concern that possibly even the U.S. HSE may not have an accurate 
appreciation of crowd sizes at SEAR 4–5 events.   
For example, the smallest average attendance crowd in MLB games (Tampa, 
18,645) is nearly double the average attendance for a major league soccer match in 
Scotland (10,263) and approaches the level of the average attendance for a major league 
soccer match in Italy (19,968).228  The Tampa baseball games are SEAR 4 or 5 events. 
As another example, the Dayton Dragons lead Minor League Baseball’s lowest 
professional league in attendance per game (8,405), according to MiLB.com. Yet the 
attendance at the Dayton games is close to the average attendance of a major league 
soccer match in Scotland, and is greater than one Major League Soccer team in Italy.229  
Furthermore, in Dayton, the club has sold out its venue for each of the season’s 70 games 
for 14 straight years, according to MiLB.com. The Dayton baseball games are SEAR 5 
events. With figures such as these, it becomes increasingly apparent that in America, 
even our Minor League baseball games, held daily throughout the summer, can pose as 
large a public gathering target as many major league sporting events throughout Europe.   
In analyzing attendance figures just within the United States, SEAR 4–5 events 
demonstrate sufficient suitability for terrorist attack to cause catastrophic casualty 
figures. Although Division I intercollegiate basketball facilities do not attract comparable 
crowds to mega-events such as the Olympics or Super Bowls, they possess abundant 
capacities to result in drastic casualties if they were to be the subject of an attack. In fact, 
it has been articulated that a sporting event does not need to have 70,000 fans in 
attendance in order to have significantly consequential effects.230  
228  “Italian Serie A Stats: Team Attendance—2013–14” and “Scottish Premier League Stats: Team 
Attendance - 2013–14,” ESPN FC, accessed April 4, 2014, 
http://espnfc.com/stats/attendance/_/league/sco.1/scottish-premiership?cc=5901; 
http://espnfc.com/stats/attendance/_/league/ita.1/italian-serie-a?cc=5901 
229 “Italian Serie A Stats.” 
230Miller and Dunn, “Perceptions of Terrorist Threat,” 2. 
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Delving into college basketball attendance statistics provides useful data: The top 
five individual team leaders in attendance during the 2009–2010 season were the 
University of Kentucky (24,111 per game), Syracuse University (22,152 per game), the 
University of Louisville (19,397 per game), the University of Tennessee (19,168 per 
game), and the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (17,786 per game), according to 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The bottom five schools rounding 
out the top 100 during the same season were New Mexico State University (5,659 per 
game), the University of Northern Iowa (5,642 per game), Tulsa University (5,491 per 
game), Marshall University (5,481 per game), and the University of Central Florida 
(5,411 per game), according to the NCAA. Thus, the average attendance numbers of the 
top five schools during the 2009–2010 season was 20,523, while the average for the 
bottom five of the top 100 schools averaged 5,537 spectators per contest. Although these 
figures may pale in comparison to the attendance at NCAA football games, an organized 
attack could result in a death toll greater than the official death toll from the September 
11, 2001 attacks of 2,977.231 
Furthermore, another routine SEAR 4 event, MLB game attendance figures reflect 
a steady increase over the past 35years.232  At 74,026,895, MLB total attendance is the 
most highly attended of any sporting league in the world. This is a total attendance that is 
5.5 times that of the German Bundesliga (soccer), the next highest non-American 
sporting league, and 4.5 times that of the NFL. Though the MLB season plays more 
games than any other sport, the average game attendance is 30,504, ranking it fourth in 
the world only behind the NFL, Bundesliga, and England’s Premier League (soccer).233  
All of the regular season MLB games are SEAR 4 events. 
Even the baseball pre-season games played every year in March reflect valuable 
data demonstrating viability as significant soft targets. The overall MLB average for 
these pre-season games is similar to that of the regular season MiLB games, and again, is 
231Ibid. 
232 Associated Press, “MLB Attendance Drops 1.2 Percent This Year,” USA Today, October 1, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2013/10/01/mlb-attendance-drops-12-percent-this-
year/2904661/. 
233 “MLB Attendance Report—2013,” ESPN, accessed October 17, 2013. 
http://www.espn.go.com/mlb/attendance. 
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similar to the data reflected at major league sporting events in Europe. The league 
average is 6,745 attendees and the team which commands the highest attendance is the 
world-renowned New York Yankees franchise. The Yankees games average 10,300 
people per pre-season game. It is imperative to note that teams play 16–18 games per pre-
season in small, virtually unprotected soft target venues in Arizona and Florida.234  
Making these soft targets pre-season MLB venues even more appealing as terror targets 
is that they also represent a significant boost to local economies. In Florida alone, pre-
season baseball adds $753 million to the local economy each year.235  These pre-season 
games are attended by many spectators that electively travel and take their vacations to 
Florida in the spring. A successful campaign of multiply coordinated terrorist attacks at 
these virtually unprotected soft targets could have a devastatingly crushing effect on the 
local economies for many years to come.  
Because these smaller SEAR 4–5 venues are highly vulnerable and offer 
rewarding opportunities for terrorists to plan them as targets, this section will briefly 
reflect on the effects of IEDs and the possibility that bomb attacks on smaller, softer 
targets can be as deadly or deadlier than at the larger SEAR 1–3 venues. 
Various DHS and U.S. military sources demonstrate that damage caused by IEDs 
depend on their size, content, construction, and placement.236  As expected, because 
vehicles can be a larger platform on which to carry explosive material, they can do more 
damage.237  Therefore, even the stadium parking lots are perhaps more vulnerable than 
inside the ballparks because of their relative weakness in security with little or no use of 
security cameras or vehicle inspection systems to access the lots.   
234 Grapefruit, Cactus Leagues See Average Spring Training Attendance Drop,” Sports Business 
Daily, April 5, 2013, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2013/04/05/Research-and-
Ratings/Spring-Training.aspx. 
235 “Florida Grapefruit League - 2013 Attendance, “Florida Grapefruit League, 
http://www.floridagrapefruitleague.com/home/attendance/. 
236 DHS, “IED Attack.” 
237 Ibid. 
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Figure 3.  Georgia Dome Tailgate Party; Effects of Marriott Car Bomb Attack238 
Venue parking lots, as shown in Figure 3, are renowned for hosting social 
gatherings and “tailgate” parties for American pro and collegiate football, auto racing, 
soccer and a myriad of other sporting and concert events. The parking lots are frequented 
annually by as many as 240 million American tailgaters that spend $35 billion on 
everything from food and beverages to tents and barbecue equipment.239   These figures 
reflect just for the social events in the parking lots before and after the sporting events. 
Therefore, stadium bowls are not the only potential terrorist target but parking lots and 
tailgating events are also potential terrorist targets. Figure 3 depicts a typical crowded 
tailgate party outside a SEAR 4 sporting event venue and displays a 33 foot deep by 40 
foot wide crater caused by the 2008 Islamabad Hotel car bomb that killed 60 people and 
injured 260. The 2,000 lb. VBIED responsible for this damage could be housed in a small 
box truck or even a full-sized SUV or van, like the ones shown in Figure 3.  
As indicated earlier, the vulnerability of these venues has increased with the 
globalization of communications, which has facilitated the posting of instructional 
material pertaining to bomb construction and placement by jihadist and terrorist groups 
across the globe. As a by-product of the war in Iraq, now there also is massive quantities 
238 Photo sources: Jason Getz, “Falcons Tailgating Rules,” Atlanta Journal Constitution; August 8, 
2013; Bill Roggio, “Bombing at Islamabad Marriott Latest in String of Complex Terror Attacks,” CBS 
News Photo, September 21, 2008. 




                                                 
of online reviews analyzing bomb attacks and IED technology of differing sizes and 
delivery methods. The Boston Marathon Bombing demonstrated that these sources are 
being used by potential attacks by home-grown radicals.   
Providing a further challenge to the HSE, DHS sources also reflect that the 
domestic terrorism bomb attacks in Oklahoma City and at the Atlanta Olympics, two of the 
most notorious perpetrated in the United States, were made or effectively compounded with 
simple homemade materials.240  The combination of the available materials with the “How 
To” on-line instructions, poses a serious threat to America’s HSE.   
Citing the multiple effects and injuries resulting from bomb blasts, it is relevant to 
note that the type and number of injuries will vary depending on the physical 
environment and the size of the blast, the amount of shielding between victims and the 
blast, fires, or resulting structural damage, and whether the explosion occurs in an 
enclosed space or an open area such as an outdoor ballpark.241 Germane to this thesis are 
the bomb blast effects which vary according to the size and structure of the sporting 
venues. 
Not surprisingly, a review of architectural layouts and plans available from MLB 
and MiLB reveal that the structural dimensions of minor league stadiums are smaller than 
major league baseball parks. However, though smaller, they may offer a tactically 
superior selection as a terrorist target. 
Routinely, minor league baseball stadiums do not have seating areas in the 
outfield portion of the venue as opposed to the much larger MLB stadiums.242  This 
means that the attendees in the smaller stadium will produce a more closely seated 
audience as opposed to attendees seated in a larger, emptier stadium with the same or 
similar size audience. Thus, the MiLB ballparks will very possibly yield a higher 
concentration of individuals in a smaller area. Therefore, the more densely populated 
stadium crowd will result in a higher death and casualty toll from the attack.  
240DHS, “IED Attack.” 
241 Ibid. 
242 “Prince George’s Stadium,” MiLB.com, accessed April 4, 2014, 
http://www.milb.com/content/page.jsp?sid=t418&ymd=20090311&content_id=522855&vkey=team1  
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Figure 5 illustrates this point. The same bomb blast amid 7,000 fans in the Prince 
George’s Stadium, home of the Bowie Baysox AA baseball club, will more likely result 
in higher casualty figures than 7,000 fans dispersed through the larger Baltimore Orioles 
ballpark at Camden Yards (Figure 4). Consequently, the casualties produced by the same 
single detonated IED in a smaller, more crowded stadium can possibly reign more bomb 
blast effect and causal damage than in a lesser crowded, larger stadium.243  Therefore, 
there exists a realistic possibility that the effects of a bomb blast in the routinely sold-out 
minor league stadium in Dayton would score more casualties than in the routinely less 
than half full major league stadium in Tampa. For these reasons, the stadium in Dayton 
may become the target of choice for an astute terrorist, with the attack there bearing the 
lower risk of being thwarted while likely accomplishing the goal of a higher casualty 
impact.    
  
Figure 4.  MLB Stadium “Camden Yards” Seating Diagram and Aerial Photo244 
243 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “Bomb Threat Stand-off Chart,” March 20, 2009, 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/DHS-BombThreatChart-6-5-09.pdf. 
244 Photos from BallParkSatiumsSeating.com, http://www.ballparkstadiumseating.com/oriole-park-at-
camden-yards-seating-chart-view-map/; “Stadium Travel Guide: Baltimore,” 
http://www.stadiumtravelguide.com/baseball/baltimore.htm. 
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Figure 5.  MiLB “Prince George’s Stadium” Seating Diagram and Rooftop Photo245 
These smaller, minor league, or SEAR 5 venues are often located in smaller 
communities and less urban areas. Because of this, local Emergency Response teams may 
not be as large, as well funded, or aptly trained for terrorism event responses as MLB 
stadiums. Further, because of the size of the security force at the smaller MiLB venue, if 
an attack includes multiple blasts, it will quickly tax the available security force, 
diverting them from efficient evacuation and response measures. Whereas at larger major 
league size venues, or at SEAR 1–3 venues, a significantly larger security team will 
likely have more capability to react to separate incidents and still execute various 
evacuation and crowd control measures. 
Moreover, a known terrorist tactic is to attract bystanders to windows, doorways, 
and the outside with gunfire, small bombs, or other methods and then detonate a larger, 
more destructive device, significantly increasing human casualties.246  Because these 
smaller venues may be older, or less well funded when constructed, they are more likely 
to have more narrow concourse levels and less efficient access and egress points from 
which to evacuate the stadium. This leads to the possibility of a congested exit route 
being the target of a secondary bomb.   
245 Photos from “Stadium Diagram,” MiLB.com, 
http://ww.milb.com/content/page.jsp?sid=t418&ymd=20100328&content_id=8975064&vkey=team1; “The 
Monumental Experience,” http://cherryhillpark.wordpress.com/tag/baltimore-orioles/. 
246 “Bomb-Threat Stand-Off Distances,” U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Accessed 
April 4, 2014, http://www.nctc.gov/site/technical/bomb_threat.html. 
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The smaller, less funded, or older stadiums may also not be built with terrorism or 
bomb damage in mind unlike many of the newer major league stadiums now being built 
(e.g., Texas Stadium).247  One of the prompts for this thesis is the premise that SEAR 5 
level venues possess a smaller amount of current protective video and explosive trace 
detection technology than do the SEAR 1–3 venues. This means that with less 24/7 
surveillance coverage in and around a stadium, an attacker may conduct reconnaissance 
of the location more easily and from closer range with less chance of being spotted by 
venue security teams. 
Not only are SEAR 4–5 venue facilities soft targets that offer a high payoff benefit in 
casualties for terrorists to consider, but their exposure to the media and therefore, viewers 
and more citizens watching or listening, has also expanded dramatically in the past 
decade.   
Catarina Kinnvall defines the concept of globalization that “events elsewhere [in 
the world] have consequences for our everyday political, social, and economic lives, 
affecting individuals’ sense of being.”248  This means that more people in more places 
are noticing, or affected by more things happening, primarily because they are learning 
about them in real-time through the Internet and global media. Therefore, 21st century 
globalization enhances the effectiveness and value of terrorism strikes at smaller, 
historically perceived less noticeable venues.   
Simultaneous to the increase in SEAR 4–5 event exposure through 21st century 
media and device platforms, the Nielsen company ratings reflect a long and steady 
decline in television ratings for the Olympic Games. This section of the thesis is not 
intended to imply that terrorists regard Nielsen ratings as a target selection consideration. 
However, the ratings are generally reflective of how much exposure a given event attains 
and therefore, how well it may serve as a platform for their cause. Prior to 1972, the 
Olympic Games had not been struck by terrorism. However, as discussed previously, it 
was these Munich Games which clearly established the modern day link of sports with 
terrorism.   
247 Anderson, “How Dallas Does Security.” 
248Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism,” 742. 
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During the Munich Games, the extensive coverage of the PLO attack on the 
Israeli Olympic team was a watershed broadcasting moment in the history of 20th 
century terrorism, receiving a Nielsen rating of 20.9 and share of 45, according to the 
audience-measuring company. This equates to 21% of all televisions in America 
watching the broadcast while 45% of all televisions in use across the country during the 
time of the broadcast were watching it. As cited in the literature review, the PLO/BSO 
selected the Games to assault for internally opportunistic political reasons, but also 
because they were a soft target and televised around the world.   
As a globally televised mega-event, the Olympics reached its zenith for television 
ratings in the 1970s, with the Games in Montreal only slightly higher than those in 
Munich. Since then there has been a marked steady decline in television ratings, Nielsen 
data show. This decline could be due to many factors such as time zones of the host 
nations, changes in association of political power with the events, the fall of 
Communism, etc. However, the bottom line reflected by the Nielsen ratings since 1976 is 
that as an event of mass appeal for consideration as a terrorist target, the numbers of 
viewers for the mega-event of the Olympics has drastically decreased. Meanwhile SEAR 
4–5 events such as NFL and MLB games have shown a vastly marked increase in 
viewership in the 21st century. 
Similarly, data reflect that the rating status of television viewership in America in 
general (i.e., the percent of all television-equipped homes watching a particular program 
at one time) is also clearly on a downward trend.249  This means it is far less likely now 
for America, collectively, to be watching any one show or event at the same time. Over 
the past sixty years, the seasonal leader in average nightly television rating has gone from 
the “I Love Lucy” show’s 67.3% of the market in 1952–53 to 12.3% of the market for 
NCIS in 2012–13.250 This means that there was an 84% decrease in the phenomenon of 
249 Jim Edwards, “TV Is Dying, And Here Are The Stats That Prove It,” Business Insider, November 
24, 2013.  
250 Alex McNeil, Total Television, 4th ed (New York: Penguin, 1996); “2003-04 Season to Date 
Program Rankings from September 22, 2003, through May 30, 2004,” ABC Medianet; Tim Brooks and 
Earle Marsh, The Complete Directory to Prime Time Network and Cable TV Shows, 1946-Present (New 
York: Ballantine Books), 1679–1698; Nellie Andreeva, “Full 2010–11 Season Series Rankings,” Deadline: 
Hollywood, May 2, 2011. 
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Americans routinely watching the same show at the same time. The leading television 
show in the U.S. in 2011–12 was NBC’s Sunday Night Football, at 12.9%. NFL Football 
is a SEAR 4 sporting event in America, and that television season it was routinely the 
most highly watched show in America.251   
Continuing the trend of rapidly narrowing the gap in exposure in the media 
between global mega-events and the SEAR 4–5 events was most recently demonstrated 
with America’s viewing of the 2014 Winter Olympics. The daily average television 
ratings were down 10% in 2014 from 2012, continuing the trend since the 1970s, 
according to Nielsen. Even one of the Olympics’ usually largest television draws, the 
prime time telecast of the closing ceremonies lost out in the ratings to American Movie 
Channel network’s series, “The Walking Dead.”252  However, despite dropping 
television numbers, the Sochi Olympics demonstrated the 21st century’s growing reliance 
on and developing value in multiple forms of media to watch events, especially through 
on-line streaming.   
For the first time ever a broadcasting company reported that it aired more hours 
via on-line streaming coverage than it aired on television. NBC also reported that its 
viewership on-line was up 54% from the 2010 Games. NBC asserts this is reflective of 
the “rapidly transforming [the] way people experience the event.”253  Although the daily 
average American TV audiences continued to trend downward, the overall viewership of 
the Games was boosted 20% by viewing via online streaming. The resulting trend is that 
the more devices that viewers are using to watch event is leading to overall elevations in 
the numbers of viewers for the sporting event. NBC’s Allan Wurtzel observed, “A rising 
tide lifts all boats.”   
This trend is relevant to SEAR 4–5 events because this same form of marketing 
and media exposure has increased the exposure and visibility of such events, thereby 
251 Edwards, “TV Is Dying.” 
252 Bill Brioux, “Olympic TV Ratings Down from Vancouver, but Online Numbers Soar: Daily TV 
Average Dropped from Four Million Viewers to 1.5 Million,” Canadian Press, February 25, 2014. 
http://www.canada.com/entertainment/Olympic+ratings+down+from+Vancouver+online+numbers+soar/9
549618/story.html. 
253 David Bauder, “Online offerings transform Olympic experience,” Associated Press, February 12, 
2014, http://wintergames.ap.org/article/online-offerings-transform-olympic-experience. 
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increasing their value as terrorist targets.   Therefore, what the data trend reveals is a 21st 
century reality that it is no longer necessary to strike an Olympics or World Cup mega-
event just to gain worldwide exposure for a terrorist cause when tremendous exposure 
can be gained globally by striking a much softer target such as a hotel254 or soft target 
sporting event.255   
Considering that terrorists plan their attacks to gain as much media exposure as 
possible,256 the expansion of devices on which to watch sporting events, especially 
through the Internet, means that these heretofore non-broadcasted events are now widely 
seen and heard around the nation and the world. With the past decade’s explosion of 
Internet and television network sports package marketing and innovations using 
accessible devices such as smartphones, iPads, tablets, and personal computers, the de-
centralization of sports broadcasting has also enabled spectators to watch a greater variety 
of sports at an infinite variety of times.257    
These SEAR 4–5 sporting events are now broadcast via the Internet and satellite 
radio in massively greater numbers than they were as little as a decade ago.   
Sporting event venues are perfect sites for both large-scale and small-scale 
attacks, and the need for the mega-event such as the Olympics to serve as the terrorist 
sporting event platform of choice, is diminishing.258  In this rapidly globalizing 
community, as part of the Counterterrorism campaign, sporting event risk managers “are 
not only on the front lines, but they are also warriors for peace.”259   
In less than its first decade, MLB’s Internet-based subscription package 
viewership has risen from its inception to more than 3.9 million subscribers worldwide in 
254 Onook. Manish and Raghav, “Information Control,” 33–43. 
255 Susan Candiotti “Suspect: Boston Bombing was Payback for Hits on Muslims,” CNN, May 17, 
2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/16/us/boston-bombing-investigation/. 
256 Toohey, “Terrorism,” 433. 
257 Alan Wurtzel, NBC Sports, February, 2014 
258 Tarlow, Event Risk Management ,135–137 
259 Ibid., XIII. 
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more than 60 nations.260  Furthermore, since its inception on Jan. 1, 2009, there are an 
additional 70 million American households that have cable television packages including 
the MLB Network, which also broadcasts SEAR 4–5 MLB and MiLB games.261  
This equates to one half million Americans attending soft target events nightly 
throughout the spring and summer months across the nation combined with 
approximately 5 million people watching and listening online or through satellite 
television and radio packages across the nation and the world. These widely broadcast 
baseball sporting events are soft targets and are routinely designated as SEAR 4–5 events.   
MLB.TV now asserts it is available on more than 400 different forms of broadcast 
devices including video game systems and smart phones. This trend of expanding global 
communications shows no signs of changing. Swedish telecommunications company 
Ericsson projects that by 2019 there will be 5.6 billion smart phones and 9.3 cell phones 
in total throughout the world.262  European research firm, Enders Analysis, projects that 
the number of smart phones in use worldwide will exceed the number of personal 
computers in the first half of 2014.263   
Broadcasted visually on television and the Internet, MLB games are also 
broadcast live worldwide via satellite radio. Today, Sirius XM radio facilitates the 
broadcast of every MLB game and began 2014 with 25.56 million subscribers.264  But 
this was not always the case. On 9/11, satellite radio broadcasting of sporting events was 
in its infancy. Demonstrated in the chart below is the accelerated growth of global 
satellite radio broadcasting (in numbers of millions of subscribers).   
260 Om Malik, “Happy Birthday MLB.TV. Now That’s What I Call Sports TV,” GIGAOM, August 
26, 2012, http://gigaom.com/2012/08/26/happy-10th-birthday-mlb-tv-now-thats-what-i-call-sports-tv/.  
261 Robert Seidman, “List of How Many Homes Each Cable Network Is In—As of August 2013.” TV 
by the Numbers, August 23, 2013. 
262 Associated Press, “Number of Smartphones Expected to Triple to 5.6 Billion by 2019,” 
Washington Times, November 11, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/11/number-
smartphones-expected-triple-56-billion-2019/. 
263 Henry Blodgett, “The Number of Smartphones in Use Is about to Pass the Number of PCs,” 
Business Insider, December 11, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/number-of-smartphones-tablets-pcs-
2013-12. 
264 “Sirius XM Exceeds 2013 Net Subscriber Target; Issues 2014 Subscriber And Free Cash Flow 
Guidance,” SiriusXM,  January 7, 2014, http://investor.siriusxm.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=817666. 
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Year Sirius SiriusXM XM Note 
2013  25.56   
2010  20.19   
2007 8.32 17.33 9.01 *** 
2004 1.14 4.24 3.1 ** 
2001   0.03 * 
* GM begins factory installed XM Satellite radio 
** Year Announced MLB Contract to start in 2005 
*** Year of Sirius and XM Satellite Radio merger 
 
Figure 6.  Growth of Satellite Radio Subscriptions265 
The rapidly expanding radio listening numbers over the past decade from across 
the globe indicate the further exposure of MLB (SEAR 4) events beyond just that of the 
visual broadcasts on television and on-line. 
Data reflect that the mega-events are spending immense amounts of money and 
committing vast numbers of security personnel to pose a much more difficult challenge 
for a terrorist to penetrate than ever before.  Meanwhile, similar or greater casualty rates 
are attainable at the soft target venues. Coupled with the tremendously rapid increase of 
national and global coverage of NFL, MLB, MiLB or NCAA athletic events in real-time, 
from the terrorists’ perspective, the phenomenon of Displacement is worthy of grave 
consideration, transforming these SEAR 4–5 venues into attractive targets.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 2 
Are there quantitative or qualitative methods to demonstrate a positive cost-
benefit relationship between potential solutions v. consequential alternatives? 
1. Definitions and Objectives 
In this era of fiscal austerity, to recommend or even to propose public policy 
options that incur greater fiscal expense is difficult, if not hopeless. Therefore, this thesis 
265 “SiriusXM Reports 2012 Results,” SiriusXM. February 5, 2013, 
http://investor.siriusxm.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=737857. 
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will analyze and determine innovative concepts for venue security public policy options 
that are of little or no cost to the federal government, those that are already built into the 
DHS budget, and those that can be subsidized through public-private partnerships with 
concurrent citizen contribution to minimize federal expense. To explain the overall cost-
benefit concept, Figure 7 provides an illustration of a basic economic model. 
 
Figure 7.  Demonstrating a Macro-Economic Model of Expenditure Returns266 
The timeless macro-economic challenge faced by government is to cyclically 
consider, decide, spend, and re-evaluate how much of its funding resources it wants to 
put toward the production of “guns v. butter.” That principle applies with the 
government’s annual decisions regarding the DOD or DHS/HSE budgets on defense and 
security spending as opposed to the plethora of other non-security-oriented domestic 
spending. In fiscally responsible governments, finite funding is allocated in order to 
conduct operations through a year. Therefore, the more money that is spent on defense 
and security budgets means the less there is to be spent on domestic programs. Or, for the 
purpose of this thesis, the more money spent on sports venue security, the less there is for 
other government expenditures. However, it is possible to add funding from other sources 
to push the curve outward in order to produce more guns and more butter.  
266 “Guns and Butter Curve,” Investopedia.com, accessed April 4, 2014. 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gunsandbutter.asp. 
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Figure 8.  Demonstrating an Improved Macro-Economic Model of Expenditure 
Returns267 
As depicted in Figure 8, it is theoretically possible for additional funding to move 
the curve outward in order to facilitate production of both at a higher level. Therein lies a 
great political quandary continually waged between American parties as to how to 
generate the additional funds or resources to push the entire curve outward. In this thesis, 
the dilemma posed is how to recommend security enhancements that either (virtually) 
don’t cost more money, or in the event they do, how to push the entire curve further 
outward by linking them to creative, new funding streams.   
In answering Research Question 3 in the next section, several options will be 
addressed to meet the goal of enabling government to push the productivity curve 
outward without increasing the tax burden on the populace to an unacceptable level. 
However, to begin the cost-benefit analysis, scholars and public policy leaders should ask 
themselves: what is the minimum point of effectiveness to make the cost worth spending?  
Below is one brief example of what such a cost-benefit scenario might resemble.   
In the Boston public housing projects of Roxie Homes, Camfield Gardens, 
and Grant Manor, a major collaborative effort was recently undertaken to 
improve the quality of life. Trained security officers from the projects, 
who have arresting powers, monitor the CCTV camera from within the 
project and respond to any illegal activity captured on the video. The 
project, known as Safe Neighborhood Action Plan (SNAP), cost $1.3 
267 Narayan Bashyal, “Shifting the Production Possibility Curve,” August 26, 2013, 
http://narayanbashyal75.blogspot.com/2013/08/economics-xi-hseb-notes.html. 
 77 
                                                 
million to implement and has reduced crime in the three projects by 30 
percent.268 
This demonstrates an example of cost of investment versus the successful return 
on that expenditure.   
However, an example of the difficulty in weighing the cost-benefit is to consider 
the relationship of CCTVs with the resolution of the Boston Marathon Bombing. By a 
2007 ACLU accounting, records show that in Boston there were an estimated 147 
cameras in the networked city system and another 400 on subways and buses operated by 
the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.269  The attackers were subsequently 
identified because of the CCTVs in place at the event. The capture of the perpetrators 
within the week demonstrates the intrinsic value of surveillance technologies. An added 
benefit of the CCTV system in place, which was widely recognized by the media in the 
aftermath of the bombing, is the deterrent factor for future violence. Therefore, 
surveillance systems can provide a benefit in after-the-fact support to solve crime, a 
deterrent effect on future crime, and real-time help in interdiction to complete the venue 
protection mission.   
This section will demonstrate a sufficiently high probability that the conclusions 
and recommended courses of action will achieve the goal of a “breakeven threshold” 
analysis. This means that a quantitative method will justify expenditures for surveillance 
or trace detection equipment (the known costs) included in certain more costly venue 
security options recommended in Chapter IV. The policy analysis decision framework 
used will enable uncertain factors to be addressed by comparing them with certain 
established costs. The end-state product is a decision model built from a response rule 
that says if the benefits exceed the costs, it is worth doing.270  Mueller’s cost-benefit 
analysis formula is one such academically recognized tool that will be used in this thesis.  
268 Marcus Nieto, Kimberly Johnston-Dodds and Charlene Wear Simmons, “Public and Private 
Applications of Video Surveillance,” California Research Bureau, February 6, 2006, 
www.library.ca.gov/crb/02/06/02-006.pdf.  
269 Chenda Ngak, “Boston Marathon Investigation: Are CCTV Cameras the Answer?” CBS News, 
April 16, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/boston-marathon-investigation-are-cctv-cameras-the-
answer. 
270 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving. 4th ed (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011), 50–53 
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2. Costs, Breakeven Point, and Formula Applied  
Mueller defines the benefit of a security measure as a function of three elements: 
• Benefit = (probability of a successful attack)  
• x (losses sustained in the successful attack)  
• x (reduction in risk) 
The “probability of a successful attack” is the estimated likelihood that a 
successful terrorist attack will take place if the security measure is not in place. The 
“losses sustained in the successful attack” include the fatalities and all direct and indirect 
damages that will accrue as a result of a successful terrorist attack. The “reduction in 
risk” is the degree to which the security measure is estimated to foil, deter, disrupt, or 
protect against a terrorist attack. This benefit, expressed as a multiplicative composite of 
the three considerations, is then compared to the costs of providing the security measure 
required to attain the benefit.271  This means that if the cost to implement the measures is 
less than the benefit amount derived by the formula, then it is worth pursuing. 
The factors used in this thesis are shown in Table 2: 
One-time Damages Subsequent Annual Damages 
Value of Lives (Quantified by Mueller) Subsequent Enhancements Instituted   
Liability for Injuries   Ticket Sales  
Facility Property Damage    Club Revenues Future Losses 
Corollary Property (Adjacent Buildings)    Marketing Ad Losses 
Response, Rescue, & Clean Up   Area Economic Disruption Activity 
Reconstruction   Businesses Bankrupt as Result 
Table 2.   Successful Attack Cost Factors272  
271 Mueller and Stewart, 76–77. 
272 Claude Journés, “Policing and Security: Terrorists and Hooligans.” Sport In Society 1, no. 2 
(1998): 145–60. 
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Therefore, to apply the formula it is necessary to approximate the losses sustained 
in a successful attack. This thesis will suggest the losses from multiple coordinated 
suicide bomb attacks with two delayed detonations occurring simultaneously at four 
geographically dispersed stadiums. 
Using the value established in Mueller’s 2011 text affixing $6.5 million per death, 
and using the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) bomb 
blast radius’ at a crowded sporting venue, for demonstrating the formula the thesis will 
assume 15 deaths and 120 wounded in the dual bombings at each of the four venues, a 
total of 60 deaths and 480 wounded would result from the synchronized attack. This type 
of attack alone would yield losses of $390 million solely due to the deaths as quantified 
by Mueller. This may be a worst case scenario, but it is also not as extreme a scenario as 
could possibly be conjectured. The 1994 and 2010 World Cup viewing site attacks cited 
earlier in the chapter revealed virtually a 1:1 ratio of deaths to wounded victims. 
However, to use a less powerful attack as an example, if such an attack occurred due to 
one suicide bomber and resulted in only three deaths, (which for a densely populated 
venue would be extremely unlikely), then even by the Mueller attribution there would be 
$19.5 million in damages due to only the deaths involved. Adding to these formulaic 
projections, the other categories cited above would dramatically increase the potential 
quantitative value of the damages from such attacks. 
Therefore, reverting to the Mueller formula: 
If asserting a 95% chance of success for coordinated multiple suicide bomb 
attacks at various SEAR 4 MLB venues, along with a $390M quantitative damage 
assessment solely from the deaths incurred, then multiplying this amount against an 
asserted security enhancement estimate will yield a Benefit. In this example, a 75% 




With this data the formula would reveal: 
Benefit = .95 x 390,000,000 x .75 = $277,875,000 
This means that if the HSE were to implement measures that could produce a 75% 
reduction in likelihood of an attack’s success, then it is advisable to spend up to 
$277.8 million to implement the measures. Of course, this is just one possible example. If 
in our same example using only 60 deaths but the projected likelihood of success before 
the measure is implemented and the effectiveness of the measure stopping the attack are 
respectively reduced, then the formula might appear as: 
Benefit = .50 x 390,000,000 x .50 = $97,500,000 
This figure now resembles one that can be considered much more palatable by the 
collaborative public-private sector, especially if spread out over a number of years. 
In considering surveillance equipment costs, during the installation the cost of the 
cameras is not the most expensive factor. Rather, the more expensive elements are the 
installation, maintenance, inter-operability of the systems, training and operations center 
staffing, according to BWI Airport security system invoicing.273 Infrastructure cost for 
the facility can include opportunity costs for lost retail/revenue generating space. In 
addition to that opportunity cost, maintenance, and eventual technology upgrade 
constitute recurring expenses. In the long term, the highest cost consideration is for 
increases in staff to accommodate SOC or system monitoring schedules, as this will be a 
routine annual expense.  
However, to consider calculating solely the costs of select types of surveillance 
and trace detection systems (i.e., just the camera system and ETD system hardware) to 
improve venue security, for demonstration purposes, the CPI adjusted figures are 
estimated as shown in Table 3.274   
  
273 Determined from Baltimore Washington International (BWI) ADT invoicing data. 
274 Surveillance and Trace Detection equipment costs have been established in 2014 dollars based on 
Bureau of Labor, Consumer Price Indexed totals from data acquired by TSA and as posted by technology 
providing companies. Prices are per system as an approximation for demonstration purposes.  
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$25k for first camera system plus 
$10k for each additional camera 
ETD $60,325  
Table 3.   Surveillance and Detection Equipment Costs275    
For example, it is reasonable to presume that $200,000 could procure an ETD 
system and 11 integrated CCTVs for synchronization into a SOC. This may not sound like 
an extensive system but for a SEAR 5 Minor League Baseball facility that only has one 
main turnstile entrance, as is the case at the Prince George’s Stadium sited earlier in the 
chapter, then it can be a profoundly effective addition to the security team’s resources. 
From these figures, and from a further analysis of the myriad of varying stadium sizes and 
configurations, purposes, and locations, it is clear that the costs to implement surveillance 
and detection technologies for a SEAR 5 MiLB or NCAA sporting venue will be less 
expensive than for a SEAR 4 MLB, NFL, or select NCAA venue. 
As an alternative cost-benefit scenario for consideration, the figures below 
illustrate the option of taking no action to support SEAR 4 and 5 venues in upgrading 
their security capabilities, and subsequently a lethal coordinated attack does occur. In 
such a case, as with aviation industry security in 2001, the HSE may find itself in the 
same predicament as it was following the al Qaeda attacks. Responding to massive public 
opinion and deep fear, developing an after-the-fact type of “knee-jerk” defensive strategy 
can also be approximated.   
In 2004, TSA analyzed expenditures incurred to implement heightened or 
enhanced security measures at the nation’s largest airports directly as a result of the 2001 
attacks (i.e., these expenses were not in place prior to the attacks). An example of the 
study’s results as shown in Table 4 revealed that at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International 
airport, annual costs increased. 
275 “Surveillance System Pricing Sheet,” SecurLinx, accessed February 1, 2014, 
http://www.securlinx.com/BR/pdf_files/FaceTrac%20Data%20Sheet.pdf. The $12,000 per camera installed 
price with training, Bureau of Labor CPI adjusted 1.5% a year since 2008. This denotes the approximate 
average of the purchase of fixed and “PTZ” cameras. PTZ cameras are “Point, Tilt, Zoom” cameras. BWI 
uses the fixed cameras at stairwells, elevators, doorways. The PTZs are for larger areas to watch people, to 
pick up on behavior or an individual and to monitor them as necessary; $50,000-per-ETD system installed 
price with training, Bureau of Labor CPI adjusted 2.11%  a year since 2005 
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Personnel $2.7M/yr 
Equipment $950k/yr 
Facility Infrastructure $1.05M/yr  
Operations/Procedures $650k/yr 
Total   $5.26M/yr 
Total CPI Adjusted to 2014 $6.55M/yr 
Table 4.   9/11 Aftermath Increased Security Costs276   
This airport handles a throughput of approximately 110,000 passengers per day. 
So to pro-rate that throughput number to one comparable for an average daily throughput 
of patrons at an MLB SEAR 4 event, of 30,000 attendees per game per day, the thesis 
will use a 27% size pro-ration. Therefore, if similar costs used by TSA to adjust airports 
to a heightened threat after a catastrophic attack were to be implemented then costs may 
be proportioned for a SEAR 4 venue to expect possible costs of 27% or .27 x $6.55M = 
$1.77M.277   This approximation would cover costs for personnel, equipment, facility 
infrastructure, and operations/procedures to attain a higher level of security at SEAR 4–5 
venues comparable to the checkpoint and surveillance systems at today’s airports. 
The data in this section is used to demonstrate the breadth of the costs to consider 
for strengthening SEAR 4–5 venue security. Further discussion of the arguments, on both 
sides of the spending spectrum, are addressed in more detail below.    
3. Considerations and Contentions against Increased Expenditures 
This section addresses the expenditures that should be considered to add enhanced 
surveillance and trace detection equipment to SEAR 4–5 venues.   
One important argument against increased HSE expenditures raises the question, 
is there “a false sense of insecurity in the United States?”278  Data reflect that since 9/11 
276Airports Council International—North America, “2004 Survey: The Cost of Security since 9/11.”  
277 These figures were attained in 2004. Therefore, using the CPI adjusted rate of 2.22% per year, this 
means that an expenditure per stadium of $1.77M annually would equate to similar security measures for a 
facility with a pro-rated throughput, to reflect that of the MLB SEAR 4 venues. Bureau of Labor, 
Consumer Price Index, http://www.in2013dollars.com/2003-dollars-in-2013?amount=100, retrieved 3/1/14 
278 Attributed to Leif Wenar of the University of Sheffield, as cited by John Mueller in “Six Rather 
Unusual Propositions,”487. 
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there have been only 27 deaths as a result of terrorist attack. Notwithstanding the 297 
wounded or injured in such attacks here in America, critics opposing expanded HS 
budgets have cited that the media does not seem to inform the public that “in every year 
except 2001 only a few hundred people in the entire world have died as a result of 
international terrorism.”279    
Perhaps it is needless to state, but if you are one of the “only a few hundred” that 
have died, terrorism was a critically important issue to you and the families and friends 
you left behind. Accordingly, for the governments representing those few hundred 
people, it is implicit in the role of government to make public safety and security a 
primary, if not singularly most important reason for existence as a sovereign government, 
i.e., to protect the people from all enemies, foreign and domestic.280  The gravest 
disservice the government can do for its people is to not even attempt to find means to 
provide better, even idealist, solutions just because of the notion they may involve cost. 
Another argument against expenditures for surveillance and detection equipment 
contends that enhancing venue security technologies and staff training may lead to the 
government failing to spend money on other ventures perhaps “of objectively greater 
societal needs.”281  Whether or not any single government expenditure is truly of an 
“objectively greater need” by any sense of measurable standard certainly is subject to 
political debate. But the point remains that CT defensive posture spending on Homeland 
Security means that funds allocated there could arguably be spent better elsewhere, e.g., 
addressing poverty, joblessness, or climate change.      
A similar argument contends that Americans suffer when the domestic agenda 
does not continue to obtain endless funding, and that deviating from this principle 
weakens the nation’s economic engine. By virtue of the government pursuing 
279 Mueller, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions,” 487. 
280 “Oaths of Office,” U.S. Army, accessed on February 21, 2014, 
http://www.history.army.mil/html/faq/oaths.html. 
281 Clark Chapman and Alan W. Harris, “A Skeptical Look at September 11th.” Skeptical Inquirer 26, 
no. 5 (2002): 30; Mueller and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money, XX. 
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“unachievable but politically popular levels of domestic security,” the terrorists achieve 
one of their goals, for the U.S. to damage its long-term financial future.282   
A more questionable argument asserts that building a strong “homeland security 
industry” is only in the best interest of the few that can profit from it. This point infers 
that the homeland security industry is profiting from hyped fear mongering about 
terrorism purported by pundits who fabricate and perpetuate the culture of fear. The 
theory contends that the conjured insecurity in America is the result of media frenzy 
created by news channels and expert panels that encourage viewers to watch their 
programming and their commercials.283  This promoted insecurity also infers a highly 
motivated private sector with foundations in the military weapons and homeland security 
technologies industries driven by profit.284  It is also reasoned that this homeland security 
industry may yield not only corporate profits for those producing equipment and 
technologies but also benefits the public officials who sell trust through security to their 
constituents.285  And finally it is hypothesized that the over-reaction to increase HSE 
expenditures could be just a knee-jerk reaction of insecurity by a people that have been 
largely geographically isolated from enemies for centuries and now find themselves 
immersed in a global village and unnecessarily afraid that danger lurks in the heart of 
every foreigner.   
Essentially, the sum of these arguments asks if there is any basis for “housewives 
in Iowa ... to be watching TV afraid that al-Qaeda’s going to charge in their front 
door?”286     
Nonetheless, as the answer to Research Question 1 demonstrates, there is a viable 
terrorist threat that is capable and willing to strike soft targets to kill American non-
combatants. Obviously, organizers and promoters of SEAR 4–5 rated sporting events 
cannot afford security expenditures on the scale of nations preparing to host an Olympics 
282 Mueller, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions,” 492. 
283 Ibid., 492–493 
284 Ibid.  
285 Ibid., 493, 495. 
286 Mark Bowden’s remarks on PBS’s Tucker Carlson: Unfiltered, which aired November 19, 2004. 
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or FIFA World Cup competition. But if they could cost-effectively structure the same 
security measures on a pro-rated scale commensurate with the size and visibility of their 
event in comparison to those fortified mega-events, would they?  If there was no adverse 
cost attached and they could even use the venue security to promote the events, using it 
as a marketing tool to their business advantage, would they?   
Similar to the U.K., as cited in chapter two, the U.S. government is essentially 
responsible for the security from the stadium property outward into society, and 
ostensibly the private sector is responsible for the security from the stadium property 
inward to the playing surface at the venue.287  Accordingly, with the private sector 
bearing the bulk of the responsibility for security on location, there is a need for 
incentive, or necessity,288 for it to continually improve the last line of security on-site. 
The law enforcement community suggested that, especially with smaller (SEAR 4–5) 
venues, the city and county governments should consider policies or legislation to require 
more direct cooperation between the private sector venue managers and the 
authorities.289  The incentive and requisite- based options should not be ruled out for 
future consideration, and will be further addressed in this thesis. 
Short of the more sweeping mandatory parameter, other incentive-based options 
have been attempted. To enhance venue safety and to facilitate better risk management, 
private sector companies in the United States are financially incentivized in the form of 
insurance cost reductions to obtain more suitable facilities and better prepared venue 
staff. However, there is no evidence that these insurance rate reductions are reserved for 
Counterterrorism (CT) strategy.   
Instead, they are incentives for property managers to ensure safety precautions 
and emergency procedures are in place. This raises the substantial point that there is a 
fine, yet important distinction, between venue safety programs and facility-event CT 
287 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Community Oriented Policing Services 
(COPS), Building Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships to Prevent and Respond to Terrorism and 
Disorder (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2004), 23–24, 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1355. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid., 24 
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strategy. It is possible that property managers obtain the insurance cost reduction 
incentive simply by ensuring that crowd control measures and first responder measures 
are in place. However, there is no direct link attributing cost incentives with the 
installation and maintenance of enhanced counterterrorist surveillance and detection 
systems to improve attendee safety by thwarting terrorist attacks. 
But what of the cost-benefit analysis offered by opponents to increased spending?  
If the cost of the security measure is $1 more than the benefit attained, does this define 
the measure as unworthy of implementation?  What is the margin of error in the accuracy 
of the study data presented by either side of this argument?  The cost figures are so 
immense and oftentimes so immeasurable that any cost-benefit analysis performed must 
be acknowledged to have an alarmingly high level of subjectivity or inaccuracy.   
A further contention regarding cost-benefit arguments rests in the qualitative 
factors previously stated. What is the obligation and responsibility of government to 
protect all citizens, not just those that are cost-effective to protect?  What is the obligation 
to protect the people as a fundamental pillar for the right to govern?  These may be 
rhetorical questions because their answers rest in the intrinsic nature of government, 
rendering it impossible to assert a quantitative value. Finally, there is the intangible factor 
of the value of security itself, i.e., for the peace of mind for the people over whom the 
government governs.  
These questions clearly constitute a more extensive level of effort is needed to 
fully account for a cost-benefit analysis than this thesis will be able to endeavor. This 
raises the daunting specter for scholars and public policy practitioners that perhaps 
national defense and homeland security are too complex to adjudicate cost effectiveness 
based solely on quantifiable data. Because there is no easy way to fully account for 
intrinsically intangible factors, such as the value of peace, the non-loss of life, or the 
capability to protect. It is also challenging to equitably compare the cost of a security 
strategy employed against its own success when the latter is predicated on an absence of 
death, destruction, or damages.    
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4. Federal Funding Sources: FEMA Grants and Government 
Expenditures in Comparison 
When studying potential resources to support select security enhancements to 
SEAR 4–5 venues, FEMA is a chief consideration due to its designation by DHS as the 
largest funding source to support the achievement of the core capabilities described in the 
National Planning Framework. For federal grants and distributions to the state, local, and 
NGO stakeholders, FEMA possessed a budget of $6 billion in FY 12.290  In 2013, FEMA 
was authorized to issue $558.7 million under the State Homeland Security Program 
(SHSP), and an additional $354.6 Million under the Urban Area Security Initiative 
(UASI). Both of these programs are part of the Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP).   
A similar federal grant program that can serve as a model for SEAR 4–5 security 
funding is already in existence within TSA. The Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) 
is intended “to strengthen the Nation’s critical infrastructure against risks associated with 
potential terrorist attacks.”291 The TSGP provides funds to transit system 
owner/operators for strengthening their security against terrorism, thereby demonstrating 
existing precedent for such a possible sports venue funding model.     
The HSGP plays a vital role in the annual implementation of the National 
Preparedness System (NPS) by supporting the building, sustainment, and delivery of the 
core capabilities addressed earlier in this chapter. The HSGP aims to support the attaining 
of the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) of a secure and resilient nation. As discussed 
previously, achieving the core capabilities are not the responsibility of any single level of 
government, organization, or community, but rather, it requires the “whole of 
community” concept described in the PPD and National Planning Framework. The FY 
290U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS Financial Assistance, accessed April, 2, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-financial-assistance. http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-financial-assistance. 
291 U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA), “Transit Security Grant Program,” March 31, 
2014, http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/transit-security-grant-program-4. 
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2013 HSGP supports core capabilities across the five mission areas of Prevention, 
Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery based on allowable costs.292   
As an example of the capability of DHS to allocate funds for sporting venue 
security, it provided a grant for $568,000 to the University of Southern Mississippi to 
study vulnerability and risks at collegiate sporting venues in 2005. This is just one 
example that precedent exists for DHS expenditure in the field. This manner of grant 
spending or budget allocation is in keeping with the purpose of the protection mission. Of 
course, when approaching the debate over whether government funding is worthwhile to 
be spent on innovative homeland security concepts, it is beneficial to consider some other 
examples of domestic spending that have been highly recognized for their wastefulness or 
frivolous connections to productive domestic spending. If it is a matter of creating the 
small budget necessary to improve security at America’s sporting venues, then many 
examples of programs could be examined in the light of further scrutiny to determine 
their worthiness to make room for security spending.    
There are numerous watchdog reports on the merit, or waste, of various 
government expenditures. It is acknowledged that some may be debatable as to intrinsic 
value to the people, but presented here are just a few examples only to demonstrate that 
streamlining fiscal expenditures can free up funds for security programs. In 2009 it was 
revealed that the Defense Department wasted $100 million on unused flight tickets and 
failed to collect refunds even though the tickets were refundable.293    Despite trillion-
dollar deficits, the 2009 approved U.S. federal budget contained 10,160 earmarks 
including one for $200,000 for a tattoo removal program in Mission Hills, California; 
$190,000 for the Buffalo Bill Historical Center in Cody, Wyoming; and $75,000 for the 
292 To further emphasize the effect government funding and legislation will have on video 
surveillance spending, IMS Research noted that the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
has issued 11 grants for physical security equipment and video surveillance that have generated millions of 
dollars of spending in the industry; “Research Firm Expects Bombings in Boston to Spur CCTV 
Spending,” Security Sales & Integration, April 29, 2013. http://www.securitysales.com/article/research-
firm-expects-bombings-in-boston-to-spur-cctv-spending/Boston_Marathon_Bombings 
293 Brian Reidl, 50 Examples of Government Waste (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation. 
October 6, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/50-examples-of-government-
waste#_edn45. 
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Totally Teen Zone in Albany, Georgia.294  GAO discovered that more than one third of 
the 2.5 million recipients of emergency assistance following Hurricane Katrina 
committed fraud in applying for or spending assistance monies, accounting for $2 billion, 
including for the payment of a sex change operation. As a last example, related to sports, 
the 2012 Super Bowl Champion Baltimore Ravens were paid $130,000 in taxpayer 
money to promote the Affordable Care Act. 
These are not raised as alarmist examples of scandal sheet media, but rather to 
point out that the adage of “where there’s a will, there’s a way” applies to government. If 
it is understood and accepted that there is a sector of the U.S. public that is vulnerable to 
a terrorist attack and proactive measures can be taken to prevent harm (even if it costs a 
modicum of federal funds), then the government owes it to the American people to at the 
very least examine these viable and invaluable possibilities.  
The purpose of this Research Question is to examine an objective means of 
weighing a cost-benefit analysis in order to respond to opposition of new forms of HSE 
expenditure. The analysis has demonstrated that there are quantifiable methods to 
adjudicate and deem select expenditures as worthy and pragmatic. Further, this section 
has revealed that the sports entertainment sector may be one of the very few business 
sectors in America that can be teamed with the private sector as well as with resource 
input from the patrons to share in the costs. There exist current models of government-
private sector cooperation that also include the customer-citizens to establish forms of 
“voluntary taxes,” or funding for government coordinated projects. For example, the U.K. 
has set up the Football Foundation, and within the U.S., the TSA serves as such a model. 
These models and more policy options will be examined in the analysis answering 
Research Question 3. 
 
294 Reidl, 50 Examples of Government Waste. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTION 3 
If evolution in security for SEAR 4–5 events is needed, what cost-effective 
public policy action or solutions can be synthesized into a new Counter-
Terrorism protection paradigm? 
If we work together, we’re stronger than if we work separately. Folks in 
the sports industry have been willing and helpful participants in this 
notion of shared responsibility.295 
 —Janet Napolitano, 
 Secretary of Homeland Security 
 
This final section of the Analysis chapter will consider innovative public policy 
proposals to be considered in order to provide enhanced security at SEAR 4–5 venues. 
These options will be categorized, essentially, into those that are not costly, and those 
that may be costly but addressed through creative collaborative funding efforts.  
Initially, this thesis has not advocated for the fortification of every semblance of 
infrastructure (i.e., to allocate resources to protect everything, everywhere, always). That, 
of course, would be impractical if not impossible.296  However, the sports entertainment 
industry is one, like the aviation industry, that is very suitable for striking a public-private 
sector collaboration to include voluntary participation by the consumers to meet the costs 
of advisable fiscal expenditures. 
Before examining such options, it is necessary to review certain relevant legal 
issues which have either been addressed or still need to be addressed. These precedents 
and issues will have an impact on what public policy options can be considered now, and 
which may need to be re-visited in the future.  
One key issue revealed in the literature was that the legal responsibility of venue 
security is borne by facility owners and operators. The review also discovered that merely 
an understanding of legal obligations is insufficient and that venue managers must act on 
295 Bill Carey, “Stadium Security Continues to Evolve 10 Years After 9/11,” SI.com, September 9, 
2001, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/more/09/06/stadium.security.changes.since.9.11/. 
296 Mueller, “Six Propositions about Terrorism,” 493. 
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their duty of care, proactively taking measures to meet their obligations to ensure the 
security of their patrons to the best of their ability.   
It has been a longstanding view that many citizens have been willing to trade 
privacy for safety, and thus did not mind “being watched.”297  Though controversial 
when first revealed, the Edward Snowden leak of government surveillance practices in 
2013 affirmed that most Americans are eager to know of the government practices, but 
yet still believe the practices are more helpful to catch terrorists than they are harmful to 
privacy interests.298   
However, looking into the future to establish maximum use of surveillance 
systems with stored databases raises several legal challenges. Commissioned by the E.U., 
Schütz, et al., posited a scenario where databases and CCTV monitoring can be combined 
with facial recognition cameras to identify and recognize members of various terrorist or 
criminal offender databases. The concept of using the most advanced research to develop 
ever-improving surveillance equipment appears to be tremendously advantageous to the 
HSE. Specifically, the futuristic scenario includes:  
Increasingly transcending into cyberspace, following traces of when-, 
where- and whatever the user intends to do. That way a finely nuanced 
profiling of (potential) perpetrators of violence at the Football World Cup 
can take place. Security service providers do not only have access to 
police databases with a variety of information on criminal offenders, they 
also cooperate with large private IT companies in order to create profiles 
of people who could attract attention through violent behaviour during the 
World Cup. In order to discover, for example, hooligans who do not 
already have a criminal record, Internet forums of fan communities and 
social networks are systematically scanned and automatically analysed. 
Raising an alarm and creating a preliminary blacklist, the fully automated 
analysis does not only consist of a search of keywords but draws on new 
semantic web technologies that are able to put words into the correct 
context and gain the relevant information out of billions of entries.299 
297 Jennifer M. Granholm, “Video Surveillance on Public Streets: The Constitutionality of Invisible 
Citizen Searches,” University of Detroit Law Review 4, no. 64 (1987): 687–713. 
298 Dana Blanton, “Fox News Poll: Most Voters Glad They Know Snowden Secrets.” Fox News, 
January 22, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/01/22/fox-news-poll-most-voters-glad-know-
snowden-secrets/. 
299 Schütz et al., Smart Surveillance, 3. 
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The intent of such a futuristic vision is to enable a government to assemble files 
on individuals (e.g., that now merit presence on the TSA No Fly List or are Known or 
Suspected Terrorists [KST]). In this scenario, the government can include pictures so that 
facial recognition-smart cameras can be alerted to their presence in crowds. On-site 
security teams or local LE can then provide surveillance on the identified KSTs, or 
apprehend them immediately.   
However, in America, this future scenario raises several unanswered questions. 
Because SEAR 4–5 venue security teams are almost exclusively private sector 
employees, how can a Top Secret classified database be shared with them?  Even if the 
database itself is not revealed to the private sector employees, individuals will be 
revealed to be in the database each time such a surveillance recognition system alerts the 
private sector security team member to the presence of the KST. 
Further, even if such a government classified information issue could be resolved 
to enable the database to be used for identity recognition purposes by a private sector 
employee, or even by a government employee stationed in the SOC, an operational issue 
arises. Specifically, if the person identified by the technology is already in a KST 
database, then there is a distinct possibility that if that person somehow managed to gain 
entry to the U.S., or is a home-grown radical, there may be a federal operation on-going 
that is currently monitoring the individual. Or, conceivably, the government may be 
working with him/her in a collaborative operation for national security interests. This 
complex scenario means that if the SEAR 4–5 security team at the SOC on location finds 
this individual matching up, then what?  Do they move forward with surveillance or 
apprehension of the individual when it is very possible that it may destroy an operational 
plan already in action by another government agency?   
Finally, the legal question is raised regarding liability issues in the event of a false 
positive, i.e., the surveillance system identifies an individual in the crowd as a member of 
the KST database, but upon apprehension, it turns out that the system erred. There would 
be a myriad of grounds on which damages could possibly be proven to exploit the 
government’s vulnerability. The government may then be susceptible to paying not only 
monetary damages, but incurring great criticism and mistrust from the people, the media, 
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and Congress. Another potentially troubling aspect of the false positive scenario is the 
possibility of damaging an ongoing operation by means of “tipping off” KSTs  that the 
government wrongly assailed a citizen that bore a resemblance to a particular terrorist.   
Therefore, though facial recognition CCTV has greatly advanced over the course 
of the past decade, for use at sporting event venues as a protective security resource it 
still is a technology in need of more technical fine tuning and a great deal of resolution in 
legal forums.   
1. Cost-Effective Options with Little or No Cost: Improving Doctrine, 
Training, and Compliance  
In lieu of leadership choosing to pursue options that may bear some expense, 
there are alternative options that are not costly. These options pertain to doctrine and 
training.   
The first inexpensive option is to push for the completion and production of the 
National Protection Framework without any further delays. In 2011, the President 
required DHS to produce the National Planning Framework. Well into his second term 
and three years later, only four of the five component parts have been published, awaiting 
the National Protection Framework portion to be completed and approved for release   
Related to this, if the published version of the National Protection Framework is 
akin to the Working Draft, it has ample room for notably more specificity. It is 
acknowledged that the Core Capabilities strategy is to enable the state/local stakeholders 
to have a great amount of responsibility for tailoring doctrine to suit their needs. 
However, the Protection Framework as drafted does not spell out any specific standards 
that can be measured uniformly across the national spectrum. Inevitably, this will 
predictably result in disparities in regions and localities as to the types of practices that 
are performed, or not. Regional differences will not allow for the obtaining of 
standardized measurements, and this fact will reduce the significance of the NPF as a 
whole. Therefore, at this time, it is possible that DHS can re-work the NPF to include 
tangible goals, milestones, and metrics so that useful information will be obtained in the 
future to best meet the objectives/goals of the NPF.   
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Perhaps not only can Frameworks be produced for each PPD outlined Mission, but 
within each Framework there can be Annexes derived broken down to address specific 
aspects within the broad context of the National Protection Framework. This measure is not 
intended to be heavy-handed or needlessly instruct the state/local stakeholders on how to 
structure their procedures, but rather to ensure that security teams across the nation all use 
the same playbook, so to speak. As explained in Chapter II, the U.K. national government 
provides training and a dedicated resource to the police department level to directly assist 
with the specific mission of sporting event local policing.   
However, even with implementation, research has shown that complacency and 
local resource constraints are substantial enemies to the HSE. With only Best Practices 
suggested for consideration, and no ostensible means to inspect or confirm the execution 
of these recommendations, there is effectively no operational procedure in place. Even if 
the over-arching strategy of this Administration is to enable the state/local stakeholders to 
determine what is best for them regarding tactics on location, it is naive to assume that 
100% of facility managers will have either the incentive or resources to implement 
suggested practices.   
One low-cost solution to the inspection and compliance void is the establishment 
of a small office within DHS to synchronize with Fusion Centers and the Offices of the 
Federal Coordinators in the respective states. This office would determine and verify 
inspection dates and compliance deadlines. As a brief example of the scope of funding to 
support such an office within DHS, in 2005, DHS granted $568,000 to study the security 
vulnerabilities in collegiate sporting venues. Likely only half of this amount could 
support an office of three personnel within DHS annually to accomplish the dedicated 
mission of inspection and compliance with viable milestones and metrics established for 
the facility managers nationwide.  
Other organizational options could be considered as well. The U.K. has 
demonstrated impressive success at addressing its domestic criminal concern of 
hooliganism with a top-down organizational system designed to support local policing 
strategies. The scale of the national policing doctrine in the U.K., which operates 52 
police departments, is much smaller and more manageable than in the U.S., which 
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operates more than 1700 police departments. Nevertheless, the organizational structure 
has proved effective in the U.K.’s local policing operations and could be adapted to the 
scale of the U.S.    
To elaborate, the U.K. dedicates Football Liaison (FLO) and Football Intelligence 
Officers (FIO) to the local police department level. Among other duties, the FLO audits the 
safety measures provided by the sporting club/team through attendance and observation at 
events. The FIO coordinates with other local law enforcement agencies and recognized 
team supporter groups, as well as coordinates intelligence gathering prior to and during 
events. These are examples of direct support from the national level that greatly support the 
front-line level coordination and standard consistency across the nation.      
The U.S. counterterrorism strategy is reliant on local policing to detect, disrupt, 
and interdict terrorism before or during the unfolding of such plans in our midst. The 
insertion of a DHS liaison to the state and local level in order to have eyes on the ground 
and direct connection to the numerous federal agencies and resources would serve several 
tangible purposes. Operationally, much like the FIOs at the local level in the U.K., it 
would mean an active full-time presence dedicated to the daily protection mission as it 
applies to the sports and entertainment industry, an important American business sector. 
Strategically it would signify a presence with whom the facility managers would interact 
in a collaborative manner to assist with meeting milestones and metrics. This active 
partnership would help eliminate complacency for practice implementation while 
providing another conduit for access and support in acquiring supplemental resources to 
facilitate improvements and inspection compliance. 
Another successful procedural model employed in the U.K. is the issuance of an 
annual “Safety Certificate” upon the verification of staff training standards.300  The 
Safety Certificates are issued by the Football Licensing Authority (FLA). The FLA was 
statutorily established by the national government to ensure all spectators “are able to 
300 ACPO, Guidance on Policing Football, 24. 
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attend sports stadia in safety, comfort, and security.”301  There currently is no such 
equivalent in the U.S.   
Although the U.K. model is inclusive of crowd management, control, and general 
safety, such training standards in the U.S. can be adapted for terrorism response and first-
responder operational partnership support and exercises. The planning and execution of such 
inspected training can simultaneously provide an incentive and requirement to the private 
sector venue managers. While these viable courses of action ostensibly have little or no price 
tag to increase the national debt or require pilfering from the domestic agenda budget, there 
also exist monetary options worth consideration. These monetary options could be coupled 
with innovative funding strategies in order to yield little expense to the government. 
2. Solutions with Some Expense Coupled with Innovative Funding 
As was demonstrated in the research and analysis of Chapters II and III, there are 
evolving and advancing technologies which become more attainable as time passes. PTZ 
CCTV systems have continued to shrink in price over the past decade and some versions 
of monitoring software are now offered online for free. American CCTV industry sales 
figures depict a steady upward trend for residential and commercial use. CCTV usage has 
become so commonplace in the U.K. that there are now more cameras in use (5.9 million) 
than there are people living in the neighboring nation of Scotland (5.3 million).302   The 
takeaway from rapidly advancing CCTV technology, tied to decreasing costs, is that it is 
possible for sporting venue facilities and parking lots of any size to be observed by 
CCTVs and linked in to local SOCs.   
Since its inaugural contracts with DHS in 2006 the price of the Z-Portal 
automobile X-ray system is decreasing in time, and its success has led cost-conscious 
institutions and nations around the world to purchase this system.303  Though perhaps 
301 Ibid. 
302 “Scotland’s Population at its Highest Ever,” National Records of Scotland, August 8, 2013, 
http://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/news/2013/scotlands-population-at-its-highest-ever. 
303 American Science & Engineering (AS&E). “American Science and Engineering, Inc. Receives 
$4.5 Million Order for Z Portal and Gemini X-ray Systems to Secure Checkpoints at Middle Eastern 
University,” news release, October 1, 2013. http://ir.as-e.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=794210. 
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initially perceived by critics as an expensive luxury security item, subsequent 
supplemental purchases by DHS in recent years have validated its worth in security 
practice at CBP, qualifying it as a suitable protection mission resource for many venue 
parking facilities.304   Similarly, though Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) systems have 
been generally unsuited for application to sizeable crowds pouring through limited 
turnstile entrances at sporting venues, the PHASE (photo-acoustic) ETD systems may 
soon be on the market. Such a breakthrough, which has been achieved technologically 
and awaits the product availability for purchase, should astutely be worked into 
acquisitions and doctrinal operations plans now.  
However, achieving an upgrade to surveillance and detection equipment at SEAR 
4–5 event venues could prove expensive. This reality combined with the circumstance 
that many of the facilities are fiscally constrained in a profit-driven market economy, 
means that it may be necessary to find ways to provide funding for equipment acquisition 
and training. Acknowledging this dilemma, however, does not mean that the federal 
government should immediately dismiss the simplest of considerations as to how it might 
be possible to obtain them or require them to be deployed. Just because the acquisition 
and deployment plan may be challenging, or even require an outlay of funding, there are 
collaborative options worth considering that will be to the collective benefit of all. 
For the purchase of CCTV, ETD, and Auto X-ray systems the government could 
seek and build a partnership with the private sector and with the patrons attending the 
events to generate revenues to cover system implementations and upgrades. This would 
not be the first time such a collaborative funding effort was achieved. 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the TSA was created. As a measure to help 
offset its aviation security expenses, the “Security Fee” was added to the airline ticket 
price. The fee was intended to avert an influx of national debt and increased taxation by 
putting the onus of the burden for funding on the citizens that use the aviation industry, 
304 “U.S. CBP Places $19.3 Million Follow-on Order for AS&E’s Z Backscatter Vans ZBVs.” Port 
Technology International, October 21, 2009, 
http://www.porttechnology.org/news/us_cbp_places_193_million_follow_on_order_for_ases_z_backscatte
r_vans_zbvs; “Defense Daily, An Access Intelligence, LLC Service,” Defense Daily, May 23, 2012,  
http://www.defensedaily.com/Assets/File/txt/TR2_2012-05-22_14-31.txt. 
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and thereby, its security system. In a statutorily innovative move, a sort of voluntary tax 
was implemented. The original TSA Security Fee launched in 2002, established a $2.50 
per leg of trip fee, with a $5 maximum fee per one way trip.305  That maximum one-way 
trip fee would now be a Consumer Price Indexed value of $3.79 in comparison to 2002 
dollars.306 There is no evidence that this nominal security fee has adversely affected 
airline ticket sales. Illustrated in Figure 9 are the FY13 figures denoting aviation security 
expenses and fee revenues collected from passengers and airlines to offset the costs.  
 
Figure 9.  Aviation Security Expenses vs. Aviation Fee Collections FY13307 
To summarize (Monetary figures rounded to the tenth of $billion): 
• FY13 total aviation security expenses were $6.8 billion; 
• FY13 total aviation security fee collections were $2.3 billion; 
• $1.9 billion in aviation security expenses (28%) funded through air 
traveler security fees; 
• $372 million in aviation security expenses (5%) funded through air carrier 
security fees; 
305 49 U.S. Code § 44940 - Security Service Fee. 
306 “$5 in 2014 → $3.79 in 2002,” In2013Dollars.com, accessed April 2, 2014, 
http://www.in2013dollars.com/2014-dollars-in-2002?amount=5. 
307 Transportation Security Administration, Office of Revenue, “Transportation Security Fees,” 
December, 2014, 2. http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/historical-fee-collection-data 
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• $4.5 billion in aviation security expenses (67%) funded through federal 
budget appropriations. 
Following the implementation in 2002, the Aviation Security fee revenues grew 
with the returning success of the airline travel industry. Since 2005, the fee revenues have 
remained very consistent, averaging $1.9 billion annually, within a 2% +/- window each 
year.308  The airline travel industry is cited as an example here because with 376 million 
fee generating tickets sold, it is similar in scale to the sports entertainment industry, with 
256 million potentially fee generating tickets sold among the seven major American 
sports in 2013.309  Therefore, the TSA Security Fee model is a solid example of the 
potential volume and benefit that a voluntary user tax that can serve the sports 
entertainment industry.   
Because the sports entertainment industry is one of the few in the American 
economy that is similar in size and scope to the travel industry, it is a potential large pool 
of untapped financial resources. As demonstrated in the model above, the Aviation 
Security Fee is not intended to cover the entire amount of the TSA security expense. 
Rather, it is intended to help offset the security costs. However, adding a similar security 
fee to the ticket price for SEAR 4–5 venues would not require the establishment of the 
vast institutional headquarters that was necessary to stand-up TSA and maintain agency 
operations. Therefore, with only the need for a limited office to manage such a DHS 
program, a tremendously larger percentage of the revenues generated can be put directly 
toward facility security equipment, personnel security training upgrades, and inspection 
and compliance practices. 
Regarding patron open-mindedness toward understanding and accepting such a 
security fee, currently many sporting event ticket offices include a “Convenience Fee” at 
least as expensive as the TSA Security fee cited above.310  Such a convenience fee is 
added to the price of a ticket solely for private-sector revenue, having no apparent 
308  Ibid., 3. 
309 Includes attendance totals for MLB, MiLB, NFL, NHL, NBA, MLS, and NCAA Football and 
Basketball. 
310 Orioles.com asserts a $6 convenience fee on each ticket purchased online. 
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purpose for the public benefit. Thus, it is possible that in the sports and entertainment 
industry, such a publicly beneficial security fee will be not perceived as an issue of much 
concern for the majority of patrons. It is extremely unlikely to adversely affect attendance 
figures for club owners and NCAA institutions any more than such already established 
and culturally accepted “convenience fees.” 
Even if there was some remote possibility that a proportionally small fee would 
influence patrons and ticket sales, there is the very possible, if not likely, consideration to 
tier the fee according to price-range of the events and the tickets sold within the event. Of 
course, this may raise questions from select groups concerning a perceived imposed tax. 
However, few activist organizations have successfully argued with the long-standing 
precedents of higher fees and taxes levied on those that are proven more able to afford it. 
In the event of opposition to this fee, one option to address the opposition could be a 
tiered approach to assessing the fee. For example, the fee attached to ticket sales for 
venues seating less than 5,000 patrons would be minimal. The security fee would then 
slightly escalate as the venue sizes increase (e.g., from 5–20,000, 20–55,000, 55,000 and 
above). This would in essence reflect the general ticket pricing for local, small college 
events, then progressing through the larger college/smaller professional events to the 
largest college/professional football venues. Further, within the seating categories, the fee 
could be slightly higher for Club level and Luxury Suite seats than for the lowest priced 
seats located in the rafters of a given building or amid the clouds of a given stadium. 
As an example, in Baltimore’s Camden Yards baseball park, as is the case with 
virtually all professional club sporting stadiums and arenas, luxury suites and club level 
tickets are for premium seats due to their venue location and customer service amenities. 
Routinely they are the highest priced tickets for sporting events. The capacity there is 
45,971 including 4,631 club seats and 72 luxury suites, according to TheOrioles.com. 
The luxury suites accommodate 14–75 patrons each, according to the site, and for this 
revenue estimation this thesis will use the approximate average of 20 tickets purchased 
per suite per game. The suites range in price from $900-$5,000/game, which equates to a 
per person ticket cost ranging from $64-$67. 
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Such an idea for a tiered security fee could, for example, affix a $1 charge to all 
tickets, $2 for Club level seats and $3 for Suite patrons. Based on these numbers, a sold 
out Camden Yards would produce $39,900 in regular tickets, another $9,262 in Club 
level fees, and $4,320 from the Suites, totaling $53,482 per sold out game. If the team 
were to sell out all 81 home events, it would have 3.72 million patrons and accordingly 
this would produce $4.33 million annually in security fees. In 2013, however, Baltimore 
was slightly below the league average in attendance, generating 2,357,561 patrons or 
29,105 per game. If pro-rating the projected security fee per game from the maximum 
possible above, this would yield 63% of seating capacity and a projected total of $2.74 
million / year in security fees.   
With 30 professional baseball clubs all generating similar revenues, it is logical to 
project the possibility of adding $82.2 million annually for security expenses including 
security systems upgrades, personnel training improvements, and security staff quantity 
increases. This example-generated revenue figure is solely based on adding a nominal 
security fee to MLB patrons, providing a voluntary tax supplemental fund. In 2013, 
MiLB generated another 41.2 million patrons; the NFL 17.3 million; NCAA football 50.3 
million and NCAA basketball another 27.8 million across 657 university venues.311    
Of course, for practical reasons and realistic implementation, a HSE Working 
Group could recommend a higher fee for congressional review and adoption by statute. 
As explained earlier, the aviation security fee originally imposed in 2002 had not been 
raised through 2013. However, Congress has now changed the fee structure in 2014 such 
that the fee is currently set at $5.60 per one way trip regardless of legs taken in the trip. 
This reflects some perspective on the amount of possible fees to consider for sporting 
event ticket purchases. Further, the original TSA security fee legislation required that the 
first $250 million acquired is mandatorily set aside for the Aviation Security Capital 
Fund which specifically provides for airport facility modifications and security 
311 Chris Huston, “NCAA Football Attendance Topped 50 Million for the First Time in 2013,” NBC 
Sports, February 10, 2014, http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/02/10/ncaa-football-attendance-
topped-50-million-for-the-first-time-in-2013/; “2013 NCAA Football Records,” NCAA, 
http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/stats/football_records/2013/Attendance.pdf. 
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equipment.312  The Aviation Security Fee has served as an excellent example of a 
successful model directly tying revenues obtained to tangible security resources provided. 
In addition to this, as with the TSA imposed airline security fees, there could be a 
similar fee levied on the private sector professional clubs and respective University 
Athletic Departments as well. These fees could be the subject of deliberative discussions 
and debate. But in the end, arriving at an agreeable fee structure with the private sector is 
not only possible, but likely given the fact that there would also be a public support 
incentive as well, to form a tri-lateral funding program based on the model in place for 
TSA and aviation industry security. 
As addressed previously, FEMA has the HSGP funds that might include sports 
venue security. Between the SHSP and the UASI Grant programs, FEMA had $913.3 
million for distribution in FY 13. If FEMA were to allocate only 2.19% of this budgeted 
Grant program, this would total $20 million annually toward SEAR 4–5 venue security 
improvements. Over the course of a possible five-year plan, this would generate $100 
million toward the nation’s public gathering venues in most dire need of support.   
The concept of a shared responsibility is not new to professional sports. In the 
NFL, M&T Bank Stadium is the venue for the Baltimore Ravens. Building the stadium in 
1996 cost $220 million; however, the funds were generated through a combination of 
proceeds from the sale of tax-exempt revenue bonds, new games established in the 
Maryland Lottery, and the Ravens football club. This is a routine method of resourcing 
for public-private ventures in the sports entertainment industry and is easily accepted as 
commonplace among industry patrons. 
Yet another possible avenue for a collaborative effort is the model demonstrated 
in the U.K. with the FA Football Foundation. The Football Foundation is the UK’s 
largest sports charity and is funded primarily by the Premier League (private-sector), The 
Football Association (NGO) and the Government. The foundation has routinely allocated 
£30m annually (approximately $45 million) into developing stadium renovations, soccer 
312 “The Transportation Security Administration and the Aviation Security Fee,” U.S. House of 
Representatives, Committee on the Budget, Paul Ryan, Chairman, December 10, 2013, 
http://budget.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=364049 
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facilities and youth programs.313  However, for 2014–2016, it will be allocating £50m 
(approximately $75 million) annually, according to the foundation’s website, and 
focusing it on stadium renovations. The foundation also works to solicit private donors to 
leverage even more funding.   
Whereas the foundation’s mission is largely to renovate aging stadiums, enhance 
security capabilities, and build new athletic facilities for community involvement at the 
very lowest levels, it sets an example of the public-private partnership that might be 
possible between American organized sporting leagues, the NCAA, and the government 
to derive funding for SEAR 4–5 venues. Perhaps to entice public policy action, this kind 
of foundation could be set up to assist organizations build and develop community 
athletic facilities for underprivileged neighborhoods in cities. This could encourage 
participation from across cultures and demographics.   
In this chapter, the thesis has analyzed voluminous research data and sources to 
provide and support responses to the three respective Research Questions. The findings 
have resolved that SEAR 4–5 sporting venues constitute viable, valuable soft targets 
susceptible to terrorist attacks. Additionally, in light of 21st century evolutions in 
communications and global media, dominance and exposure, these venues are likely to 
serve as a platform for proclaiming terrorist causes. This chapter also demonstrated a 
cost-benefit analysis that indicates sufficient rationale to consider select, cost-effective 
public policy options to fortify SEAR 4–5 event security. And finally, the chapter 
identified and briefly reviewed numerous public policy options ranging from little or no 
fiscal expense to those options that do include significant cost. In analyzing the more 
expensive options, this thesis has also provided numerous examples and models for 
innovative funding streams to minimize any government expense.   
In the final chapter of this thesis, the problem statement will be re-visited and 
conclusions will be derived from the research, thereby serving to provide 
recommendations for further HSE research, review, and deliberation.   
313 David Conn, “FA Makes £150m Pledge to Improve Run-down Urban Facilities,” The Guardian, 
February 25, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/football/2013/feb/25/fa-premier-league-grassroots-
facilities. 
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IV. SUMMARY 
Mankind, it seems, makes a poorer performance of government than of 
almost any other human activity. In this sphere, wisdom, which may be 
defined as the exercise of judgment acting on experience, common sense 
and available information, is less operative and more frustrated than it 
should be. Why do holders of high office so often act contrary to the way 
reason points and enlightened self-interest suggests?  
—Barbara Tuchman, 
A March to Folly 
 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The overarching conclusion of this thesis is the necessity for the federal 
government and private sector to build an exceptionally robust public-private 
collaboration to more successfully protect SEAR 4 and 5 sports venues from potential 
terrorist attacks. The following recommendations provide a viable range of options, 
which when implemented in full, will this partnership and strengthen existing security 
measures at these less nationally prominent yet vulnerable venues. 
Notwithstanding the security operations being executed by the private 
sector, there will be the need to integrate the setting of standards, to 
actively conduct compliance monitoring, to strategically plan and manage 
security operations, and to provide the overall synchronization of the 
twenty-first century’s multi-agency, collaborative approach to homeland 
security.314 
In 2011, this was a congressional statement regarding how aviation industry 
security should be reorganized from the federal sector into a private sector-based 
structure in order to decrease federal expenditures and increase efficiencies.  Sporting 
venue security is already structured in such a private sector-reliant manner. In the 
following seven recommendations, this thesis advocates the same congressional ideal be 
314 U.S. House of Representatives Joint Majority Staff Report, “A Decade Later: A Call for TSA 
Reform” (Washington, DC: Congress, November 16, 2011), 20, http://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/2011-11-16-TSA_Reform_Report.pdf. 
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applied to America’s sports venues, but at a fraction of the cost of today’s security in the 
transportation industry.  
The recommendations of this thesis are listed in order of escalating cost and 
associated with increasing legislative and/or public resistance. The final recommendation, 
however, is in preparation for the future and involves no current fiscal expense. Provided 
here is a summary list of the recommendations with the lead agency/entity denoted; each 
recommendation is subsequently explained in greater detail: 
1. Finalize and publish the National Protection Framework with a specified 
Annex for sporting event venue security (DHS) 
2. Establish a streamlined office within HSE for inspection and compliance 
adherence (DHS) 
3. Replicate U.K.’s organizational structure placing a federal Subject Matter 
Expert with state/local level personnel to synchronize security at the local 
level with the national level to improve operational harmonization (DHS) 
4. Allocate 2.2% of the FEMA Grant budget annually for a five year plan 
dedicated to reduce security vulnerabilities at SEAR 4–5 venues 
nationwide (DHS) 
5. Assess a statutory security fee on sporting event ticket purchases to fund 
enhanced SEAR 4–5 venue security, while acting to obtain patron 
stakeholder partnership with the government  (DHS and Congress) 
6. Create a charitable foundation to serve as a funding source dedicated to 
stadium infrastructure renovations to facilitate improved security for 
SEAR 4–5 events (Private sector)   
7. Rapidly prepare for future use of CCTV facial recognition technology by 
addressing operational and legal concerns immediately (DHS) 
Recommendation 1: Finalize and publish the National Protection Framework 
(NPF) with a specified Annex for sporting event venue security (DHS) 
Current DHS policy does not intend to reach down into state/local LE operational 
realms, nor does it intend to direct how local policing can best be accomplished. 
However, it is essential for DHS to establish, finalize, and publish the NPF. But that is 
only a requisite beginning, as also needed is a public event protection mission doctrine, or 
Annex, that is specific enough to be useful at the local level and to provide consistency 
nationwide. The working draft NPF with general core capabilities listed is conducive to 
empowering the state/local LE communities to derive tailored doctrines. However, it is 
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too broad and leaves room for disparate or limited regional local doctrines. In some areas 
of the NPF there is essentially no doctrine or uniform approach to sporting event venue 
protection issues. Further, the federal doctrine needs to provide an effective inspection or 
compliance mechanism. Local compliance must be an intrinsic component of any 
successful doctrine meant to responsibly ensure a national standard of protection is being 
met. 
The sporting event Annex to the NPF should paint the ideal picture of what SEAR 
4–5 event venue operational security should look like, i.e., the “how to” document to 
effect the partnership between DHS, private-sector, and state/local authorities 
(government and LE). Of course, this image would be provided to the extent possible 
understanding that each venue has characteristics and circumstances rendering it unique. 
However, as described in Chapter III, the Secret Service has established a widely used 
conceptual site strategy deploying outer, middle, and inner rings of security, albeit 
intended for the most high-profile major events.315  Therefore, it would be extremely 
reasonable for the NPF Annex to echo and complement that conceptual strategy for 
application to SEAR 4–5 events.   
The Annex should entail how the existing and future technologies (now in the 
prototype stage) will be used to complement each other in providing the over-lapping 
belts of security on-site. It should provide intent and guidance for deploying automobile 
X-ray equipment for parking facilities, ETD equipment placement on approaches to 
venue entry points, and CCTV surveillance and SOC procedures. And of practical 
importance, it can provide specificity as to new structural organization, intended working 
relationships, licensing process, and procedural means to attain funding and support from 
DHS. These specific matters are addressed in the additional following recommendations.    
Recommendation 2: Establish a streamlined office within (DHS) for partnering, 
inspection, and compliance adherence (DHS)  
Unfortunately, a frank economic truth is that private-sector profit routinely 
emanates from efficiency. Oftentimes, such streamlined operations entail lean staffing 
315 Connors, Planning and Managing Security, 33–37. 
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designs and reluctance to pay for cutting edge technologies. This equates to decisions 
made assuming more operational risk in order to spend less on security costs. In sum, it 
can be expected that the private sector will hope to strike a balance of how much to spend 
v. how much threat to protect against. However, a U.S. military adage is that “hope is not 
a course of action.” 
As demonstrated in Chapter III, the current reliance on the Best-Practice resources 
as a doctrinal strategy, dispersed haphazardly across the sports entertainment industry has 
resulted in inconsistent implementation, notable complacency, and overall systemic 
failure. The recommended office within DHS can be the oversight focal point to set 
terrorist response training standards, establish and monitor practice consistency 
nationwide, as well as to establish and issue licensure certifications.   
With a suitable, measurable doctrine in place, it is necessary to provide a conduit 
for outreach/engagement, capacity development, and ensuring the inspection-compliance 
mechanism has the resources to be successfully executed.316  There are various federal 
agencies that have field offices across the country and even in remote regions of the 
world with similar duties.   One such existing office within DHS is TSA’s Office of 
Global Strategies (TSA-OGS).317  It is a proven, successful model for an office with 
oversight, compliance and partnership roles in the field. So it would not be unprecedented 
to establish this proposed DHS office for sports venue security and licensing oversight 
with personnel stationed in the field, embedded at the state/local level. The organizational 
mechanism for the licensing procedure is discussed in more detail in Recommendation 3 
and the Implementation Plan, below. 
Admittedly, there are other agencies, such as the FBI, JTTF, etc., that work with 
the state/local LE level to provide federal level operational support. However, these 
entities are not charged with the responsibility of measuring a national standard for 
executing the protection mission as is DHS. Therefore, the Department needs to have a 
316 These three facets of a proposed office align with the TSA Office of Global Strategies published 
mission areas. U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA), “Global Strategies,” August 28, 2013, 
http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/global-strategies.  
317 TSA-OGS provides liaisons stationed in dozens of countries worldwide to meet the three goals 
cited above: outreach/engagement, capacity development, and inspection-compliance. 
 108 
                                                 
more active role regarding Protection Security doctrine and its compliance. A small 
centralized office is recommended to provide oversight as well as to partner with the 
public-private stakeholders at the local level to help them get to the desired standards. 
The personnel from this office will be stationed in the field, and their roles will be 
addressed in the following recommendation below. 
Though likely an unpopular measure with the private sector, compliance with the 
standards should be linked to a national protection mission certification or license, like 
the one issued in the U.K. by the Football Licensing Authority, in order to prevent 
complacency from becoming the reason for terrorist success. As cited in Chapter III, 
elements within the law enforcement community already advocate legislation requiring 
licensing standards. Currently, the NCS4 at the University of Southern Mississippi offers 
a voluntary, Best Practice type “Sport Venue Staff Certification.”318  The certification 
targets venue staff and security team training and background-screening. The licensing 
procedure recommended in this thesis would begin with this program and add onto it 
select requirements for surveillance and detection equipment installation and training.   
If the local level stakeholders encounter resource constraints in meeting standards, 
the newly dedicated DHS office would be the ideal conduit for multi-agency 
collaboration and multi-resource synchronization for solutions. 
Recommendation 3: Replicate select aspects of the U.K.’s organizational 
structure by embedding a federal Subject Matter Expert at the state/local level to 
synchronize with national level personnel to improve operational harmonization 
and better support local policing at sports venues (DHS) 
Placing a federal Subject Matter Expert, such as the U.K.’s Football Liaison or 
Football Intelligence Officers at the state/local level specifically to synchronize and 
coordinate federal level support will improve operational harmonization. These personnel 
will be the face of DHS at the local level to act as the channel for multi-agency 
coordination and to confect professional trust and partnering with the private-sector for 
318 “Sports Venue Staff Certification,” National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security, 
accessed April 2, 2014, http://www.ncs4.com/csvs. 
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procedural compliance. Currently, there is no such equivalent at the Fusion Centers or 
state/local level.   
Currently, the JTTF does have operational personnel at the state/local level. 
However, the DHS structure down to the local level would not be operationally oriented 
in the same manner as the JTTF SMEs. Instead, the DHS presence is recommended to be 
more of a specified FLO or FIO type of position that the U.K. has immersed successfully 
at the local police department level. Such a resource can focus specifically on the sports 
and entertainment industry schedule through the course of a year and continually 
coordinate with Fusion Centers, JTTF, state/local LE, and venue security teams. 
Though this is an option involving staffing expenditures, Chapters II and III have 
revealed the extent of the successful practice in the U.K. Having people on the ground at 
the local level building trust, establishing rapport, and directly linking that to national 
level resources and leadership will go a long way to cover the gap of inconsistent 
standards now present in the field. Strategically embedding the DHS presence at the local 
level will be critical to synchronizing this recommended system because it is local 
policing, local police departments, and local venues that serve on the front lines of the 
national protection mission.   
As explained in the comparison section of Chapter II, though there are many more 
police departments in the U.S. than in the U.K., the roles for these DHS FLO/FIO type 
positions embedded at the local level would not be positioned at every police department 
responsible for a venue as is the case in the U.K. Rather, these personnel would serve the 
dual purpose to operate a “train the trainer” program. These DHS personnel in the field 
would routinely go on-location to venues throughout each state to provide much needed 
training and exercise support to venue security teams. Partnering with local LE and first 
responder agencies will empower the venue security teams to consistently maintain their 
protection mission-based counterterrorism and operational readiness.   
As revealed in previous chapters, there is no current protection mission doctrine. The 
DHS office recommended above should provide that doctrinal guidance and develop this 
“train the trainer” strategy for the embedded SMEs to coordinate. The SMEs should then 
collaborate with and deliver course materials to local LE and private-sector security teams so 
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that they can be self-sufficient to maintain their doctrinal compliance and operational 
proficiency to standard. Recommendations 4–6, below, specifically address funding 
innovations to alleviate the fiscal expense for this proposed organizational structure.   
These DHS personnel embedded at the local level would also serve the invaluable 
function to facilitate the outreach/engagement to and from the local level with the federal 
level to work through regional specific issues. They would serve as the conduit 
previously mentioned to expand mission capacity development, procuring funds for 
equipment and training support. Finally, these DHS SMEs would dispel the daunting 
notion of externally based “federal inspectors” periodically appearing from “inside the 
beltway” to assure compliance. The embedded DHS personnel would partner, side-by-
side, with the state/local authorities and private-sector entities to routinely, closely 
collaborate to mitigate vulnerabilities, meet and maintain the requisite standards for the 
issuance of a security license authorizing venues for sporting events. 
A key element of this recommendation is to create a credible, seamless 
partnership with the state/local LE and private sector at the local level to facilitate 
meeting standards and enhancing security at the SEAR 4–5 events. 
Recommendation 4: Allocate 2.2% of the FEMA Grant budget annually for a 
five-year plan dedicated to reducing security vulnerabilities at SEAR 4–5 venues 
nationwide (DHS) 
As illustrated in Chapter III, the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) serves as 
a model for administering a sector-specific funding stream in support of counterterrorism 
security. Based on the example cost-benefit analysis conducted in Chapter III, DHS 
should allocate 2.2% ($20 million annually) of the total FEMA HSGP budget for a five 
year plan to earmark $100 million for SEAR 4–5 venue security. These earmarked funds 
would not be adding to overall federal expense because the HSGP funding is already in 
the federal budget.   
Also demonstrated in Chapter III, successful precedent has been established for 
statutorily dedicating funding to facility renovation and surveillance/detection equipment 
procurement. The current TSA Security Fee statutorily channels $250 million annually 
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specifically toward airport facility renovation and equipment purchase and upgrades.319  
Like the statutory requirements in place for TSA now, this recommended FEMA five 
year plan would help empower SEAR 4–5 security teams with the purchase of CCTV 
equipment, EDT technology systems, establishing SOCs, and establishing training and 
operational exercises at venues nationwide.   
Further, the value of the ETD (PHASE) technology breakthrough recounted in 
Chapter II cannot be underestimated.   As explained on p. 25, ETD equipment with a 
proven effective 100M stand-off range will be an invaluable addition to the HSE fight 
against IED attacks. This technology should be funded and fielded as absolutely soon as 
possible.   Therefore, funding should be invested immediately to expedite its path toward 
production. Though the cost of the marketable PHASE ETD system is not yet 
established, it soon will be, and the benefit that the HSE and the public could reap from 
its success may prove priceless. Such a landmark breakthrough will certainly prove to be 
a key weapon on which SEAR 4–5 venue security teams will rely to accomplish the 21st 
century HSE protection mission.   
Recommendation 5:  Assess a statutory security fee on sporting event ticket 
purchases to fund enhanced SEAR 4–5 venue security, while acting to obtain 
patron stakeholder partnership with the government (DHS and Congress) 
This recommendation focuses on obtaining spectator-patron buy-in to partner 
with the government and private sector for funding SEAR 4–5 venue security. As shown 
in Chapter III, the sports entertainment industry has massive customer base and economic 
scope. This, coupled with the rare industry attribute of possessing a potentially enormous 
funding base from its own patrons (like the aviation travel industry), enables it to partner 
in the funding of expanding security resources and operations for its own advantage.   
The innovative idea to assess a Security Fee to sporting event ticket purchases 
will essentially constitute a voluntary tax that will be paid by the concurrence of the 
people benefitting the most from its existence. Not only could such a Security Fee be 
319 TSA, “Transit Security Grant Program.” The FY 2014 Transit Security Grant Program was initially 
authorized in Section 1406 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 
Public Law 110–53 (6 U.S.C. 1135) and is currently funded under Public Law No: 113–76, H.R.3547 – 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014. 
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applied to ticket purchases but also to parking lot pricing in order to help allocate funds 
toward automobile X-ray equipment for use at the venue parking facilities. The data used 
in the earlier examples demonstrate that the additional burden of cost on the consumer 
base is unlikely to adversely impact the private sector’s sales or profit level. 
As seen in Chapter III, future equipment implementation and personnel training 
expenditures can largely be offset through assessing a nominal security fee per each 
ticket sold. Surveys can be conducted and further research completed to determine 
specific consumer acceptability levels and price-break data in order to arrive at the 
optimally effective but least intrusive fee to be assessed.    With the requisite goal to 
minimize consumer impact, even the simplified tier-model approach demonstrated and 
explained in Chapter III could be employed.   
Positive spectator opinion and support is realistically achievable for several 
reasons. First, America’s travelling public has come to accept the normalcy of the litany 
of fees assessed on airline tickets now. Further, the sports ticket buying public has also 
accepted the purely for profit convenience fees already attached to sporting event ticket 
prices. Providing visible, directly tangible improved sporting venue security measures 
that are initiated and maintained for spectator benefit will provide them with something 
to show for the nominal fee.   
Recommendation 6: Create a charitable foundation to serve as a funding source 
dedicated to stadium infrastructure renovations to facilitate improved security for 
SEAR 4–5 events (Private sector)   
As explained in answering Research Question 3, the U.K.’s Football Foundation 
sets an excellent example from which the U.S. sports entertainment industry can glean 
valuable insight. If the spectator population may be required to contribute toward 
offsetting the costs of improved security training and equipment at SEAR 4–5 event 
venues, then the private-sector can also be an equal partner in the tripartite funding plan.   
The private-sector sporting club ownership groups and even the collegiate athletic 
departments nationwide can lead by example partnering to set-up and manage a charitable 
foundation benefitting the long-term future of the industry, its participants and its spectators. 
Plus with it bearing a charitable status, there will be ample incentive and marketing strategies 
that can be employed to increase its value to the public and benefit to the HSE.   
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The U.K. model functions to raise money to overhaul aging stadiums and to 
provide new facilities for learning and playing the game in underprivileged metropolitan 
neighborhoods and in remote regions of the nation. In the English Premier (Soccer) 
League, the club ownership groups and the Football Association, as the NGO, have 
partnered to contribute £150 million (approximately $225 million) over the next 3 
years.320  Establishing such a high-profile fundraising role for the benefit of the sporting 
industry’s patrons, as is now the case in the U.K., is a “good news story.”  Adapting this 
to the American sporting industry, demonstrating private-sector partnership in bearing 
fiscal burden, will further support the likelihood of spectator “buy-in” to a statutorily 
enacted security fee attached to ticket purchases. 
Recommendation 7:  Promptly prepare for future use of CCTV facial recognition 
technology by addressing operational and legal concerns immediately (DHS) 
The last recommendation of this thesis, preparing for the use of CCTV facial 
recognition technology, allows time for the technology to evolve to a requisite state of 
negating or vastly minimizing the prospect of false-positive alarms. The false-positive 
alarms, as illustrated in the Analysis chapter, yield myriad operational and legal issues 
that the HSE is not yet prepared to address and overcome.   
However, it is important to note that within the private sector, products such as 
FaceTrac are quickly making advances to technology which will minimize false positive 
alarm rates. In concluding with the last of the recommendations, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the legal and operational questions regarding facial recognition CCTV 
raised in Chapter III. Each of these will need to have organized responses prepared for 
now and ready to publish when the technology “catches up,” or becomes suitable for the 
HSE protection mission to employ.   
The plethora of questions previously raised includes:  Where is the line to be 
drawn as to what citizen photo identification comparison database will be used?  Will it 
include only individuals on the No Fly List?  Will it include KSTs or an FBI, other 
federal level, or state/local LE criminal database?  What specific access will private 
320 Conn, “FA Makes £150m Pledge.”  
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sector security employees have to that database?  Even if no private sector employee 
access to that database is granted, then what is the sequence of events when the alarm 
sounds in the SOC recognizing a “match” with one of the comparison databases?  What 
of the actions to be taken?  Has any operational coordination been completed between 
federal and state/local LE levels to preclude confronting a KST only to destroy what may 
be months or years of work by another agency in monitoring or tracking that individual?   
The bottom line is that the HSE needs to prepare now for when facial recognition 
CCTV technology products are ready to be a valuable resource to the national protection 
mission and can then be utilized at SEAR 4 and 5 sporting events. Therefore, it is 
essential for the HSE to move quickly in its preparations for the coming day when the 
technological breakthrough will call for immediate implementation at SEAR 4 and 5 
sports venues. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
In order to render these recommendations a reality, several steps are necessary in 
the near term and long term future.   
The first step is for DHS to form a Working Group across Department and 
Agency borders. It is essential to remove the idea of such creative solutions from the 
abyss of the federal stove-pipe syndrome, where ideas are thought of and conceived 
simultaneously but without coordination, i.e., repeating the same efforts and wasting time 
and resources in so doing. 
This Working Group (WG) should examine the nuances of the issues raised and 
further research the shaping of the thesis recommendations. The WG will also bear the 
responsibility and authority to form a collective judgment not only regarding doctrinal 
revisions and additions, but for deriving new HSE organizational structures and working 
relationships, assessing technological capabilities, and laying the groundwork for the 
innovative funding streams recommended. These actions would tremendously serve the 
people by evaluating and planning for the future development of where, when, and how 
to stop terrorist attacks in America.   
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The WG must be expansive enough to be insightful but not bloated to the point of 
inaction or inability to move at anything more than glacial speed. Preparations are needed 
now for technology innovations on the cusp of becoming reality in the market. More 
importantly, as facility managers already perceive, it is just a matter of time before 
attacks occur at SEAR 4–5 venues. The WG must move forward with purpose. Therefore, 
representation on the WG will be needed from: 
• Professional sports league Security Directors from  MLB, NFL, NBA, 
NHL, and MLS; 
• Three select NCAA Security Directors, such as one each from the 
Southeastern Conference, the Big 10, and the Pac 12; 
• The state/local law enforcement community, such as the Association of 
Chiefs of Police, several major metropolitan Police Chiefs such as from 
New York, Boston, and Dallas, as well as  a few select State Police 
Chiefs; 
• Federal law enforcement SMEs from the FBI and JTTF; 
• Intelligence Community representation, i.e., one or two SMEs from any of 
ODNI, NSA, CIA, DHS-OI and/or NPPD;  
• The Academic community, with a representative from the two leading 
centers for sports venue security study at the University of South Carolina 
and Southern Mississippi University 
A WG of these 18–20 representatives with DHS HQ synchronization will serve as 
an excellent resource base of Subject Matter Expertise and be reflective of an industry-
wide partnership with the HSE. 
Though the thesis recommendations may incur some modicum of cost for the 
most ambitious applications, the WG can fully analyze the investment for long-term 
security. As demonstrated in Chapter III, staying ahead of the imminent next steps of the 
terrorists will be far more worthy an investment than scrambling to form a knee-jerk 
security response after many have perished at one or more of America’s soft-target SEAR 
4–5 sporting venues. 
Because even state and local agencies in the U.S. are facing austere fiscal 
climates, the burden of the training for local law enforcement and private sector security 
teams can be shared with the federal government. The WG can advocate congressional 
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action to grant private sector incentives, statutory fees, and FEMA funding for training 
venue security team employees how to use world class technology and to conduct 
training to standard in the roles as emergency first responders, as is done in the U.K. 
Such funding for training can be used by DHS for conferences and forums that continue 
to push constantly developing technology and collaboration in the security industry. With 
such equipment and SOC precision planning possible, the security workforce executing 
the operations plans must receive comparable quality training.    
The WG will also serve as the initial collaborative planning body for the 
operational partnership between federal and state/local levels. It will establish the roles 
and responsibilities for the federal embedded personnel and make determinations as to 
where these people will work daily, such as at Fusion Centers or in Police Departments. 
The WG can also complete detailed reviews of other functional and logistically practical 
aspects of implementation.    
So it is imperative that DHS establish the Working Group to explore the 
possibilities recommended in this thesis, to ensure the HSE is making its fullest effort to 
accomplish its Homeland Security protection mission.  
C. CONCLUSION 
We will always remember. We will always be proud. We will always be 
prepared, so we will always be free.  
—Ronald Reagan, 
40th U.S. president 
 
Just because a well-orchestrated, multiple coordinated IED attack has not yet 
reigned catastrophe at America’s smaller sports venues, does not mean that the United 
States Government should not take prudent, sage steps forward to prepare a defense for 
that imminent terrorist strategy. The NCTC considers this a worst case scenario, and so 
too should DHS.   
The thesis problem statement indicated that there will continue to be terrorists in 
the American homeland and there are currently potential sports venue targets that are 
vastly softer than others. The research questions diagnosed that SEAR 4–5 rated sporting 
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events are such a viable, valuable, and vulnerable soft target; that there are quantitative 
cost-benefit means available to analyze possible solutions; and that there are numerous 
public policy options available at no cost, little cost, or innovatively funded minimal 
costs to consider for implementation.   This thesis has recommended action now, both for 
mending the gaps in security in the present, as well as for preparing for well-reasoned, 
long-term solutions for the future. 
If the Department of Homeland Security is to win not only in the close-in, current 
battle against terrorism, but also in the deep, future battle against terrorism as well, then it 
must take time to recognize the status-quo of its protection mission posture as insufficient 
to meet the threat of an ever-increasingly more sophisticated enemy. Such status-quo 
recognition will illuminate where increased protection is needed today and paths forward 
tomorrow. DHS should proactively pursue and act on the recommendations provided in 
this thesis by establishing a professional Working Group to improve on the HSE 
protection mission of sports venues today and move aggressively into the future, before 
the enemy does. 
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